Relating to HKB”H; SHa’ar Habitachon Perek 3

The first question is ka-yadua whether or not to count mitzvos d'rabbanan in the minyan hamitzvos. This is a machloket between the Ba-hag and the Rambam says as follows.

והסתכל ממי שישמע לשונם נאמרו לו למשה בסיני וימנה קריאת ההלל ששיבח בו דוד עליו השלום את הקל יתברך שציווה בו משה.

So how can the Ba-hag count Hallel as a mitzvah d'oraita when and say that that mitzvah was communicated to us from HaKadosh Baruch Hu via Moshe Rabbeinu when the text of Hallel is shibe'ach bo David? So how is that possible? The Ramban says

והפליאה שאמר הרב ז"ל התבונן והתפלא איך נחשוב שקריאת ההלל ששיבח בו דוד להקל שמשה רבנו ציווה בו וגם בעיני יפלא מאמר הרב שהוא עצמו ז"ל מנה במצות תפלה שנאמר ועבדתם את השם אלקיכם.

The Rambam counts Tefillah as a mitzvah d'oraita והנה לדעתו צריך שנפרש that mi-d'oraita they were mitpallelim כל אחד ואחד כפי צחות לשונו וחכמתו and then later Chazal would kovei'a matbei'a tefillah.

וכבר ביאר הרב כל זה בפרק ראשון מהלכות תפילה ואמר מצות עשה להתפלל בכל יום ואין מנין התפלות ולא חיוב התפלה הזאת מן התורה וכן היה ממשה רבינו ועד עזרא ובית דינו עזרא ובית דינו עמדו ותקנו י"ח ברכות כדי שיהיה ערוכה בפי הכל.

Im kein why does he yitpalei on the Hallel

שנסתבר למשה בסיני שיאמרו ישראל שירה במועדיהם לקל שהוציאם ממצרים וקרע להם את הים והבדילם לעבודתו ובא דוד ותקן להם את ההלל הזה כדי שישירו בו?

Says why is that any more of a kashya on the Ba-hag than it is a kashya on the Rambam himself? How can Tefillah be d'oraita if the Anshei Knesset HaGedolah the ones who authored the text of Tefillah? So that's derabbanan. Tefillah d'oraita is a person expresses himself k'fi tzachut l'shono. Anshei Knesset HaGedolah gave a set text. So too Hallel d'oraita is we express ourselves k'fi tzachut l'shoneinu and David HaMelech gave a text which then was instituted as the text. So why is the Rambam so amazed at the Ba-hag? This is a very, very strong kashya here. So I don't know but maybe the following: you have in the Gemara in Berachot. Again this we're mentioning as a mashal, not as not as directly relating because it's not talking about Hallel. The Gemara has in Berachos lamed gimel

ההוא דנחית קמיה דרבי חנינא אמר האל הגדול הגבור והנורא והאדיר והעזוז והירא החזק והאמיץ והודאי והנכבד המתין לו עד דסיים כי סיים אמר ליה סיימתינהו לכולהו שבחי דמרך למה לי כולי האי אנן הני תלת דאמרינן הגדול הגבור והנורא אי לאו דאמרינהו משה רבינו באורייתא ואתו אנשי כנסת הגדולה ותקנינהו בתפילה לא הוינן יכולין למימרהו ואת אמרת כולי האי ואזלת.

So again, this is a mashal, only a mashal b'alma that by Shemoneh Esrei Rabbi Chanina was makpid not to add on to the adjectives of Gadol, Gibbor, and Nora. That the only way we can say adjectives are, again this is also a question which we're not getting into now, that we have the double authority of A, אמרינהו משה רבינו באורייתא, B, ואתו אנשי כנסת הגדולה ותקנינהו בתפילה. Why do you, why do you need both? Okay, whatever. So a mashal. But with that mashal in mind, let's take a look here at the Gemara in Pesachim קי"ז עמוד א. If you see אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל on five lines before they branch out to the left. אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל Shir ShebaTorah Rashi Oz Yashir Rashi.

משה וישראל אמרוהו בשעה שעלו מן הים. והלל זה מי אמרו?

Who who's the author of Hallel HaMitzri?

אמרו נביאים שביניהן תקנו להן לישראל שיהו אומרים אותו על כל פרק ופרק ועל כל צרה וצרה שלא תבוא עליהם ולכשנגאלים אומרים אותו על גאולתם.

Tanya, היה Rabbi Meir

אומר כל תשבחות האמורות בספר תהלים כולן דוד אמרן שנאמר כלו תפלות דוד בן ישי אל תקרי כלו אלא כל אלו. הלל זה מי אמרו? רבי יוסי אומר אלעזר בני אומר משה וישראל אמרוהו בשעה שעלו מן הים. וחלוקין עליו חבריו לומר שדוד אמרו.

v'nir'in devarav midivreihem. Why?

אפשר ישראל שחטו את פסחיהן ונטלו לולביהן ולא אמרו שירה?

So al korchacha it has to be that Yisrael, that Moshe v'Yisrael amruhu. Because אפשר ישראל שחטו את פסחיהן ונטלו לולביהן, how can that be? Right so there's one obvious question here, just in the simple p'shat in the Gemara. Again the Gemara k'she'atzmo we would really need to understand what this svara is. Why is it, why is it so obvious that the shechitas hapesach and netilas lulav has to be accompanied by Hallel? I think Rashi when the Gemara is quoted earlier, I think Rashi there comments on it, not l'gufo shel inyan, that's not what we're going to focus on. What does Rashi say there? Rashi gives a very very enigmatic comment back on tzed-hei. He says כיון דדבר מצוה הוא טעון הלל. So I don't know, not too many people said Hallel this morning when they put on tefillin. So what's that כיון דדבר מצוה הוא? Okay, so Iyan Sham, whatever Rashi means. But so that's one question p'shat the Gemara which which we're not going to deal with now. The other question is zal zein azoy, whatever the svara of אפשר ישראל שחטו את פסחיהן ונטלו לולביהן, but meheicha taysi was this Hallel? meheicha taysi, how does that prove that Hallel HaMitzri was said? They said whatever they said, they said whatever they said. But as an answer we're going to suggest is not the only answer by any stretch of the imagination, but ve'itachen, maybe the Rambam learned pshat in this Gemara that Rebbe Yossi is saying again, this is that he thinks there's a sevarah peshuta, it's compelling that shchitas hapesach and netilas lulav have to be accompanied by Hallel. Okay, and there's another assumption here also. And that assumption is, and Hallel to praise Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not something which can again, here's where the mashal from the Gemara in Berachos it's only a mashal, with the mashal from the Gemara in Berachos comes into play that what Rebbe Yossi is saying is, it can't be that Hallel is something which is left to k'fi tzachus leshonenu. To praise Hakadosh Baruch Hu, the line between saying Hallel and saying inappropriate praise is such a tenuous line, it's such a delicate balance, that the pshat in Rebbe Yossi is that he's assuming it can't be that there's a mitzvas Hallel without a fixed text. So if you're going to tell me that the fixed text for Hallel is first introduced by Dovid Hamelech, so then how did they say Hallel the whole time until Dovid Hamelech came around? From Matan Torah until Dovid Hamelech, so

אפשר ישראל שחטו את פסחיהם ונתנו ללויים ולא אמרו שירה.

So if that's the case, so then that would be the answer on the Ramban's kashya. The Ramban says, what doesn't the Rambam understand? The Rambam himself explained a similar phenomenon by tefillah according to his approach. That tefillah is d'oraisa at a certain point, for the reasons the Rambam himself describes in Perek Aleph Hilchos Tefillah, so Chazal would koveia a set matbei'a tefillah. So the Rambam holds no, tefillah takeh l'd'oraisa doesn't need a set text. Here the Gemara is telling us אפשר ישראל שחטו פסחיהם ונתנו ללויים ולא אמרו שירה and therefore it must be that the Hallel of the set text that we know, that Hallel must date back to when you first have a mitzvas Hallel. So could be that that's a mahalach in the Rambam. In the inyan, more or less be'oso inyan, that there is a tendency that we sometimes have, that people sometimes have, that in looking very sincerely to relate to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so people try to humanize Hakadosh Baruch Hu, try to make that challenge of relating to the Ribono Shel Olam one that they can relate to more easily. So there's a tendency that people sometimes have to humanize Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And it's if a person Rachmana Litzlan goes far enough off course in following that tendency, it can mamash lead to kefirah Rachmana Litzlan. Hakadosh Baruch Hu isn't a person. Hakadosh Baruch Hu isn't a person. And the solution to the challenge of relating to Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not to try to Rachmana Litzlan. So how do we deal with the challenge of relating to Hakadosh Baruch Hu then? So the Rav has a footnote, I think it's in his essay Uvikashtem Misham. He doesn't formulate the question, he's not explicitly addressing this question, but what he says does address the question. He talks about how people distort the Rambam's teachings in Moreh Nevuchim and how they attribute to the Rambam the Aristotelian position of thinking that the world, dehino people, have love for Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but it's not reciprocated because rachmana litzlan Hakadosh Baruch Hu is sort of detached. And he says that it's from the yesodos of yahadus that that's not true. But here comes the crucial distinction, and he refers to the matbe'a, he refers to the psukim, matbe'a, matbe'a hatefilla. So many psukim speak of me'ahavas Hashem eschem and we say it in tefilla. In Navi, ki ach, how does the pasuk go? Haftara, no. Ach Esav leYaakov, vesEsav saneisi, vesYaakov ahavti, so something, something more or less along those lines. So what does it mean? So lichora, so how do when we say that, so how do we mean that? When we talk about, when we say every morning ahava rabba ahavtanu, ahavas olam ahavtanu, אהבת עולם בית ישראל עמך אהבת. So what does that mean? How are we supposed to understand that, and how are we supposed to intend that? On the one hand, that's a yesod gadol like the Rav says. M'idach gisa, again, we can't humanize Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So what does it mean? So lichora what it means, and you'll take a look in that footnote, you know, I think, I think everything we're saying is except for one hosafa at the end is there. Whenever we talk about Hakadosh Baruch Hu, whenever we describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so the Rambam and others also, everyone says this, everyone says this. Those who are coming from the yodei chein, who are coming from al pi kabbala say the same in this respect as the Rambam also. That whenever we describe, we're describing again not Hakadosh Baruch Hu, we're describing Hakadosh Baruch Hu's ways of interacting with the world. Never describing Hakadosh Baruch Hu k'she'lo atzmo. That's a yesod gadol. We can't, we don't have the capacity to understand Hakadosh Baruch Hu k'she'lo atzmo, to know Hakadosh Baruch Hu k'she'lo atzmo, על אחת כמה וכמה to define Hakadosh Baruch Hu k'she'lo atzmo. And that's what the Rambam famously explains, that everything we say about Hakadosh Baruch Hu is negative. We just say that he's incorporeal, he doesn't have a body, he's infinite, he's non-finite, etc., because we can't give any definition, that's beyond us. When we do describe, when we talk about רחום וחנון ארך אפים ורב חסד ואמת, so we're describing the way we perceive Hakadosh Baruch Hu interacting in the world. And it's on that level that we speak of ahava rabba, of ahavas olam, of me'ahavas Hashem eschem. All that again is on the level of describing Hakadosh Baruch Hu's interactions with the world. And that's why again when one says kavyachol, what kavyachol means is again that it's not a description of Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is angry? No, people are angry. Those are categories that we're borrowing from human experience. So when you say it about Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so לעולם יהא לשון זה שגור בפינו kavyachol kavyachol kavyachol, what it means is again that it's not a description of Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself. if one is saying Hakadosh Baruch Hu such and such you add kavyachol which means that we're describing again the way we perceive his interaction in the world. And it's on that level, the Rav says, it's on that level that that's the only level on which we can talk but that's okay, that's also the only level on which we live and it's on that level that we talk about אהבת עולם בית ישראל עמך אהבת and the Ahavah Rabbah Ahavtanu. But we're not defining and talking about even with a kavyachol it doesn't give us license to engage in any anthropomorphism. Again, with a kavyachol, so we find in the Chumash Hakadosh Baruch Hu is angry, by Maamrei Chazal that it makes Hakadosh Baruch Hu happy, it makes Hakadosh Baruch Hu sad. So with a kavyachol, so then a person can speak of these anthropomorphisms. But even with a kavyachol a person can never, should never ever Rachmana litzlan, regardless of of what something may seem to mean literally, a person can never say with a kavyachol that kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't know something or kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu is imperfect or such lashonos we can't even, even with a kavyachol one can't say that. The kavyachol is when we're describing middos which we're supposed to describe because we need to emulate them. So kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu's angry, kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu's happy, so the kavyachol is to remind us that we can only describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu's interactions in the world and we realize that we're not describing, defining him himself because ilu yedativ heyisiv because הקדוש ברוך הוא הוא ודעתו אחד, so how can we claim to know or understand him? It's a very important yesod. That's also why Chazal tell us in the Gemara Chagigah that a person can't think about what was before, before briyas haolam, because before briyas haolam, so then by definition a person is trying to understand and talk about Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself as opposed to Hakadosh Baruch Hu as he reveals himself in the world, as he interacts with the world, and that is beyond the the limits of of human capacity. Okay, maybe just one or two, just to highlight one or two passages here in the Chovos Halevavos. I don't remember exactly where we left off, but I think it was around perek shelishi. The Rabbeinu Bachya is describing what components need to be present for a person to have genuine bitachon in Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So the first thing he mentions is that a person should recognize within Hakadosh Baruch Hu everything he discussed in the previous perek of that Hakadosh Baruch Hu possesses, as it were, all the criteria, everything, all the qualities one would look for in him in whom one places one's trust. Then he says, very interestingly, the fourth, the second one he says is that a person should... A person should genuinely have bitachon. Unfortunately sometimes we have a mentality, the story is a woman's husband is sick. So they go to the doctor and the doctor says, "well, it's a very serious illness, but we can do such and such." And the doctor's treating him and he's getting worse and worse. And finally the wife says to the doctor, "Doctor, is it time to pray yet?" dehaynu that we only pray when, as long as we think we're in control and we can do something. So as long as she thinks the doctor... so "Doctor, is it time to pray yet?" So the third of the hakdamos which Rabbeinu Bachya has, the third of the components which need to be present is that a person's bitachon should be solely in Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And the fourth one is very fascinating. Rabbeinu Bachya says a person can't have bitachon or can't be deserving of having his bitachon responded to if he's not medakdek b'mitzvos. Can't be, can't be that a person is gonna say, "I have bitachon in Hakadosh Baruch Hu" and maybe even psychologically he does have bitachon. But it says, how can it be that... He says Dovid Hamelech says בטח בה' ועשה טוב. It can't be that a person, it's a tarti d'sasri for a person to feel and speak of bitachon if he's not medakdek b'mitzvos. עשה רצונו כרצונך כדי שיעשה רצונך כרצונו. agav here in the Chovos Halevavos is mashma in this perek לכאורה דלא כהחזון איש. Chazon Ish very famously says in his, in his essay about the emuna bitachon that he thinks it's a complete ta'us what the velt says that bitachon means that vet zein gut, meaning vet zein gut on our terms in, according to our definition, it'll be good. The Chazon Ish says that that's absolutely wrong. He says bitachon means that it will be good, but lav davka good from Hakadosh Baruch Hu's vantage point. Whatever's gonna be is gonna be good from Hakadosh Baruch Hu's vantage point. Does that mean that it's gonna conform, that it's gonna correspond to what we're able to perceive as good? lav davka says the Chazon Ish. He thinks the whole thing is a complete, complete ta'us. I think the velt says Rav Yisrael Salanter held, held like what the Chazon Ish is polemicizing against. That through bitachon na, taka means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu will be memalei a person's bakashos. But it sounds like that here in the Chovos Halevavos. In the Chovos Halevavos it sounds לכאורה דלא כהחזון איש because he says like this:

ההקדמה הרביעית שתהיה השגחתו חזקה והשתדלותו גדולה לקיים מה שחייבו בו הבורא מעבודתו ולעשות מצותיו ולהזהר מאשר הזהירו ממנו כפי מה שהוא מבקש כדי שיהיה הבורא מסכים לו במה שהוא בוטח עליו בו.

sefarim acherim but it's fundamentally the same:

כפי מה שהוא מבקש שיהיה הבורא לו במה שהוא בוטח עליו בו.

I think I checked Rav Kappach's translation, I don't remember, I think it was the same but I'm not positive. The same in terms of substance.

כמו שאמרו רבותינו ז"ל עשה רצונו כרצונך כדי שיעשה רצונך כרצונו.

So again the mishna in Avos itself you could have given different pshatim to it, but it sounds like the Chovos Halevavos is saying that's what it means. That you have your ratzon, a person wants to be matzliach in a certain area, so bitachon taka means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, if a person is an emes'dike ba'al bitachon, that does translate into, presumably if what he wants is reasonable, that... not like the position which the Chazon Ish is forcefully articulates. Then in the context of the Hakdama Chamishis, Hakdama Chamishis again the fifth component, the fifth thing a person has to be aware of, again has to be aware that Hakadosh Baruch Hu possesses all the qualities of someone in whom you would trust. Person has to be aware that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is constantly mashgiach, person has to have exclusive bitachon in Hakadosh Baruch Hu, a person has to be medakdek in mitzvos, and then the fifth is to realize that everything comes from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Some things come directly, some things come through intermediaries. But even for intermediaries it's really Hakadosh Baruch Hu pulling the strings. Dehainu, the Chovos Halvavos explains, let's say Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants a person to have twenty million dollars. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu can make the person find a lottery ticket on the street and then the next day lo and behold he wins the jackpot and has twenty million dollars, or Hakadosh Baruch Hu can give him an idea and he works very hard developing the idea and goes into business and builds a business and gradually through a lot of hard work over the course of many years he has the hatzlacha and earns the twenty million dollars. Hakadosh Baruch Hu has different ways of, but a person should realize that both are totally from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Sometimes Hakadosh Baruch Hu puts lots of intermediate causes between himself and the result, sometimes it's much more direct. Then the Chovos Halvavos has a fascinating discussion of given the fact that everything is from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, given the fact that כל מזונותיו של אדם קצובים לו, so why is it that we don't live on mon all the time? Why is it that we have to go to college and get a job and no it seems like it would be a lot easier to just live off of mon, so why isn't that takeh the way the world works? Again, so this lishitoso again the Chovos Halvavos says that a person through his hishtadlus is going to get what Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants for him. He's not going to get a penny more, he's not going to get a penny less. So ebaizeh, if that's what I'm going to get, so then my hishtadlus isn't going to be gorem. So if that's the case why not just give it to me without all the hishtadlus? Again, the question is as significant, the assumption, the understanding on which the question is based is as significant as the answers. So he gives two answers. One answer is he says that hishtadlus for parnassa is a nisayon. It's a nisayon that a person should pursue parnassa according to halacha, according to Torah. There's lots of again when it seems to us as though kochainu ve'otzem yadeinu, so there can be all kinds of nisyonos, all kinds of nisyonos, all kinds of opportunities to cheat, all kinds of opportunities to do things which are shelo k’din in pursuit of one's parnassa. And that's what it is. And basically having parnassa is making hishtadlus for parnassa is Hakadosh Baruch Hu, that's one of the areas, that's one of the in which Hakadosh Baruch Hu chooses to let us exercise our bechirah chofshis whether we're going to do things, whether we're going to live al pi Torah. The second one he says, based on the mishnah in Pirkei Avos of

יפה תלמוד תורה עם דרך ארץ שיגיעת שניהם משכחת עון,

and again the derech eretz in that context means the hishtadlus for parnassa that a person makes, that

יפה תלמוד תורה עם דרך ארץ שיגיעת שניהם משכחת עון וכל תורה שאינה עם מלאכה סופה בטלה וגוררת עון,

that most people are programmed that if they don't have the shibud of hishtadlus for parnassa so they get themselves into trouble and that a person is supposed to be busy, יגיעת שניהם משכחת עון. That's why lichoara it's actually nogaya halacha lemaaseh. And let's say a person is going to make his hishtadlus for parnassa in a way that again it would still be reasonable hishtadlus even though he's very much minimized it. If a person's hishtadlus for parnosse is a job that pays ten dollars an hour, he can't say, well, I'll work three hours a day and that's my hishtadlus for parnosse. But let's say a person, ich veis, he has a business where he tries to sell things to certain clients or sort of work on a type of commission basis and you make one or two sales, you hit it big, and there's no direct even bederech hateva there isn't a direct correlation between the hours invested because he's not a salaried worker. You can hit it big in a few hours, you can have a long dry spell also. So the shaile is: can a person with genuine bitachon say, well, I'll work four, five hours a day making calls, trying to create the sale, trying to match up two people and get a commission on the deal and I'll work so many hours a day but I'm not going to work forty, fifty, sixty hours a week and a person has that genuine sense of bitachon? So lichora, in addition to everything else that the Chovos Halevavos requires, the answer, part of the answer halacha l'maaseh is, what's he going to do with the extra time? If a person is legitimately going to have that bitachon, so what's he going to do with the extra time? If the extra time is he's going to take it easy and he's going to coast a little bit, so then that's not what bitachon is there for. A person is supposed to be yageia, that's what you see from the Mishna in Avos that

יפה תלמוד תורה עם דרך ארץ שיגיעת שניהם משכחת עוון. כל המקבל עליו עול תורה מעבירין ממנו עול דרך ארץ,

a person has to have an ol, a person is, and having an ol means a person is yageia. That's what Chazal are telling us is how a person is supposed to live his life. He's supposed to be yageia, he's supposed to have an ol to the degree that if this person were to work six hours a day instead of eight hours a day, and again in terms of hishtadlus it makes sense, it can work at six hours a day, again if he'll have hatzlacha. It can work at six hours a day, so the shaile is what's he going to do with the extra two, three, four hours that he saves? If he's going to go to the Beis Medrash and really be learning for those two, three, four hours, he's going to be osek in other inyanei mitzvos, so then lichora that's a legitimate cheshbon. He's being yotze his chiyuv hishtadlus. But let's say he doesn't have the zitzfleisch, he's not going to, there's only so many hours a day that he's going to learn productively. So then better he should be working more and even if he's working more he's earning extra money, so he'll put a cap for how much money he takes for himself and he'll give, and he should give extra tzedaka. But just to work less if that yegia is not going to be redirected, if it's just going to minimize the quotient of yegia in a person's life, it's not going to redirect it in terms of the balance between yegiat shneihem, so then bitachon isn't intended, we're not supposed to rely on bitachon in that context. Okay bli neder, im yirtze Hashem next week we'll learn some inyanei Erev Pesachim. Is there any possibility Sunday? Is there a time which is shaveh l'chol nefesh later in the day on Sunday? 5:00, 6:00, who could come at 6:00 on Sunday? Everyone who can come at 6:00 can come at 5:00, anyone else come at 5:00 also? We should stick at 6:00. So let's say bli neder then 6:00 Sunday.