Which of the 7 Miztvos Benei Noach Are Intuitive?

Divrei Hashkafa by Rav Mayer Twersky
Divrei Hashkafa by Rav Mayer Twersky
Which of the 7 Miztvos Benei Noach Are Intuitive?
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📖 Source: Ramban Al haTorah

Resolution to seeming contradictions in both the Ramban and Rambam regarding whether the 7 mitzvos are intuitive or not.

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So we saw last week that the Ramban on Chumash, Perek Vav, Pasuk Yud Gimmel, where he quotes that Rabboseinu amru in Maseches Sanhedrin שעל הכל נחתם גזר דינם. So even though the dor hamabul was guilty of hashchasas derech as well as chamas, but the g'zar din was כי מלאה הארץ חמס. And the Ramban said

והטעם מפני שהוא מצוה מושכלת אין להם בה צורך לנביא להזהיר.

That since gezel is a mitzvah muscheles, it's a mitzvah which the moral intuition and the moral logic that Hakadosh Baruch Hu implanted within us recognizes and dictates, so there's no conceivable defense. A person doesn't have to have heard a nevuah, there's no possible defense. So the question in this Ramban minei ubei, I don't remember whether we discussed this, the question was raised after shiur, I don't remember whether we talked about it yet altogether. The question that's raised is so what is the Ramban implying about the hashchasas derech? Is he implying that that's not a mitzvah muscheles? That's sort of one question just minei ubei in this Ramban. The other question, if you take a look at the Shitas Kadmonim on Ramban from the Ramban in Toras Hashem Temimah, the picture went up? Yeah. If you take a look at the Shitas Kadmonim on Ramban from the Ramban in Toras Hashem Temimah, so the Ramban writes, it's on page kuf ayin gimmel in the Shavel Kisvei Ramban:

והנה יצאתי הרבה מדרכי לפרש ענין נסתר לפרשה צריכה ביאור.

Okay, I digress. Now, ve'atah ashuv limkomi.

כי הגיע סיפור בראשית מדור אנוש וקצר ואמר היכי הוחל עבודת זרה.

Az huchal likro as everyone agrees that what that posuk means is avodah zarah came into the world in dor she'l Enosh.

ואמר אחר כך סיפור נח הצדיק ופירוש לכמה שנים היה המבול מן היצירה. והוא צריך גם כן להודיע כי על עוון העריות והשחתת דרך נענשו דכתיב ויראו בני האלהים את בנות האדם.

And ויקחו להם נשים מכל אשר בחרו, you know indiscriminately, whether the woman was willing or unwilling, whether she was single, whether she was married, that

ויקחו להם נשים מכל אשר בחרו. וכתב כי השחית כל בשר את דרכו.

And al inyan hagezel dichsiv

כי מלאה הארץ חמס. ועל דעת רבותינו כבר היו מצווים באלו ובשבע זיין המצוות מאדם הראשון. והוציאו אותם מרמז הכתוב ויצו ה' אלקים על האדם לאמר מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל,

Gemorah Sanhedrin darshans how there's an allusion to each of the sheva mitzvos there. I think the Maharsha points out that generally let's say when you have tzav, it's tzav es, צו את בני ישראל ואמרת אליהם, in parshas hatamid, Korbani lachmi le'ishai, it's tzav, it's tzav es. And here it's vayitzav al ha'adam which suggests that there's more to the tzivui than just what the peshuto shel mikra מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל. That's sort of the prompt for the drashos Chazal. So that's what the Ramban says, that Chazal tell us that Hakadosh Baruch Hu revealed the שבע מצוות בני נח already to Adam ha'Rishon. אלא שלא האריך להם, so why is it only beremez? מפני שאנו מסיני מצווים בהם. The Torah is nitna le'Yisrael and is emphasizing our mitzvos. Now, ve'al derech hapeshat, derech hapeshat complementing the drashos Chazal, אלו מצוות שכליות הן. The שבע מצוות בני נח didn't need to be revealed, didn't need that Hakadosh Baruch Hu reveal them to Adam in nevuah and that Adam then transmit what he had received in nevuah because אלו מצוות שכליות הן. Vechol nivra. And a person doesn't have to receive a communication from Hakadosh Baruch Hu to be nizhar because since it's a mitzvah sichlis, whatever a person can recognize on his own, so he's mechuyav to abide by based on again, on that God-given moral intuition that people have.

וכמו שכתוב באברהם ושמרו דרך ה' לעשות צדקה ומשפט אף על פי שלא

nitzavu or something, again, there's something missing here. So then additionally, the question is how do you sort of integrate or did the Ramban change his mind? Here the Ramban is clearly saying that the sheva mitzvos are equally mitzvos muskallos, mitzvos sichliyos, whereas our Ramban seems to be suggesting a distinction between chamas and hashchasas derech. Right? So the question number one is just minei u'vei in our Ramban, does he really mean that that arayas are not mitzvos sichliyos? And then question number two is did the Ramban change his mind or do these two Rambans do they work together? So he talks as follows. The Rambam in Perek Vav, Shmoneh Perakim, which is where the Rambam talks about which is the higher madrega of avodas Hashem, if a person is a chasid mitivo that he wants naturally to act in accordance with the Torah or whether he's kovesh es yitzro. So the Rambam says that there's stiros, and then he says the answer to the stiros is the difference between mishpatim and chukim. When it comes to mishpatim, so the person should be a chasid mitivo and when it comes to chukim, that's where he should be a kovesh es yitzro. But when the Rambam is listing the mareh mekomos and posing the question with the apparent stirah, so the Rambam has this is the way the Rambam has the Toras Kohanim and the way he quotes it,

רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר לא יאמר אדם אי אפשי לאכול בשר בחלב.

A person's not going to say I have, he shouldn't say I have innate, not acquired, I have innate instinct not to eat basar bechalav. אי אפשי ללבוש שעטנז. I have an innate instinct not to wear shaatnez. אי אפשי לבוא על הערווה. A person shouldn't say I have an innate instinct not to lavo al ha-erva, אלא אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. No, a person should say if if the Torah hadn't been given and told us not to eat basar bechalav, I would have eaten basar bechalav. If the Torah hadn't been given and told us that a בגד כלאים שעטנז לא יעלה לא יעלה עליך, I would have worn shaatnez and if the Torah hadn't been mazhir al arayos, I would have been over on arayos. Okay, the Rambam apparently had a different girsa in the Gemara in Yoma, but that's not for now necessarily. So that's one mareh makom. Leumas zeh, that the Rambam in Perek Tes of Hilchos Melachim, the Rambam writes

שישה דברים נצטווה אדם הראשון על עבודה זרה ועל ברכת השם ועל שפיכות דמים ועל גילוי עריות ועל הגזל ועל הדינים.

Eiver min hachai according to the Rambam doesn't come until Noach. The Ramban and the Baalei HaTosafos assume that eiver min hachai was already given to Adam HaRishon. The Rambam thinks it wasn't given until Noach. Okay. But then the Rambam says אף על פי שכולן קבלה הן בידינו ממשה רבינו. We have the harsaa from Moshe Rabbeinu as to these שבע מצוות בני נח and number two, ve-hadas noteh lahem, the mitzvos sichliyos. A second makom, he says additionally מכלל דברי התורה יראה שעל אלו נצטווה. It's also mashma like that in in the Torah SheBiKtav. So the Rambam here says that hadas noteh lahem to the שבע מצוות בני נח, one of which is gilluy arayos. The Rambam in Shemonah Perakim quotes the Toras Kohanim, a person shouldn't say אי אפשי לבוא על הערווה, no efshi, but אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. So what what do you do with that with that stira? So lichora the answer is that at least some of the arayos is hadas noteh lahem, but not all of them. So when the Rambam says hadas noteh lahem, certainly some of the arayos is hadas noteh lahem and when the Rambam says that אלא אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי, it means others which, I don't know, the Rambam you don't know, in the Rambam it could be that it could be that possibly all the arayos of bnei Noach is das noteh lahem and maybe it's only some of the additional arayos le-Yisrael which is which is lo muskeiles where a person would say efshi. But the point we're interested in is that lichora you see in the Rambam that within arayos gufa, again within the Rambam, again it's going to be different when we'll circle back to the Ramban, within the Rambam lav davka within the arayos of bnei Noach that that's the case, some arayos is hadas noteh lahem and some is not, some is אלא אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. So it's a machlokes tanaim what the arayos of bnei Noach are. The Rambam paskens here in Perek Tes of Hilchos Melachim that שש עריות אסורות על בני נח. That again the Chinuch points out that when we talk about שבע מצוות בני נח we don't mean sheva mitzvos, we mean seven categories of mitzvos because arayos for instance, arayos includes more than one erva so it's not one mitzvah, it's sort of one category of gilluy arayos.

שש עריות אסורות על בני נח האם ואשת האב ואשת איש ואחותו מאמו וזכור ובהמה.

Right, so that's maybe good fine. So let's let's zero in here on achoso. So achoso mei-imo is assura, right, if it's a half a maternal half-sister is one of the arayos to bnei Noach, but a paternal half-sister is not. Right, Avraham Avinu said

וגם אמנה אחותי בת אבי היא אך לא בת אמי

and I think Rashi comments there, right, what's the significance of that distinction that it's achosi vas avi not achosi vas imi? That only achosi vas imi is assura to bnei Noach, achosi vas avi is not. I don't think there's any intuitive difference, and I don't think anyone can say that they intuit that there's a difference between achoso me-imo and achoso me-oviv. So itochein that the pshat in the Ramban is like this. When the Ramban, let's first begin with the Ramban al haTorah where the question was minei u'vei, is there an implication that hashchosas derech is not mitzvah muskalos? So the answer is yes, partially. Partially it is the case, not all. Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants to tell Noach something which doesn't need a footnote. So He's telling him chamas is entirely a mitzvah muskalos. And because of that, it's something which is so intolerable that there's no, again, there's no defense for it because a person can't plead ignorance, a person can't say, well, this form of gezel... no, it's muskalos. It's muskalos. As opposed to hashchosas derech which, again, depending upon which of the arayos of Bnei Noach, some of them ein hachi nami also muskalos, but just to say hashchosas derech be-chlal is not entirely muskal. It's not entirely muskal. When that's lichora the pshat in our Ramban al haTorah. The Ramban is not talking about mishkav zachor, mishkav behemah, avadai, the Ramban holds that that's mitzvah muskalos. That it's a mitzvah muskalos. Achoso me-imo is asura, achoso me-oviv is mutteres. That's not mitzvah muskalos. The Ramban in Toras Hashem Temimah lichora means like this. The Ramban says al derech hapsat even if you didn't have a tzivui of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, שבע מצוות בני נח, so then you would have had all the שבע מצוות בני נח but not necessarily all the details. Meaning you would have had gilui arayos, ein hachi nami, you wouldn't have had all the sheish arayos, but you would have had all the שבע מצוות בני נח. Again, it's the same yesod, right, the same distinction. You would have had all the שבע מצוות בני נח. What would you have known in sevara? You would have known zachor, you would have known behemah, you would have known eishes ish, you wouldn't have known achoso, achoso me-imo. You would have known imo, you would have known imo, so that's what the Ramban is saying that everything is muskal. It means that not necessarily that you would have generated the same list of gilui arayos but you would have had gilui arayos and it's that which the Torah is referring to and that's why that's what they would be held accountable for. Okay, we'll stop there.