Hilchos Teshuva Perek 5: Self Control

פרק ה' הלכה ג'. עיקר זה עיקר גדול הוא והוא עמוד התורה והמצווה, שנאמר ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב ואת המוות ואת הרע. וכתיב ראה אנוכי נותן לפניכם היום ברכה וקללה. כלומר שהרשות בידכם, וכל שיחפוץ האדם לעשות ממעשי בני האדם עושה, בין טובים בין רעים. ומפני זה העניין נאמר מי ייתן והיה לבבם זה להם. כלומר שאין הבורא כופה בני האדם ולא גוזר עליהם לעשות טובה או רעה אלא ליבם מסור להם.

So I don't know if you can say it's mamesh b'feirush but certainly the impression you get from the Rambam is that the Rambam considers the capacity of bechira chofshis to be absolute in the sense again not what we're going to talk about not what the Rambam's going to talk about in פרק ו' הלכה ג' but absolute in the sense that as long as a person retains his bechira chofshis, he hasn't been deprived of it because of chatta'im rachamana litzlan, so a person can basically do whatever he wants. וכל שיחפוץ האדם לעשות ממעשי בני האדם עושה. This is le'afukei lichora from two alternatives that one finds. More famous and radical of the two is Rav Dessler in Michtav Me'eliyahu. Rav Dessler gives his famous mashal. כששני עממים נלחמים הנה המלחמה היא במקום מערכתם. This is Perek Beis in his Kuntres HaBechira. כששני עממים נלחמים הנה המלחמה היא במקום מערכתם. If you sort of imagine hand-to-hand combat, so then there's a point at which the forces engage.

כל מה שאחורי צבא העם האחד הוא כולו תחת רשותו ואין לו שם שום ניגוד כלל.

Whatever's beyond the front lines in one direction is totally under the control of one army and they don't encounter any opposition there. וכן מה שהוא מאחורי השני כולו ברשות השני. Now,

אם האחד ינצח פעם בקרב וידחה את השני מרחק מה אזי בהתחדש הקרב יהיה במקום שיעמדו שניהם אז.

So then the front line will have moved as many kilometers as they conquered. Now,

במקום שרכש לו הראשון שם אין עוד מלחמה כי הוא ברשותו.

Now when the front lines have been pushed forward, so these so many kilometers and now again there's no milchama transpiring there because it's secure under that army.

הרי שבפועל יש רק חזית אחת ובכוח פוטנציאלי כל שטח שתי המדינות הוא מקום הקרב.

Depending upon how the war goes, how each battle turns out, so potentially the front line could move anywhere to within the countries of the two combatants.

כן הוא גם בעניין הבחירה. היינו בנקודת פגישת האמת שלו עם האמת המדומה

toldos hasheker. Maybe we'll come back sometime and talk about that bli neder. Now this is very, very radical, very radical. Aval rov ma'asav says Rav Dessler

הם במקום שאין האמת והשקר נפגשים שם כלל. כי יש הרבה מן האמת שהאדם מחונך לעשותו ולא יעלה על הדעת כלל לעשות ההפך. וכן הרבה אשר יעשה מן הרע והשקר שלא יבחין כלל שאין ראוי לעשותו. אין הבחירה שייכת אלא בנקודה שבין צבאו של היצר הטוב לצבאו של היצר הרע.

So just as in the the the war mashal, so too there's a there's a point where the yeitzer hatov and yeitzer hara clash, where the confrontation happens. That's where a person's bechirah is, but the territory which is securely under the yeitzer hatov, a person is doing that sort of automatically, robotically, and similarly what's under what's already been conquered by the yeitzer hara. And he goes on to give examples.

הרבה נכשלים תמיד בלשון הרע מפני שהורגלו בו ולא יעלה על דעתם כלל כי רע הוא. ואותם אנשים עצמם לא יבוא לפניהם יצר הרע להציע להם מחשבת חילול שבת ביטול תפילה ציצית ותפילין וכדומה והיינו משום שבשבת ותפילה וציצית נתחנכו והורגלו כל כך עד שאין כניסה שם ליצר הרע.

And then he says, as a person as a person makes his decisions, that affects where the point, where the nekudas habechirah will be. So on the one hand, it's very radical because he drastically limits the bechirah chofshis that a person has according to Rav Dessler, drastically. On the other hand, that's partially offset by what he says here in perek gimmel that

יש הפרש גדול בין מקום נקודת הבחירה שקבעו מן השמים ובין אשר קבעו האדם בעצמו על ידי בחירותיו הקודמות.

The nekudas habechirah can be the result of kva'u min hashamayim, circumstances beyond our control, or it can be circumstances that were totally that we created, that we generated. So basically he says that even if a person has become so it has become so habitual for a person to do a certain aveirah that לדבריו של רב דסלר that he it's really not his nekudas habechirah anymore, but he's still responsible because he created that situation. He created that situation. So it's only a mitigating factor if he didn't create it, but if he created it, it's not a mitigating factor. So on the one hand, it drastically limits a person's bechirah chofshis besha'aso. On the other hand, it it magnifies the achrayus that a person has as he himself points out for every time he exercises his bechirah because according to his mahalach, so it could be what I'm doing right now, the rachmana litzlan if a person does the wrong thing and because of that he won't have his nekudas habechirah in in some area for the next ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty years, so all of that achrayus rides on what the person is doing now. So on the one hand again, it limits the application bechirah chofshis, on the other hand it it greatly, greatly magnifies the the stakes and and and the consequences and and the aftermath of bechirah chofshis now. The pshat is it's very hard to to think that the Rambam would be maskim with this. Again, is it mamash a thousand percent black and white against? I don't know, maybe yes, maybe no. Again,

כלומר שהרשות בידכם לכל שיחפוץ האדם לעשות ממעשה בני אדם עושה.

You get the impression that the Rambam would not agree with it. It doesn't mean that the Rambam doesn't think that what a person does creates momentum. Avadeh it does, but Rav Dessler thinks it creates and and momentum that a person then lav davka can control. The Rambam would agree that it creates a negative momentum which will make things... things more difficult, like the Rambam has the end of Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas. So the Rambam talks about the following progression. He says first people sit around and they talk devarim beteilim. He says the effect of talking devarim beteilim, this is what he means, the effect of talking devarim beteilim is that people become cynical. Become cynical about, if you sit around, you talk devarim beteilim, you begin to talk lashon hara about people, so you become very cynical. There's so much good to see in the world, and all a person manages to see is yene's chisaron over here and his chisronos over there. So then it makes a person cynical. Once a person becomes cynical, so then you can't compartmentalize middos, right? That was part of Rav Yisroel Salanter's whole approach is that you can't compartmentalize middos. That's why Rav Yisroel Salanter and the Baalei Mussar picked up from him. A person has to be neat, and a person has to be organized. So what's that got to do with, what's that got to do with avodas Hashem? So beyond just avoiding wasting time, it's because if a person can't be neat and organized in milei d'alma, so he's not going to be makpid on zmanim in Krias Shema and tefillah. A person can't compartmentalize middos. So a person becomes cynical, so the Rambam says so first people talk against each other. Then they begin talking against the chachamim. Then they begin talking against nevi'im, and ultimately, the Rambam, this is the Rambam, he describes this progression at the end of Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas, then ultimately people, Rachmana litzlan, talking against the Ribbono shel Olam. If a person, cynicism is the antithesis of emunah. The antithesis of emunah is cynicism. So the Rambam agrees that there is momentum in what we do. And the Rambam agrees that the consequences of whether or not a person wakes up bizrizos in the morning is not just that morning and that second. No, it affects tomorrow. It doesn't affect tomorrow unalterably. It doesn't affect tomorrow that a person won't have his bechirah chofshis tomorrow morning, but it does mean that it's going to be, he's going to be operating again, whether he'll be operating with a deficit or whether he'll be operating with the in the black. In that sense, even the Rambam will agree. Okay, so that's one lichora alternative that you find to again, to the pshat of what the Rambam's presenting here. The emes is that you do find something in the direction of Rav Dessler. I don't want, before we come, just to read. So Ramchal has the following in beginning of perek tes. Hinei mafsidei hazrizos, those things which counteract and undermine hazrizos, הם הם מגדילי העצלות, the things which increase atzlus. Vehagadol shebechulam, the most potent of all these anti-zrizos forces,

הוא בקשת המנוחה הגופנית ושנאת הטורח ואהבת העידונים בתשלום כל תנאיהם.

Person wants to, wants to take it easy, doesn't want any kind of physical exertion. He wants all the pleasures and comforts.

כי הנה אדם כזה ודאי שתכבד עליו העבודה לפני בוראו כובד גדול.

Avodas Hashem is going to become incredibly onerous for such a person.

כי מי שירצה לאכול אכילתו בכל הישוב והמנוחה ולישן שנתו בלא טורח וימאן ללכת אם לא לאיטו וכיוצא בדברים האלה הנה יקשה עליו להשכים לבתי כנסיות בבוקר או לקצר בסעודתו מפני תפילת המנחה בין הערביים או לצאת לדבר מצוה אם לא תהיה העת בוער כל שכן למהר עצמו לדבר מצוה או לתלמוד תורה.

Okay, so so far he just said if a person wants to do these things, so then it will be difficult for him, yikshe alav. Okay. But now listen to the next line. ומי שמרגיל עצמו למנהגים האלה, a person who trains himself, a person who habituates himself, these types of behavior become habitual, איננו אדון בעצמו לעשות היפך זה כשירצה. He's not sovereign over himself, he doesn't have control,

איננו אדון בעצמו לעשות הפך זה כשירצה. כי כבר נאסר רצונו במעשה ההרגל הנעשה טבע שני

because his ratzon, his will, has been arrested, it's been imprisoned in the the prison of of habit which has become an acquired second nature. So Ramchal has it here, Ramchal has it here. The sha'alah is what would Rav Dessler teina, I don't remember that Rav Dessler is metzayen this, but maybe take a look see if he is. I don't remember that that he is. Sha'alah is what would Rav Dessler teina that once you concede this so again, Ramchal says it in this context and he says it about the the habit that a person develops in terms of the spectrum of atzlus and zerizus. That's what Ramchal says. The sha'alah is, I don't know, maybe maybe what Rav Dessler would teina is that if you concede it here so then you give away the store. If it happens here so meichei taisi that that it shouldn't be true in every other example that I give. So I don't know, so maybe ilu zachinu and and Rav Dessler would comment on this, and maybe he would say, "No, this isn't a third opinion, this isn't an opinion in between in between me and the Rambam." Once you say this so then so then, you know, if you follow it through to its logical conclusion so so that's what what that's what I say in the Kuntres HaBechirah. Ayin sham, ayin sham, whether is that muchach or not. Lema'aseh, Ramchal doesn't say it everywhere. So maybe Ramchal means that certain areas, there are certain areas where habit is משל למה הדבר דומה. So there're certain substances which are more which create addiction more than than others. I don't know, if you eat you smoke rachmana litzlan, so the nicotine a person gets addicted. I don't know, you eat Cheerios for breakfast every morning, I don't know ayin sham whether a person's mamash mamash addicted to to Cheerios. So maybe the same way the Ribbono Shel Olam created the physical world that way, that there are some substances which are addiction forming and and there are others which are which are not addiction forming even if a person habitually imbibes. So maybe the same thing is true in terms of certain midos. And lich-ora, and that's why one would say Lo Ke-michtav Me-Eliyahu, that that doesn't mean that Ramchal goes all the way to to the again to this really very radical position of the Michtav Me-Eliyahu. No, but Ramchal says you have to modify somewhat the the Rambam's formulation. The Rambam himself in Perek Daled, the Rambam in Perek Daled talks about devarim chamurim, he uses such a word, the דברים שקשים לפרוש מהם. Correct, but then at the end of the perek what does he say? And at the end he says,

אף על פי שכל אלו מעכבין את התשובה אין מונעין אותה מן התשובה אלא אם עשה אדם תשובה מהן הרי זה בעל תשובה.

So it sounds like it sounds to me the exact same thing as the Ramchal. I'm not sure because just one moment, let's find a line that gives an example. Just one second. There's one line especially where he where he does talk about what you're saying. One second. But but does the Rambam say mefurash here? I mean according to Ramchal the pashas is that if a person I don't know how long it how long it takes for for the for the koach of the hergel of which Ramchal is speaking to to reach this critical level, to reach the critical point, but pashas is Ramchal would say at a certain point with all the ratzon hatov that a person will have and all the divrei hisorerus and divrei mussar and divrei kibushen so he's not going to get up early, he's not going to get up in time tomorrow morning. Right? That's what Ramchal would say. Does the Rambam does the Rambam take that final step or the Rambam will say a person can put himself in a position again? That's where we were saying from Hilchos Talmud Torah but you're right this is a much better mareh mokom. I don't think the Rambam ever takes that final step to say that lemaiseh he can't. What he's going to say is it's going to be inordinately difficult. But there's a difference between there's a difference between saying einenu adam beatzmo and saying the person is mamash in prison and between saying that that in more addicted a person becomes, the more difficult it's going to be. I thought Ramchal used a very strong lashon, prison, like someone in chains. Okay, if you say דברה תורה בלשון הבאי, okay, in hachi nami, but if you take it pshuto kemashmao, you're right. If you don't take it pshuto kemashmao so then so then you're absolutely correct. If you take it pshuto kemashmao, I'm not sure why you wouldn't, if you take it pshuto kemashmao,

מי שמרגיל עצמו למנהגות האלה איננו אדם בעצמו לעשות היפך זה כשיחפוץ.

So then that's a you juxtapose that to that kashe liphrosh mehem, there's a difference between kashe liphrosh mehem and איננו אדם בעצמו לעשות היפך זה כשיחפוץ. So different a very different lashon. Very different lashon. Further another and again so here too here too again the same point that that Rav Dessler makes in in terms of again within within his system how the consequences of every bechirah a person makes because of the fact that that he's charting not only his destiny but to the extent that our bechirah impacts our children and and and our chaverim and and the society in which we we move. So again so within the more narrow confines where Ramchal does say that and the pashas is it is much much much much more narrow, very dramatically so, but there too it means that in any of these areas where the Ribono shel Olam created addictive middos that it means that every choice a person is making is is tremendously tremendously significant. In Perek Yud Ramchal has as follows. He's explaining the difference between zehirus and nekiyus. So Ramchal says as follows:

הזהיר הוא הנזהר במעשיו ורואה שלא יחטא במה שכבר נודע לו ומפורסם אצל הכל היותו חטא אמנם עדיין איננו אדם בעצמו שלא ימשך לבו מן התאוה הטבעית שלא תטהו להורות לו היתרים באיזה דברים.

She'ein ra'utam mefureset. Vezeh,

כי אף על פי שהוא משתדל לכבוש את יצרו ולכבוש את תאוותו,

lo mipnei zeh ישנה טבעו ולא יוכל להסיר מלבו התאוה הגופנית. Can't do it, can't do it like that. And because of that, yes, there's a process of

אלא שיכבוש אותה וילך אחר החכמה ולא אחריה. אחר כל פנים חשק החומריות עושה את שלו להסיתו ולפתותו.

Omnam achar, a person cannot jump to nekiyus. Basically again, how the Ramchal defines nekiyus as basically complying with Shulchan Aruch. Right? That's what nekiyus means, that a person is mekayem what it says in the Torah, what it says in the Shulchan Aruch: קוצה ופורטה פרטי פרטותיה. And he says meforesh, ba'asher hu sham, a person cannot leapfrog to middas hanekiyus. That unless a person works on middas hazehirus, zerizus, and zehirus, he can't come lidei nekiyus because he says the taivos that a person will weaken will begin to uproot as he cultivates zehirus and zerizus. But until he does that, those taivos make it impossible for him to see clearly enough to have middas hanekiyus. I don't know, maybe he's not that narrow. I mean the Rambam lichora broader than the, I still don't think he goes as far as the Mesillas Yesharim, but it's probably not as narrow as I said a minute ago. And I think he has it at least one more time. I'm looking back at Perek 14 of Prishus here. Says the Ramchal, I'll really read the whole thing, but says the Ramchal as follows:

הנה על כל אלה ודאי שלא יחפוץ אדם בדבר הזה כיון שטובתו אינה טובה ורעתו רעה ושכל ההנאות שבעולם כמו כן אלו יתבונן בהם יראה שאפילו הטוב המדומה שבהם אינו אלא לזמן מועט והרע שיכול להוולד מהם קשה וארוך עד שלא יהיה לשום בעל שכל לשום עצמו בסכנת הרעות על רווח הטוב המועט ההוא וזה פשוט. וכשירגיל את עצמו ויתמיד בעיונו על האמת הזאת הנה מעט מעט יצא חפשי ממאסר הסכלות אשר חושך החומר אוסר אותו בו ולא יתפתה מפיתויי ההנאות הכוזבות כלל. אז ימאס בהן וידע שאין לו לקחת מן העולם אלא ההכרחי כמו שכתבתי.

That's just what he's saying it here also. So it's hard to dismiss all this as strong melitzos. But in the Rambam lichora you don't see any of this. In the Rambam lichora you don't see any of this. There is a question, I'm not going to talk about it now. I don't think we're going to talk about Perek 3 at all, but if we do maybe we'll... the Rambam almost provokes the question why bechira chofshis isn't in perek hayud-gimmel of Peirush Hamishnayos where the Rambam has the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. Here the Rambam tells us that bechira chofshis is mamash all of Torah rests on bechira chofshis. Without bechira chofshis, the Torah is nonsensical. Why do you have tzivuyim: do this, don't do this? Why do you have sachar va’onesh: you’ll get this reward, Rachmana litzlan, this punishment? The whole thing is go, go, go tell your computer that if it doesn't get to that webpage within 30 seconds, you’re gonna smash it with a hammer. It doesn't work. It doesn't work. Halacha daled.

אילו היה הבורא כופה בני אדם ולגזור עליהם לעשות להיות צדיק או רשע או אילו היה שם דבר שמושך את האדם מעיקר תולדתו לדרך מן הדרכים או למדע מן המדעות או לדעה מן הדעות או למעשה מן המעשים.

So mada min hamadaos is, beliefs, beliefs, I guess, theological, philosophical. Deiah min hadeios is what the Rambam talks about in Hilchos Deios: character traits, dispositions. Maaseh min hamaasim is clear. כמו שבודים מליבם הטיפשים הוזי שמיים. It's quite clear that the Rambam doesn't think there's any, something can be wrong but a good svara, but it happens to be wrong. Or something can be totally krum and something can be absurd. The Rambam obviously thinks that the belief in determinism is not only wrong, but basically as krum as it can be. And that's what he's saying, כמו שבודים מליבם הטיפשים. So it's something they're inventing. It's not a glatta svara which happens, not every good svara turns out to be right. Some good svaros turn out not to be right. It's not a svara which turns out to be wrong.

היאך יצוונו הנביאים עשה כך ואל תעשה כך הטיבו דרכיכם ואל תלכו אחרי רשעכם והוא מתחילת בריאתו נגזר עליו תולדתו שתמשכהו לדבר שאי אפשר לזוז ממנו ומה מקום היה לכל התורה כולה ובאיזה דין ובאיזה משפט נפרע מן הרשע או נשלם שכר לצדיק השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט. ואל תתמה ותאמר היאך יהיה האדם עושה כל מה שיחפוץ ויהיו מעשיו מסורים לו וכי יעשה בעולם דבר שלא ברשות קונו ובלא חפצו הכתוב אומר כל אשר חפץ ה' עשה בשמים ובארץ דע שהכל בחפצו יעשה ואף על פי שמעשינו מסורים לנו.

Keitzad?

כשם שחפץ היוצר להיות האש והרוח עולים למעלה והמים והארץ יורדים למטה והגלגל סובב בעיגול וכן שאר בריות העולם להיות כמנהגן שחפץ בהן כך חפץ להיות האדם ברשותו ובידו וכל מעשיו מסורים לו ולא יהיה לו לא כופה ולא מושך אלא הוא מעצמו בדעתו שנתן לו האל עושה כל שהאדם יכול לעשות.

Again, the pshat is when he says moshech, he spells it out once and pshat is that יצא מן הכלל ללמוד על הכלל כולו that it means מושך באופן שאין לזוז ממנו. It's not that the Rambam is denying, I think in Hilchos Deios he befeirush does acknowledge obviously we can have predispositions. People obviously have predispositions. And when the Rambam says that there isn't anything be'ikar toldoso that is moshech es ha'adam, it means irresistibly. It means like a magnetic attraction that is irresistible. That doesn't exist. That a person has a predisposition, that one person has a predisposition in this direction, another in that direction, so that the Rambam acknowledges.

לפיכך דנין אותו לפי מעשיו, אם עשה טובה מטיבין לו ואם עשה רעה מריעין לו. הוא שהנביא אומר: מידכם היתה זאת לכם, גם המה בחרו בדרכיהם. ובענין זה אמר שלמה: שמח בחור בילדותך ודע כי על כל אלה יביאך האלוקים במשפט. כלומר, דע שיש בידך כוח לעשות ועתיד אתה ליתן את הדין.

It'll be be-ezrat Hashem next time, but maybe one more mareh makom on the discussion in terms of behirah hofshit. So, lekhora, the following also pertains to our discussion. The famous Ibn Ezra about lo tahmod. Rabbim yitmehu, how can the Torah legislate lo tahmod? And what does the Ibn Ezra answer? He answers with his famous mashal. People are not homed to sprout wings and be able to fly. A ben kefar is not homed to marry the princess. Why? Because what people know is impossible, they're not homed to do. A person knows that he can't sprout wings, so mi-meila, a person is not homed to sprout wings and to fly. The villager knows that there is absolutely no chance that the king is going to take as his son-in-law some illiterate poor villager. So what's the nimshal? So says the Ibn Ezra, the nimshal is if a person knows that Hakadosh Barukh Hu, whatever every person has, Hakadosh Barukh Hu apportions to that person. אין אדם נוגע במוכן לחברו. And what's apportioned, what's allocated min ha-shamayim to Reuven, Shimon cannot take, Shimon can't get, and vice versa. So then a person wouldn't be homed that I wish what was his is mine. Again, it's not lo tahmod if a person wants something comparable. If I see you have a, whatever, a good car, and I wish, oh I wish I had a good car also, that's not lo tahmod. If I wish I had your car, that I wish that car which you're driving is mine, so that's lo tahmod. If I wish that I could go get a car kayoze ba-zeh, it may be a middah tovah, maybe a middah ra'ah, but it's not lo tahmod. So that's what the Ibn Ezra says. The she'eilah is like this. How does that answer the question? The peshat is the question of the Rabbim yitmehu is that lo tahmod is an instinctive reaction. Lo tahmod is, you have this, Rahmana litzlan, poor homeless person hasn't eaten a square meal in days, maybe in weeks, subsists on scraps of food which he finds in the garbage. He's wearing a threadbare shirt and it's sub-freezing weather. And he walks outside this beautiful home and he sees the fire going in the fireplace, and he sees a table set sumptuously, and people are dressed so elegantly. So he doesn't stop and think, should I, now let's see, should I be homed? No, he instinctively is homed. So the Ibn Ezra says no. If only he would have taken Philosophy of Yahadut 101, so he would, it's not a premeditated deliberate, it's an instinctive reaction. So clearly, clearly, what the Ibn Ezra means is that yesodei ha-emunah are supposed to be so internalized that our instinctive reactions reflect yesodei ha-emunah. Yesodei ha-emunah not supposed to just be something that a person checked if there's a questionnaire. They like to find out about religion in America. Do you believe such and such? Do you believe in an afterlife? Do you believe this? Do you believe that? So you check it off. So yesodei ha-emunah is supposed to be not just something that a person checks off the yes box in a questionnaire, but it's something which is so internalized that the way a person reacts, he reacts instinctively in accordance with that. But that also lechora means that let's take the example of lo sachmod, the pashas is according to the Ibn Ezra whether a person will be in compliance with lo sachmod won't be determined on the spot. That's also going to, that will be an example of what Ramchal is talking about. That that it will be a function of what deios, what hashkafos a person has internalized. If a person hasn't internalized this hashkafa of אין אדם נוגע במוכן לחברו, so then he may takei instinctively be chomed again. So as Rav Dessler says, yitachen that he'll be responsible for that, that he'll be liable for that to the degree that that's a consequence of his own prior way of thinking and living etcetera. But in terms of whether or not the bechira at that moment, so the pashas is that the Ibn Ezra again in that one case is saying something similar to what Ramchal says in terms of the effect that taivos have on us.