Taamei Mitzvos, part 2

I think we left off in the middle of the Ramban here in Ki Teitzei, right? So the Ramban has two ma'amarei Chazal which he understands to indicate that it's a machlokes within Chazal whether or not there are reasons for the mitzvos.

וכי מה איכפת ליה להקדוש ברוך הוא בין שוחט מן הצוואר לשוחט מן העורף הלא לא נתנו המצוות אלא לצרף בהן את הבריות.

So the Ramban apparently translates that as to test. And the Ramban says, no, it means to purify. And it's not that that man de-amar is denying a ta'am as the Rambam understands. Rambam says we don't follow that man de-amar. But rather, it's emphasizing that the mitzvos are not for Hakadosh Baruch Hu’s welfare, it's for our welfare. Similarly, the second ma'amar Chazal the Ramban has that האומר על קן ציפור יגיעו רחמיך is mash'thikin oso משעושה מידותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים v'einan ela gezeiros. So the Ramban has a different havana there also. So maybe let's pick up there. I think that we didn't see yet, correct? I think that's where we're up to.

וכן מה שאמרו לפי שעושה מידותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים.

You see that in the Ramban in Ki Teitzei?

וכן מה שאמרו לפי שעושה מידותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים

v'einan ela gezeiros

לומר שלא חס הקל על קן ציפור ולא הגיעו רחמיו על אותו ואת בנו שאין רחמיו מגיעין בבעלי הנפש הבהמית למנוע אותנו מלעשות בהם צרכנו שאם כן היה אוסר השחיטה. אבל טעם המניעה ללמד אותנו מידת הרחמנות ושלא נתאכזר כי האכזריות תתפשט בנפש האדם כידוע בטבחים שוחטי השוורים הגדולים והחמורים שהם

anshei damim zovchei adam achzarim m'od.

ומפני זה אמרו טוב שבטבחים שותפו של עמלק. והנה המצוות האלו בבהמה ובעוף אינן רחמנות עליהן אלא גזירות בנו להדריכנו וללמד אותנו המידות הטובות.

So the Ramban says that the Ramban, excuse me, says that the reason mash'thikin oso if he says

האומר על קן ציפור יגיעו רחמיך משעושה מידותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים

v'einan ela gezeiros means that he's distorting the mitzvah that implies that the mitzvah is designed as rachamim on the tzipor when in reality it's a gezeirah, it's a law, not a law without a ta'am, but a gezeirah, a law which is promulgated for us.

והנה המצוות האלו בבהמה ובעוף אינן רחמנות עליהן אלא גזירות בנו להדריכנו וללמד אותנו המידות הטובות.

v'chein yikre'u heim. The lashon gezeirah doesn't necessarily have the semantics of having no reason, says the Ramban.

וכן יקראו הם כל המצוות שבתורה עשה ולא תעשה גזירות

k'mo she-amru ba-Mechilta. Ramban quotes this Mechilta back in Parshas Yisro also and Sefer Mitzvos as well. כמו שאמרו במשל המלך שנכנס למדינה. אמרו לו עבדיו gzor aleinu gezeiros. gzor aleihem gezeiros.

אמר להם כשקיבלו מלכותי אגזור עליכם גזירות. כך אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא קיבלתם מלכותי אנוכי ה' אלוקיך קבלו גזירותיי לא יהיה לך.

So the semantics of gezeirah, again, it's a mitzvah which is promulgated, a mitzvah which is a law which a directive which is issued. So what's objectionable about האומר על קן ציפור יגיעו רחמיך is not giving a ta'am, it's that it's giving the wrong ta'am. Mitzvos are intended for us, they're not intended for the. The pshat of this Sforno is as follows. 32nd second. If you have, if you take a look at the Ramban at the end of Parshas Bo, it’s פרק יג פסוק טז, a famous Ramban where he explains why we have so many mitzvos zecher l'yetzias mitzrayim.

פרק יג פסוק טז. הנה מעת היות עבודת גילולים בעולם. הנה מעת היות עבודת גילולים בעולם בימי אנוש.

You have it? Understand?

הנה מעת היות עבודת גילולים בעולם בימי אנוש החלו הדעות להשתבש באמונה. מהם כופרים בעיקר ואומרים כי העולם קדמון כחשו בהשם ויאמרו לא הוא.

Some became atheists, rachmana litzlan. They said that the world has always been here, there's no Borei Olam, and they became atheists, rachmana litzlan. And u'mehem machshishim b'yediya. Yedi'as hapratis ואמרו איך ידע אל ויש דעה בעליון. Others recognized that there is a Borei Olam, but they said that the Borei Olam doesn't know, his, his yedi'ah only relates to things which are absolute and unchanging, but his yedi'ah doesn't encompass all the changing realities of life. Umeihem, and the third school of heretical thought, rachmana litzlan, she-yodu b'yedi'ah, no, they not only acknowledge Hakadosh Baruch Hu and his yedi'ah, but makchishim b'hashgacha, that they deny Divine Providence. ויעשו אדם כדגי הים שלא ישגיח הקל בהם. So when the Ramban wants to explain what it means to, when he illustrates the view that denies hashgacha for people, he says that in their worldview, people are no different than fish. So fish not davka. Fish meaning the same would be true for animal life. So this is a prevalent view in the Rishonim that hashgacha exists for people. Hashgacha doesn't exist for animals and whatever sort of on the hierarchical chain of being, whatever's below people, so there is no hashgacha. And so therefore, the way to express this again, this heresy of saying that there's no hashgacha even for people, is to say that in their erroneous heretical worldview, people are no different than fish, meaning what they say about fish is correct, but in their equating people to fish, obviously there is where the shibush ba-emuna is present. To have a mitzvah which focuses on an animal would be a form of hashgacha, right? A mitzvah which is there to not to instill middos rachmanus in us, to keep us away, to keep us away from middas achzariyus, but if the mitzvah is designed to protect the animal, that's a form of hashgacha. Again, the hashgacha, Torah u-mitzvos is also a form of hashgacha. Hashgacha is not only that, you know, when you're walking down the street and you're very tired and someone comes along and gives you a ride, that can be hashgacha also. That can be an expression, a manifestation of hashgacha, but the fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives each and every one of us Torah u-mitzvos to guide us in life, to direct us in life, to tell us how to navigate life, that's also an expression of hashgacha. That's also an expression of hashgacha. To even, even without being the metzuveh of a mitzvah, but even just to be the intended beneficiary of the mitzvah would also be a form of hashgacha. So that's what the Ramban here is shitaso here in Ki Seitzei, shitaso here in what he tells us in Parshas Bo, that there's no hashgacha for animals, so it can't be that the pshat in the mitzvah of kan tzippor is that על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך. It can't be that the pshat in oso v'es bno is the concern for the animals because that lichora would be a form of hashgacha on the animals, and Hakadosh Baruch Hu exercises hashgacha on people. People are on a level of existence that warrants hashgacha, but what's lower than that, so there's no, there's no hashgacha. Lichora that's the. Last year I think Rebbe said that, that you can point to the Ramban that we said that the Torah cares about not making animals extinct, to not, to not kill the mother and the son on the same day, would that be a claim that we would openly make in lieu of the fact that the mitzvah isn't really for the animal? So would it be like, kind of like, tell when we say the Torah. And you ask how do these two things mesh? Yeah, how do they mesh? How do we say that the Torah doesn't really care about the animals, but we can still claim that the Torah cares about that? Right. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu, again even there the Ramban, you know, whether Hakadosh Baruch Hu will sort of intervene and interfere to prevent a species from being extinct, it doesn't then say, it just says that we're supposed to, you know, take measures that we're not supposed to contribute to becoming extinct. Would Hakadosh Baruch Hu interfere, Ramban not necessarily saying. Even if one would attribute that opinion to him, so it still doesn't, it doesn't conflict with this, because by people, so there's hashgacha, not just that humanity shouldn't be destroyed, as much as hashgacha that mankind isn't destroyed, there's hashgacha for the individuals. And that certainly isn't the case by animals. Even if you say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu would intervene to prevent dolphins from becoming extinct, but that doesn't mean that there's hashgacha for this dolphin as opposed to that dolphin or whatever. But again, even that, ayen sham, you know, is that implied by the Ramban? The Ramban is clearly saying that we have an obligation not to tamper with the structure of Maaseh Bereshit. And part of the structure of Maaseh Bereshit is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created minim, He created different species. Whether or not He would interfere, I don't know. Ayen sham if there's proof of what the Ramban holds on that. Does hashgacha mean interference, like Hashem's interference with the world? Protection, or whatever word you want. Providence means that it's not going to be, you know, it's... its fate is not going to be randomly determined. It's not being abandoned to... not being abandoned. I'm not sure why I'm assuming that non-individual isn't as special. No, according to the Rishonim, there is no hashgacha. There's no hashgacha, there's no din either. What's there to be dan then for? They have no zechuyot, they have no... they have no chovot. That's what the Ramban points out in... and there's a funny Rashi there, but that's what the Ramban points out in Parshat Noach. Where's the Ramban? Perek Chet? You have a Vayizkor Elokim, Perek Chet, Pasuk Alef in Bereishit. Perek Chet, Pasuk Alef in Bereishit.

ויזכר אלהים את נח ואת כל החיה ואת כל הבהמה הזכירה בנח מפני שהיה צדיק תמים וכרת לו ברית להצילו ובנח יכללו זרעו אשר אתו שם ולא הזכירם כי בזכותו ניצולו אבל הזכירה שאמר בחיה ובבהמה אינה בזכות שאין בבעלי נפש זכות וחוב זולתי באדם לבדו.

There's no... you can't talk about zechut and chov by animals.

אלא הזכירה בהם כי זכר את דבר קדשו שאמר ויהי העולם והרצון אשר לו בבריאת העולם עלה לפניו ורצה קיום העולם במינם אשר ברא בו.

So again, this is here. So again this is here also the idea that Hakadosh Baruch Hu you see from Ma'aseh Bereishit that Hakadosh Baruch Hu willed that the world should consist of these different species and והנה רצה עתה להוציאם שלא יכלו בטבע. There is a funny Rashi here that the Ramban is and he doesn't quote the Rashi but he's implicitly being masig to figure out what pshat in Rashi is. The Radak explains when the pasuk says

עיני כל אליך ישברו ואתה נותן להם את אכלם בעתו

that doesn't mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is apportioning this crumb for this ant and and and and that crumb for for that ant and this big fish is going to eat that little fish but Radak says that that sometimes psukim attribute to Hakadosh Baruch Hu what results from the system that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created when he created the world. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world in in such a way that all animals all fish all insects they all have what to eat. He he created the world in in such a way and that's what it means ואתה נותן להם את אכלם בעתו that the ants the fish the the the birds the animals all find what what to eat. That's what it means ואתה נותן להם את אכלם בעתו doesn't mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is apportioning because again there is no the Radak also like the Rambam. The Rambam says like the Ramban also. The Radak also is of the opinion that there is no hashgacha for for the individual in the other than other than amongst other than amongst people. Okay so maybe we'll we'll just begin to the next topic here within Ta'amei Hamitzvot in the Ramban but but as sort of as in conjunction with that we'll take a look at a Rambam if you have the Rambam take a look at the end of Hilchos Me'ila. It's the last halacha in Me'ila so that's Perek Ches Halacha Ches. This is the Rambam writes:

ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף עניינם כפי כוחו.

A person should reflect on the mitzvos ha-Torah and understand to the best of his ability what they are geared towards what they are designed to achieve right sof inyanam. ודבר שלא ימצא לו טעם ולא ידע לו עילה. Something that a person is not successful in understanding again what the what the goal of the mitzvah is אל יהי קל בעיניו. He shouldn't chas v'shalom be mezalzel in it and ואל יהרוס לעלות אל השם פן יפרוץ בו. He shouldn't be reckless in Rachmana litzlan as it were passing judgment about that mitzvah ולא תהא מחשבתו בו כמחשבתו בשאר דברי חול. If you have a dvar chol and you think about it and it doesn't make any sense so you're entitled to conclude that it doesn't make any sense. You read a book and the book doesn't make any sense so you're entitled to say that the book doesn't make any sense and Rachmana litzlan a person can't say that the mitzvah doesn't make any sense he can say I don't understand the mitzvah. בוא וראה כמה החמירה תורה במעילה. You can you can imagine the mussar word for. from dinim of meilah. What's the din of meilah? Meilah refers to the issur to be ne'eneh from something which is hekdesh. ומה אם עצים ואבנים ועפר ואפר which have no intrinsic standing, no intrinsic status, כיון שנקרא שם אדון העולם עליהם בדברים בלבד, that a person says harei zeh hekdesh, he's makdish it to the Bedek Habayit, he's makdish it to the Mikdash and thereby associates it, it's hekdesh l'Hashem. He therefore associates it with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Niskadshu, they become sanctified, וכל הנוהג בהן מן החול, and if a person then goes ahead and is ne'eneh, which is being

נוהג בהן מן החול, מעל בה' ואפילו היה שוגג צריך כפרה. קל וחומר במצוות שחקק לנו הקדוש ברוך הוא, שלא יבעט אדם בהן מפני שלא ידע טעמן ולא יחטא בדברים שלא כן על ה' ולא יחשוב בהן מחשבה בדברי החול. הרי נאמר ושמרתם את כל חקותי ואת כל משפטי ועשיתם אותם. ואמרו חכמים ליתן שמירה ועשייה לחוקים כמשפטים.

So both chukim and mishpatim were commanded to have both shmirah and asiyah. V'ha'asiyah yeduah, sheya'aseh hachukim. Asiyah means to comply, to practically comply. V'hashmirah, what does it mean to have shmirah?

שיזהר בהן ולא ידמה מהן ולא ידמה שהן פחות מן המשפטים.

So shmirah, the Rambam defines, and my father zichrono livracha used to say, to esteem. The same way we intuitively respect issur gezel, issur shefichas damim, because we understand how necessary it is, so that same respect, that same esteem, we should have for chukim. Now what's the definition of mishpatim? What's the definition of chukim?

והמשפטים הן המצוות שטעמן גלוי וטובת עשייתן בעולם הזה ידועה, כגון איסור גזל ושפיכות דמים וכיבוד אב ואם.

The reason is apparent and the benefit which they bring to life is well known.

והחוקים הן המצוות שאין טעמן ידוע. אמרו חכמים חוקים שחקקתי לך ואין לך רשות להרהר בהן ויצרו של אדם נוקפו בהן ואומות העולם משיבין עליהן, כגון איסור בשר חזיר ובשר בחלב ועגלה ערופה ופרה אדומה ושעיר המשתלח.

So for the Rambam, the definition of chukim are those mitzvos whose reason is not immediately apparent. That's the Rambam's definition of chukim. Again, the distinction between mishpatim and chukim, the Rambam here is quoting from the Gemara in Yoma, but the definition of what differentiates chukim from mishpatim, so chukim is ta'aman galui, excuse me, mishpatim is ta'aman galui, chukim is ein ta'aman yadua. So we'll begin with tomorrow im yirtzeh Hashem is to see whether the Ramban agrees with this way of distinguishing chukim from mishpatim. And so we'll pick up tomorrow.