Hil. Yesodei HaTorah 1:6

In Sefer HaMitzvot Mitzvat Aseh Aleph shene'emar anochi Hashem elokecha. The Rambam says that anochi Hashem elokecha knowing metziut Hashem is a mitzvat aseh and in his list of taryag it's of course the first of the taryag mitzvot. In Sefer HaMitzvot Mitzvat Aseh Aleph the Rambam has as follows: המצוה הראשונה היא הציווי שציוונו להאמין באלוהות and again so we already mentioned the Chaim Heller's he'arah in terms of the translation that yitachen it should be leda

והוא שנאמין וגם שנדע שיש שם עילה וסיבה הוא פועל לכל הנמצאות והוא אמרו יתברך אנכי ה' אלהיך.

Now ובסוף גמרא מכות אמרו תרי"ג מצות נאמרו למשה מסיני. Mai kra?

תורה צוה לנו משה. כלל מנין תורה גימטריא והקשו על זה ואמרו תורה בגימטריא הכי הוי שש מאות ואחת עשרה הוי.

Ay so you're left with a discrepancy of two. Torah is 611 but

תרי"ג מצות נאמרו למשה מסיני? והיתה התשובה אנכי ולא יהיה מפי הגבורה שמענום. הנה כבר התבאר לך כי אנכי ה' מכלל שש מאות ושלש עשרה מצות והוא ציווי באמונה ובידיעה כמו שביארנו.

So the Rambam says again the Rambam knowing that the Bahag as is often the case the Rambam Sefer HaMitzvot is polemicizing with Bahag knowing that the Bahag didn't count anochi as a mitzvah and that this is somewhat controversial the Rambam says I'll prove it to you from a Ma'amar Chazal that Chazal did count anochi in the minyan taryag because the famous gemara in Makkot says that תורה צוה לנו משה. תורה צוה לנו משה morasha kehillat yaakov. So ay so Torah is only 611 where are the other two? The answer is no for 611 is תורה צוה לנו משה and אנכי ולא יהיה מפי הגבורה שמענום. So 611 plus anochi velo yihye 613. Ad kan devarav. So the Ramban in his defense of the Bahag says no says adaraba that gemara the Bahag would say contradicts the Rambam because if you look at the dibros of anochi velo yihyeh there's more than two mitzvot in it. You have anochi. Let's say if you go to the Rambam's minyan hamitzvot. In the Rambam's minyan hamitzvot so you have more than two mitzvot in the dibros of anochi velo yihyeh. You have anochi lo yihye lecha לא תעשה לך פסל לא תשתחוה להם ולא תעבדם. That's five no? Right? anochi lo yihye lo ta'ase lo tishtachave lo ta'ovdem. So you have five. So adaraba so maybe says according to the Bahag maybe you can learn as follows: anochi doesn't isn't a mitzvah. Says לא יהיה לך ולא תעשה. Again taking lo yihye lecha like the view in the Mechilta that Rashi quotes that it's about having idols and lo ta'ase is about manufacturing idols so maybe the Bahag thinks that those two are really one count as one mitzvah. Idols. Idols. Either to have i.e. own or to manufacture and then the other is on avodah zarah and and the Bahag doesn't break down into two separate lavin לא תשתחוה להם ולא תעבדם. So he says adaraba so if you don't count anochi says ech shehu you can maybe maybe calculate that in the two dibros of אנכי ולא יהיה לך you only have two mitzvot. But according to the Rambam that gemara is a stira to the Rambam's own minyan hamitzvot. עד כאן דברי הרמב"ן. So there's an amazing amazing Meshech Chochma here. mamash hafle vafeleh. Meshech Chochma says as follows and and he he makes a comment he says that that mishnat haRambam he says is consistent Sefer HaMitzvot, Yad HaChazaka, Moreh Nevuchim mikol miksha achat he says. The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim has a very very interesting and different interpretation of what it means that אנכי ולא יהיה מפי הגבורה שמענום. We generally understand that when we when we learn that gemara so we understand it means there's a difference of opinion in Chazal whether or not whether or not Klal Yisrael heard all aseres hadibros or whether Klal Yisrael only heard the first two of the aseres hadibros and the rest were were only communicated to Moshe Rabbeinu and then Moshe Rabbeinu. shema'anum and Gevurah here is as a kinuy for Hakadosh Baruch Hu and everything else was תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהלת יעקב. That's the way we generally understand and we're in good company. That's clearly how the Ramban understood the Gemara as well. The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim says no, that's not the pshat. Gevurah here doesn't mean Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Gevurah means gevuras hamofes. And what it means is, the Rambam says that for all of the mitzvos we're dependent upon the tzivuy Hashem which came על ידי משה רבינו. But for אנכי ולא יהיה לך, not the dibros of אנכי ולא יהיה לך. For the mitzvos of אנכי ולא יהיה לך, we don't need the ציווי על ידי משה רבינו as it were because those are truths which can be established על ידי מופתים שכליים. And that's what it means אנכי ולא יהיה לך מפי הגבורה שמענום means what was mechudash Moshe Rabbeinu takeh todas Taryag Mitzvos. What was mechudash as it were in what Moshe Rabbeinu told us that we wouldn't know on our own and and be on equal standing with Moshe Rabbeinu was 611 of those Taryag. But when it came not to the dibros of Anochi and lo yihiyeh lecha, when it came to the mitzvos of Anochi and lo yihiyeh lecha, mitzvos which can be known על ידי מופת שכלי, so there mipi hagevura not מפי הקדוש ברוך הוא, מפי גבורת מופת שמענום. We can understand them, שמע בכל לשון שאתה שומע, not excuse me, sh'ma in terms of lashon havana, not in terms of auditory sense. So says the Meshech Chochma, so it's gevaldig. So it's gevaldig. So that's the Rambam l'shitaso. That's the rayah the Rambam's bringing, that the way the Rambam learns pshat in that Gemara in Makkos, so that Gemara in Makkos is not talking about the dibros of Anochi and and lo yihiyeh lecha. That Gemara in Makkos is talking about the mitzvos of Anochi and lo yihiyeh lecha. So it's mamish an offenah Gemara, that's what the Rambam's saying, that Anochi Chazal clearly reckon that within the minyan Taryag. The Ramban l'shitaso, the Ramban l'shitaso so we mentioned, we didn't mention, but the Ramban clearly in in a few places in Parshas Bo and and on the Aseres Hadibros, so the Ramban consistently says the mitzvah is not leida as distinct from leha'amin, leida u'leha'amin. So then אנכי ולא יהיה לך wouldn't be in a separate category than anything else because the mitzvah leha'amin. So that's the case. So the Ramban understands the Gemara of Anochi that Anochi v'lo yihiyeh refer to the dibros of Anochi v'lo yihiyeh. So that's the kasha that he asks on the Rambam. Mamish a gevaldige Meshech Chochma. Okay. There is a very famous question on on the Rambam raised by Rabbi Chisdai Crescas of isn't it circular to have Anochi as a mitzvah? That before you can have a mitzvah you have to acknowledge a metzaveh. So it's it's a precondition for Torah, it can't be part of Torah. That doesn't make it less important, arguably it makes it more important. I don't know if it can be made more important than it is. But again, not that Rabbi Chisdai Crescas is saying that there's anything optional about it, but just saying that what's axiomatic to Torah, sort of like Rav Chaim Vital about the middos, not that it's less important, but what's axiomatic to Torah isn't counted in the minyan hamitzvos of Torah. So too a metzaveh is axiomatic to the notion of mitzvah. So how can you say there's a mitzvah to acknowledge the metzaveh? That's the famous kasha which he asks in Or Hashem. So there were more than two but two basic answers that that are given. One is again drawing attention to the fact that the Rambam says that the mitzvah is leida, not simply leha'amin, and the tayna or the circularity which which Rabbi Chisdai Crescas criticizes the Rambam for is is removed, is broken, because once you believe, so then there's a metzaveh. So that what's axiomatic is in place. Then the mitzvah is leida. He, capital H, in whom you believe has commanded you that there's a mitzvah that you shouldn't be content just with believing, but you should know it על ידי מופת שכלי. That's one answer on Rav Chasdai Crescas's question. The second answer is that the mitzvah includes not only metzius Hashem but certain details about Hashem, basically the first four of the yud gimmel ikkarim. Not just to know Hashem, but to know that Hashem is יחיד ואין יחידות כמוהו, to know that Hashem is אינו גוף ולא ישיגוהו משיגי הגוף, to know that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is rishon ve'acharon. That that's part of the mitzvah. And again, there's there the already there's no circularity. A person can believe can know a metzaveh but lav davka that he knows these crucial theological details about the metzaveh. So both of these answers seem so so strong and so compelling that that you wonder ודקארי מאי קארי ליה. So perhaps as follows, I don't know, I'm not I don't know the sefer so it could be in context that all this is totally wrong. But I don't know, out of context I think it's good. In context, b'ezras Hashem you have to go check and see. There is a famous Ibn Ezra in Aseres Hadibros where he quotes Yehuda Halevi.

שאלני רבי יהודה הלוי מנוחתו כבוד למה הזכיר אנכי ה׳ אלהיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים ולא אמר שעשיתי שמים וארץ ואני עשיתיך. וזאת הייתה תשובתי אליו דע כי אין מעלות בני אדם שוות באמונתם בלבם שהם מאמינים בשם הנכבד,

excuse me,

שהם מאמינים בשם הנכבד כי רבים מאמינים להשמעות אזנים שיאמר להם אדוניהם ככה ולמעלה מהם שראו זה כתוב בדברי התורה שנתן ה׳ למשה. ואם יבוא אפיקורוס לערער כי אין אלהים ישימו ידיהם לפיהם כי לא ידעו להשיב ואשר נשאו לבו ללמוד חכמות,

et cetera, מדרכי השם יכיר את המאציל וידע את השם. So kitzer maise the Ibn Ezra says, he says people's people are not all on the same level. There's a whole spectrum. He says some people they believe in Hashem because preis a servant his master told him to believe in Hashem. A child his parents told him to believe in Hashem. And some say this is sort of a you know sort of a precursor to the you know to the to the joke about the Brisker with the apikores that it's a meforesh Rambam. So the Ibn Ezra says and others believe because it's a meforesh pasuk. It says in the Torah Anochi Hashem Elokecha. So it's the Ibn Ezra deserves deserves credit for it. And then he says others maskilim you know maybe with more of a of a capacity and a philosophical bent so they know Hakadosh Baruch Hu midarkei Hashem. Midarkei Hashem in the world all the chochma in the world they're able to to reconstruct to figure out Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence. So basically says the Ibn Ezra his answer to Rabbi Yehuda Halevi was that אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים is דבר שוה לכל נפש. That everyone can know Hakadosh Baruch Hu on that basis but not everyone living a few thousand years after berias ha'olam is going to be able to recognize that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is אשר עשיתי שמים וארץ. So עד כאן דבריו של the Ibn Ezra. So that so what emerges is a fascinating machlokes then between the Ibn Ezra and the Rambam. Now if you come back to the Rambam so the Rambam says the mitzvas asei is leida and again we explained already that leida within the Mishnas HaRambam means על ידי מופת שכלי. So that means the Rambam here pays us a tremendous compliment each and every one of us a tremendous compliment. He says again a mitzvah a mitzvah like the the Ohr Sameiach explains but he says it so well but but obviously it has to be like this he can't say different. A mitzvah has to be a דבר שוה לכל נפש. There's no such thing as being metzuveh in a mitzvah which is just in and of itself beyond one's capacity על אחת כמה וכמה there's no such thing as a mitzvah which is beyond the capacity. capacity of eighty, ninety percent of people. If it's a mitzvah, it means that we all have the capacity to fulfill it. So the Rambam clearly thinks in terms of what he how he gauges our capacity. He says our capacity again, and that means each and every one of us. Each and every one of us have the capacity lada'at, have the capacity to understand על ידי מופת שכלי מציאות השם. And the Ibn Ezra says lav davka. He says a lot of a lot of fine ehrliche Yidden, but I don't know if they necessarily all have this capacity to be able to know על ידי מופת שכלי. So now with that, that's a fascinating machlokes. With that, you come back to Hasdai Crescas. Yitachen that with one more hakdama that we discussed, what was it last week maybe? I forget when it was. That the Rambam says that to be nitpas, again we commented on the fact that the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim they don't all appear in Minyan HaMitzvos, at first glance very, very jarring. And we said no, you have to understand, we have to understand what the musag of a mitzvah is and what what is classified as a mitzvah, and realize that because a mitzvah has its own sort of definition, lav davka that everything axiomatic, fundamental, mandatory is encapsulated in a mitzvah. And specifically, that the Rambam doesn't have belief in techiyas hameisim, doesn't have belief in Melech HaMashiach, doesn't have belief in Torah Min HaShamayim as a mitzvah in the Minyan Taryag. So what's the pshat? So what's emunah as opposed to yedi'ah? The Rambam says that's not that's not to be classified, again, formally as a mitzvah. So let's assume that Hasdai Crescas agrees with the Ibn Ezra, right? And Hasdai Crescas, so then if he agrees with the Ibn Ezra, so then you understand. So the teretz everyone gives to the Rambam is: what don't you understand, Hasdai Crescas? The Rambam wasn't saying the mitzvah is is to believe. You're right, that's circular. You have to believe in a metzaveh in order to have a mitzvah. The Rambam said the mitzvah is to know. But Hasdai Crescas doesn't like that. He agrees with the Ibn Ezra. Lo yitachen that that's the mitzvah. That's beyond the reach of too many people. It's beyond the reach of too many people. So what does the definition of the mitzvah have to be? The definition of the mitzvah has to be to believe. So that's already that's already circular. And in terms of why he doesn't like the second answer of the Prishah, so again, so there mah nafshach. If if it's to know, it's the same objection. If it's to believe, so then there yitachen that he's maskim with the Rambam that—but I'm not sure about that that last part. But in terms of the the first teretz, lichora that's the pshat in in Hasdai Crescas. There is the the famous story with the the Ba'al Shem Tov and one of the contemporary Gedolei Yisrael who wasn't necessarily favorably inclined based on the stories he he had been hearing. So the way the story goes is that this gadol, one of the gedolei hador, met the Ba'al Shem Tov and said to him: they say that you can read people's mind, so tell me what I'm thinking. Tell me what I'm thinking. So the Ba'al Shem Tov says to him: you're thinking about אנכי ה' אלקיך שמע ישראל ה' אלקינו ה' אחד. That's what you're thinking. So he says: hah, wrong! It's not true. So the Ba'al Shem Tov says: a gadol b'Yisrael, a manhig b'Yisrael, and he's not thinking... Then again apparently he had some doubts as to what the Baal Shem Tov knew and didn't know. So he says to the Baal Shem Tov, tell me what's the din if you daven Mincha on Rosh Chodesh and you forget Ya'aleh V'yavo. So the Baal Shem Tov says it doesn't make a difference. It doesn't make a difference what the din is. He says what do you mean it doesn't make a difference what the din is? He says you tell me, he says, even if they repeat Shemoneh Esrei, they'll forget it again. He says in my Chassidus, how can I forget it in the first place? It doesn't make a difference what the din is. Anyway, that's the story with the Baal Shem Tov with the mitzvah of Anochi Hashem Elokecha. In Halacha Hei, the Rambam has

המצוי הזה הוא אלוק העולם אדון כל הארץ והוא המנהיג הגלגל בכח שאין לו קץ ותכלית בכח שאין לו הפסק.

How do you know that? Shehagalgal sovev tamid. Right? The heavenly bodies are constantly in motion. ואי אפשר שיסובב בלא מסובב. And they're not self-sufficient, so every effect has to have a cause. If they're turning, someone has to be turning them. So the someone, the something that has to be responsible for that has to be self-sufficient and also has to be has to have כח שאין לו קץ ותכלית because the motion just goes on and on and on and on. So there has to be inexhaustible koach. והוא ברוך הוא המסובב אותו בלא יד ובלא גוף. Because only what's not physical can be unlimited. What's physical by definition is limited. So this Rambam already gives us an understanding, perhaps. Could be that it's completely understandable without this as well. But the Rambam in פרק ג בהלכות תשובה, I don't remember whether at the time whether we if we spoke about it, we didn't speak about it. So the famous Rambam and the Raavad where the Rambam says in gimmel zayin that

האומר שיש שם רבון אחד אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה.

Meaning חמישה הן הנקראים מינים and one of those five who's called a min is a person who thinks that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is corporeal. Just parenthetically we saw then that the Raavad doesn't question that the belief is minus, but he questions the Rambam describing the person as a min, right? ולמה קרא לזה מין? Not lamah, why does he think this is minus, but why does he think if a person makes an innocent mistake that that person is a min? So what's the pshat in the Rambam? So either or both of the following. Number one, the Rambam says it's such a in and of itself it's just such a major major distortion that memaila what the person believes isn't Ribbono Shel Olam anymore. And it's yitachen that that's totally totally adequate to say pshat in the Rambam. But it's also true that the emes is that when you learn perek aleph in yesodei hatorah you see that according to the Rambam once a person rachmana litzlan makes the mistake of thinking Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a baal guf, so then that automatically introduces other distortions into his conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Because the very minute a person thinks that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a baal guf, then he then he has to think that there are limitations on Hakadosh Baruch Hu. That's what the Rambam is explaining here in perek aleph of yesodei hatorah. So it's not only quotation marks only. It's not only that the person is distorting the conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu in terms of corporeal versus incorporeal, but the very minute a person rachmana litzlan makes that mistake so then everything... mistakes ensue as well, and certainly once you have all those, so then that becomes a a caricature Rachmana litzlan of Hakadosh Baruch Hu rather than Hakadosh Baruch Hu. I think Rav Pinkus in in one of the sichos that they posthumously transcribed, I think he gives the following moshel. I think he mentions it in conjunction with this Rambam but I'm not sure. He he gives the following the following moshel. So the the a certain village is told that the king is going to pay a visit to the village. Going to pay a visit to the village. Okay, so the they're gearing up for the for the visit and of course whenever the king comes, you know they're gonna prostrate themselves and and and declare their their undying loyalty to him, etc. Okay. They don't know exactly the king's schedule, how to pin down, so they're not given an exact day, an exact time, but they're told approximately approximately when. Approximately when. So then within that range, within that window of of when the king is expected, so a carriage, a very impressive carriage drawn by very again impressive looking horses rolls into town and in the carriage is a donkey. A donkey. And and everyone כורעים ומשתחווים ונופלים על פניהם and then they and they all pay tribute and and declare their their loyalty. Then two days later, so the king actually comes bichvodo u'v'atzmo. And he tells them I'm going to wipe out the entire city. So they said we made an innocent mistake. Adaraba, it was our we were well intentioned when we were what happened two days ago. So the the king says to them what do you mean you were you were well intentioned? You mistook a donkey for me. That's well intentioned? That was the the ultimate insult. That's the the moshel which I think Rav Pinkus gives to to in this in this context. Okay, next week im yirtzeh Hashem I hope to be away so the