Cardinals in the beis

אנכי ה׳ אלקיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. Malbim explains how simply the pshat shel mikra encapsulates so many ikrei emunah in this pasuk. The shem yud-kay-vav-kay, the shoresh of course is lashon havayah which means existence. And when Hakadosh Baruch Hu identifies himself as Anochi Hashem Elokecha, so it means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is, is in his essence havayah, metzius. What that means, what the lashon the Malbim uses, the Rambam has it already, is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mechuyav hametzius. Mechuyav hametzius means that, that existence, let's say for us, is not something essential, it's not what we are, it's incidental. Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave it to us. Hakadosh Baruch Hu let us exist. We can, we can not exist also. It's not something which is, which is mechuyav. It's not something which, which is integral to, to the definition of who of what we are. But with Hakadosh Baruch Hu, Anochi Hashem Elokecha, it means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mechuyav hametzius. And, and it also then means that since Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mechuyav hametzius, only Hakadosh Baruch Hu, again, exists in, in essence, that everything else that exists comes from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu is then mamtzi kol nimtza. And all of that is encapsulated within Anochi Hashem Elokecha. A. That the Ribbono Shel Olam is mechuyav hametzius. Again, it's, it's not that Hakadosh Baruch Hu happens to exist. That's essential to who he is, to what he is. And there's, there's a notion of exclusivity in that. There's a notion of exclusivity and hence, therefore it tells us that everything else that exists is because Hakadosh Baruch Hu, Hakadosh Baruch Hu allows it to exist, as the Rambam writes in Yesodei HaTorah, mi'amitas himatzo, from his own existence. The Rav points out, others I think pointed this out before also, but the Rav used to point out that a very, very important yesod that if you take a look in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, so when the Rambam describes this, so the Rambam says

יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון וממציא כל נמצא וכל הנמצאים שבשמים ובארץ ולא נברו אלא מאמיתת הימצאו.

And the Rav used to underscore that the Rambam uses the lashon hoveh, that mamtzi kol nimtza. It's not that Hakadosh Baruch Hu five thousand seven hundred and so many years ago that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world and now the world exists by inertia, the world exists on its own momentum, but rather Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mamtzi kol nimtza that at every moment it's only because Hakadosh Baruch Hu allows us to continue to share and to exist from his metzius. Now the Rambam says that Anochi, this is the first of the minyan taryag which the, which the Rambam enumerates. The mitzvah according to the Rambam is not only to believe but the mitzvah is to know. The mitzvah is that a person in every way available that a person should be convinced of this, not just well I'll blindly believe it, no but a person through every, every source available for him has to know and be convinced of the. belief in HaKadosh Baruch Hu. Now this notwithstanding, it remains an inyan of bechira chofshis. And it's very important to understand, sometimes, sometimes it can be driven by different things. But sometimes you meet guys and they want to have a certitude about emuna which doesn't allow for that bechira chofshis. So for instance, so for instance, they'll come sometimes and they have a question, a genuine question, a sincere question. Okay, so you discuss it with them, you answer, and they say, "Well, okay, it makes sense to me, but how do I know maybe I'm overlooking something? Maybe this, maybe that?" The bottom line is that the way HaKadosh Baruch Hu created the world, the way HaKadosh Baruch Hu created the world, even what's absolutely and objectively true, it still requires an act of bechira chofshis to acknowledge that truth. And therefore when one realizes that, hey, if I'm skeptical or cynical enough, I can question anything, right? And it has been done in the history of philosophy, but that doesn't point to any weakness in terms of one's yedia or one's emuna. That just points to the fact that the way HaKadosh Baruch Hu created the world, that it's supposed to be a world of bechira chofshis, is that even again, what's so absolutely and so objectively true, even that requires an act of bechira chofshis to acknowledge and to recognize that truth. And nistama this is part of what Chazal mean when you find a lashon in Chazal that מכאן פתחון פה למינים. That the Torah gives a pitzchon peh laminim. What it means the Torah gives a pitzchon peh laminim, that no matter how overwhelmingly true and no matter how absolutely true the propositions of our emuna and our yesodei hatorah are, but there's still bechira chofshis to recognize it, there's still bechira chofshis to acknowledge it. And the fact that a person can cynically or skeptically spin a theory which to create a question doesn't point to any weakness in the emuna, in the yedia. Rather it just drives home the fact that the acknowledgment requires bechira chofshis. It's interesting that despite the fact that this is a mitzvas asei, it's not formulated in a lashon tzivuy. Right? It's not formulated in an imperative. Okay, that's not the only example in the Torah of a mitzvah which isn't formulated belashon tzivuy, but אף על פי כן it's an interesting thing to note. In this context, it would seem to point to the following: That Anochi Hashem Elokecha is not stam a mitzvah. Anochi Hashem Elokecha is supposed to be the central reality of one's life, supposed to be the central reality of one's existence. And that's what the Torah is saying almost—it's not just a mitzvah, not that there's such a thing as just a mitzvah rachmana litzlan. But the point is Anochi Hashem Elokecha, it's not belashon tzivuy. Lashon tzivuy, da'u, veha'aminu, so then there's a certain gap between me and that yedia. No, Anochi Hashem Elokecha, it's not belashon tzivuy because that's the central reality of our existence. That's the central reality of our existence, that Anochi Hashem Elokecha, that only HaKadosh Baruch Hu exists on His own, and that we exist through Him. We exist only because of Him, through Him, and therefore the Torah emphasizes this as stating it as a fact rather than in a lashon tzivuy, an imperative. And clearly this is what the chiyuv of Kiddush Hashem in terms of avoda zara is rooted in. That because this is the central fact of all existence, Anochi Hashem Elokecha, so that's something which can't be compromised even at the cost of surrendering one's life because certain things are more precious than life. And the basic fact of all existence of Anochi Hashem Elokecha is not something which can be compromised. I'd like to spend a few minutes talking about the concept of Kiddush Hashem, what's included in Kiddush Hashem. And what's not included in Kiddush Hashem. So kayadu'a, the Rambam presents this all in perek hey of Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah. And the Rambam says that gimmel aveiros, the three cardinal aveiros, are giluy arayos, shefichas damim, and avodah zarah. So that we pasken is yehareg v'al ya'avor even b'tzina. And it's not only as the Ramban says in Milchamos later in Sanhedrin because of the chomer ha'aveirah, but it's also Kiddush Hashem and Chilul Hashem. It's also Kiddush Hashem and Chilul Hashem. So that's one form of Kiddush Hashem, Chilul Hashem, to be neherag and not to be over in terms of the gimmel aveiros is Kiddush Hashem, Rachmana litzlan to do the opposite is a Chilul Hashem. If it's befarhesia and leha'aviro al daso, that that's the intention of the anas is that we should go against the Torah and it's befarhesia, parhesia defined as bifnei asarah miYisrael, so then shear aveiros shebaTorah is also yehareg v'al ya'avor. And if it's b'sha'as gezeiras hamalchus, so then afilu min hakal, even that is yehareg v'al ya'avor. All of these then get us involved in the mitzvah of Kiddush Hashem and the issur hachamur of Chilul Hashem. Then the Rambam concludes perek hey and says there's another type of Kiddush Hashem also. The other type of Kiddush Hashem is whereby our behavior we command respect, and because of that so we reflect credit on Torah, and we elicit a reaction, Rambam paraphrasing the Gemara in Yoma, we elicit a reaction of אשרי אביו שלמדו תורה, אשרי רבו שלמדו תורה. And if Rachmana litzlan on the contrary, if through our actions Rachmana litzlan, so we reflect badly on Torah Rachmana litzlan, and we elicit a reaction of

אוי לו לאביו שלמדו תורה, אוי לו לרבו שלמדו תורה,

so then that constitutes Chilul Hashem. So there's no question that if the talmidim in our yeshiva through their steadfastness, through their loyalty, through their uncompromising integrity to Torah, even while being involved in the modern world, they remain loyal, steadfast, there's no question that that's a kiddush shem shamayim. And if it elicits a reaction and if gentiles are honest enough to notice it and to comment on it and it elicits a reaction of אשרי רבו שלמדו תורה, אשרי אביו שלמדו תורה, so that is a Kiddush Hashem, that is a Kiddush Hashem. However, it's most assuredly not a Kiddush Hashem to allow cardinals with large crosses to walk into a Beis Medrash. There's absolutely no Kiddush Hashem in that. It's a Kiddush Hashem that when we comply with divrei Torah and by being motivated by our compliance with divrei Torah, so we either voluntarily or begrudgingly earn respect and command respect, so then that's an act of Kiddush Hashem. But to allow to come into the Beis Medrash with a shesi v'erev, with a cross, so in addition to, I'm told that the teshuvah in the Har Tzvi has been discussed and circulated, what the Har Tzvi discusses this and says that it's assur, that it can't be, but in addition to what the Har Tzvi discusses, the cross is a symbol of two things. It's a symbol of two things. It's a symbol A of avodah zarah and B it's a symbol of countless and if we're going to count the number goes into millions of Jews whose blood has been shed, and that's the symbol of it. It's been shed and the symbol of all that Jewish blood shed which saturates the soil of Europe and which is, and the same antisemitism is being revived in Europe today, so the symbol of that is the cross. So what kind of Kiddush Hashem is it to allow that symbol of the Inquisition of Jews being burned at the stake so why is that a Kiddush Hashem to allow that symbol into the Beis Medrash? So I don't know so who's who's conferring respect upon who? Respect is being conferred upon us or on the contrary are we are we saying I don't know is it conceivable that that you could walk into that you could walk into a church with some I don't know with some symbol which which is associated with I don't know with the ancient Roman empire where until until Constantine converted so the early Christians were persecuted? So could you walk into a church with that? Wouldn't they understand how deeply offensive that is? And if they don't understand so then the the fault is not ours. Presumably they would understand. There's no reason that people wouldn't understand. There's no reason that people wouldn't understand. You know there there have been books written in in recent years and it's they're well worth reading. They're well worth reading. Books not by not by Jewish apologists but written by Catholics. Written by Catholics who struggle with the bloody history of of the church's relations with the Jews. There's there's a guy named James Carroll who wrote a whole book called Constantine's Sword talking about the whole history of anti-Semitism and the degree of responsibility which which which his church has for it. There's a book the first part of which only the first part of it talks about this. There's a book written by someone called Gary Wills called Papal Sin and the first part of it also discusses the the history. Again these are books written by by Catholic writers. Catholic writers discussing the the history. So certainly if there's any kind of any kind of candor about or honesty about history it has to be recognized that a cross again in addition to symbolizing what according to our Yesodei HaTorah is is is not a belief which has a place in the Beis Medrash. It's also associated with just indescribable bloodshed throughout the generations. And that's not something we have to apologize for. We don't have to apologize for that. And we don't have to forget it either and we shouldn't forget it. Not for a minute. Not for a minute. In terms of is there any is there any basis for discussion in terms of how how the Yeshiva operates. So in his essay Confrontation so the Rav wrote that the reason you can't have interfaith dialogue is because in general you can't have a conversation you can't have a discussion unless there's certain axioms which are agreed upon. Let's say you want to debate let's forget interfaith dialogue for a minute. You want to debate an issue in morality. An issue in morality is it is it moral to cheat on your taxes or is it immoral to cheat on your taxes? Just fine. So if the ground rules are that we all subscribe to the Shulchan Aruch so now we can have a debate. So everyone will try to prove their case according to the Shulchan Aruch. But if there are no axioms if there's if you can't agree on the axioms if you can't agree on on what's authoritative what isn't authoritative then then you can't have any there's no basis for there's no basis for discussion. So so one person will say you can't you can't cheat on your taxes because that's like stealing and stealing is immoral. And the other person will say no I don't think stealing is immoral. So prove to me that stealing is immoral. They'll say well obviously it's immoral. And we'll say no I don't think stealing is immoral. I think might makes right. If there are no axioms you can't there's nothing to discuss and the same thing is true in terms of religious discussion. How could you be you can't discuss if if one one community the Rav says operates with with a set of beliefs and principles of Torah Min HaShamayim and a certain understanding of who and what Hakadosh Baruch Hu is and another community doesn't operate with those axioms. So what is there to discuss? What is there to discuss? Baruch Hashem the Yeshiva here is flourishing. The Yeshiva here is thriving. But the reason for that is The reason for that, with all, with all educational philosophy is very important and a Rebbe should be as good a pedagogue as he can. He should be as good a Ba'al Masbir as he can. But ultimately, the reason this Yeshiva flourishes and the reason every Yeshiva flourishes is not because, it can't be attributed to the fact that the Rebbeim are wonderful pedagogues, they're wonderful Ba'alei Hasbara. No, the reason the Yeshiva flourishes is because when you open a Chumash, when you open a Gemara, you're learning Devar Hashem and you're captivated by Devar Hashem. There's no question if a Rebbe doesn't do a good job presenting it, okay, so then he's going to prevent you from experiencing the Devar Hashem. But what captivates you is the Devar Hashem. That's what captivates you. So what's to discuss? You can't distill, you can't separate, you can't separate the educational philosophy here at Yeshiva or in any Yeshiva from our basic Emunos V'De'os which we don't share with what the Rav in that essay would call any other faith community. So there's no common ground. And similarly, why is it, why is it, this remarkable achievement that we have Baruch Hashem in the Beis Medrash, outside of the Beis Medrash, already amongst graduates of the Yeshiva, how is it that we have people who are totally integrated into modern society in the highest echelons, whether they're doctors, whether they're accountants, whether they're lawyers, whatever, whatever, and they're 100% committed and Kove'a Itim L'Torah? So how is that possible? So again, it's not because of any sophisticated ideology that we have. It's ultimately because like the Rav used to say, you can read this in Chamesh Drashos for instance, the Rav used to say, he meant this rhetorically, he said that he would add a 14th Ani Ma'amin to the Rambam's 13 Ani Ma'amin's, he would add a 14th Ani Ma'amin that in every condition, under every set of circumstances, Torah can thrive, Torah can flourish because Torah is Nitzchis. Obviously he meant that rhetorically, obviously that's part of the Rambam's י"ג עיקרי אמונה of, of

וזאת התורה לא תהא מוחלפת ולא תהא אחרת מאת הבורא יתברך שמו,

the fact that the Torah is eternal. So the Rav said it, he dramatized it by saying I would make a 14th Ani Ma'amin. But if we want to know ultimately what's the secret to the success of Yeshiva, again, not to downplay or minimize all the Koachos that go into Chinuch and all the Koachos that you put in to be Mechanech, not to downplay any of that, but all of that, that doesn't work on its own. Ultimately, what is the Hatzlacha due to? The Hatzlacha is due to because Torah is Nitzchis. That's why it's flourishing. That's why what we see here is that yes, you can be a computer programmer, you can be a professor of medicine, whatever it may be, and you can flourish. But there's nothing that we can separate that out from our Emunos V'De'os. There's nothing to discuss. That's not something that can be shared, it's not something which can be transposed or something which can be recreated in a different faith context because our belief is that the Hatzlacha in terms of the learning and in terms of the thriving, in terms of the Kol Torah in this Beis Medrash and all Batei Midrashos of Hakol Kol Yaakov is because it's Devar Hashem, Devar Hashem which is Nitzchi. And the fact that Torah flourishes even outside of the Beis Medrash, like the Rav describes in Chamesh Drashos, in the office place, in the laboratories, all over, is because again, because what all these people are living is they're living Toras Hashem which is Nitzchis. And that's the secret to the success. That's the secret to the success. So what the Rav said applies in this context also. There's no basis for comparison, there's no basis for dialogue because we can't separate, we can't separate how we learn from what we learn. That's a spurious distinction. It doesn't exist for us. We can't separate our lifestyle, the ability to integrate, the ability to filter, and as necessary, reject as necessary, integrate as necessary. We can't separate that from what we believe in, from the Torah lifestyle. It's not something which is generically religious. It's not that it's a generic religious text, no, it's because it's... notes on that than there was in any previous generation. What the Rov wrote in the 1960s, the Rov stood by his entire lifetime. It's simply not true that things that happened in the 70s affected his opinion because he knew very well what happened. He knew very well what happened and didn't think that anything he said needed to be modified. And it's very difficult to see that things have changed. The other thing the Rov writes in the essay and everyone should read the essay because you're going to hear a lot of discussion. And basically you can save yourself a lot of confusion by just reading the essay and seeing how clearly the Rov presents things. It's just so categorical and so unequivocal. There's nothing to pilpel about if you just read the essay. So one of the things the Rov he writes there is that also you have to be mindful and you have to understand that the majority in these types of situations looks to impose its will on the minority. I'm not aware that the eschatological vision, the vision of acharis hayomim of the church has changed and that it's any different today or what's supposed to happen to us rachmona litzlon in that vision than it ever was. So things are not... all those considerations which the Rov spoke about, those all remain the same, they remain constant, and there's every reason to think that he would have said the same thing today as he said then.