Vayigash, Vayechi

We're all familiar with the very famous Pshat of the Beis Halevi in the Pasuk and the Midrash of

אני יוסף העוד אבי חי ולא יכלו אחיו לענות אותו כי נבהלו מפניו.

So the Midrash says on this Pasuk, everyone's a very very famous Beis Halevi, אוי לנו מיום הדין, אוי לנו מיום התוכחה that the Shivtei Koh who just happened to be who were being confronted by a Basar Vadam, by Yosef, so they weren't able to be Omed Lifnei his Tochacha. They weren't able to give an adequate Din v'cheshbon. So what will we do Le'asid Lavo? אוי לנו מיום הדין, אוי לנו מיום התוכחה. So Kayaduah the Beis Halevi explains what kind of Tochacha was there here? Yosef is just revealing himself. He's telling them that he's their long-lost brother. He's not giving any Tochacha. So the Beis Halevi explains that implicit in what Yosef was saying there was a very very profound and penetrating Tochacha. Dehainu, if you read the Psukim, so the brothers haven't gone back to Eretz Yisrael since they were last in Yosef's court. They were stopped at the end of Parshas Mikeitz and they never make it back to Yaakov Avinu. Last time they had had an audience with Yosef, so at that point Yosef had also asked about Yaakov Avinu. He'd also asked about Yaakov's welfare. So they obviously didn't have any update, they didn't have any status report which was more current than the one he'd already gotten. So why did Yosef bother asking a second time Haod Avi Chai when their information was no more up-to-date than the information they had already shared with him? Says the Beis Halevi, Al Korchacha the Pshat is אני יוסף העוד אבי חי that the question was more of a rhetorical question and was intended as Tochacha. That's what the Midrash is saying. Ani Yosef, I am Yosef that you sold to Mitzrayim and you subjected my father to all that profound Agmas Nefesh and distress because he thought I'd been killed. Was he able to overcome that Tzaar and is he still alive? So Haod Avi Chai was giving them Tochacha. He was giving them Tochacha. He was giving them Tochacha. It wasn't the question as to Yaakov's welfare because he knew that already. He said, is it conceivable that Yaakov survived all the Tzaar which you inflicted upon him? Mistama, I don't remember the Beis Halevi says this, mistama that also accounts for the Lashon Yachid of Avi as opposed to Avinu. He's talking to his brothers, no? So usually, I don't know, if you're talking to your siblings, you don't talk about my father or my mother, you talk with your siblings so you would say our. But Haod Avi Chai clearly personalizing it because of the Tochacha. And the Beis Halevi goes on, Kayaduah, to explain that the that Yosef HaTzadik's Tochacha was especially cutting because Yosef was was questioning them and highlighting internal inconsistency. That here is Yehuda making a whole appeal based on the fact

ואיך אעלה אל אבי והנער איננו אתי פן אראה ברע אשר ימצא את אבי.

How can I witness the Agmas Nefesh which my father will have? So Yosef is highlighting the inconsistency in their behavior. Haod Avi Chai, was he able to withstand all the Tzaar which he went through on account of what you did to me? And the Beis Halevi explains that that's Pshat in Din v'cheshbon. Din means that we're asked on an absolute basis to account for our actions. And then Cheshbon is that Le'asid Lavo we have to show internal consistency. He gives an example, if we're asked why didn't we give more Tzedakah and we say we couldn't afford it, so then Le'asid Lavo we're shown all kinds of frivolous expenses that we incurred while we were pleading poverty when it came to Tzedakah. It comes to giving tzedaka. I wanted to, so this is all yadua. I wanted to elaborate just on one example which the Beis Halevi gives, which is very, all the examples are very important and the musar is a very very powerful one. But it's interesting, the Beis Halevi says וכן הוא בעניין האמונה. This same internal inconsistency is true gabbi emuna as well. And here the Beis Halevi points out something very very important, very important to be aware of. People who are nebach not ma'aminim usually paint a portrait that there's something irrational about having emuna and that the reason they don't believe is because they are totally thoroughgoing utterly rationalists and they're not willing to suspend their reason to believe in things, and that's why they can't believe and that's the basis for their kfira. And they paint people who are ma'aminim as being willing to suspend their reason and as being certainly less rational and more more gullible as it were than people who are eino ma'aminim. Says the Beis Halevi, if you look at it carefully, apikorsus involves more blind faith than emuna does. People who are eino ma'aminim in their kfira, in their heresy, are less rational than people who are ma'aminim. How is that? I'll give an example, it's not the example he gives, we'll come to maybe later we'll come to the example he gives. Example: the whole enterprise of science rests on one assumption. Everything, everything, every single branch of science, every scientific endeavor is based on one yesod gadol. There's one yesod hayesodos for all of science and that is that the world we live in is orderly and that there are laws of nature and that there are patterns of nature, that there are chukei hateva which can be discovered and therefore you can formulate theories and you can make predictions based on these theories and in so doing you can test the theories and you can establish the truth as to what laws govern nature. If you if you don't have that assumption, if you assume that everything in the world is possibly random or chaotic, so then the whole endeavor of science is crazy. If you if you have no reason to think that a tenth planet exists, so to spend your life and to dedicate your life searching for something that you have no reason to think exists is a very very irrational and crazy thing to do. Crazy thing to do. And yet, and yet, some of the some of the most outspoken kofrim, some of the most outspoken eino ma'aminim are men of science, are men of science. And yet they display a totally irrational emuna that the world around us isn't random, that it isn't chaotic, that it's totally orderly. And not only that, not only that, if you look, there is another yesod which is accepted by all scientists in the scientific community and that is let's say you have two theories to account for different phenomena. You have two theories. So virtually everyone agrees that the simpler the theory, the better it is. That if one theory has 25 rules to explain ich veis the orbit of the planets or something else, and the other one has one rule, so the simpler the theory the better, the better the theory, and that's the theory which is accepted. So not only not only is there an assumption that the world is orderly and not chaotic, but the assumption also is that it's as orderly as possible, as neat as possible, and that those theories should be as beautiful as possible. Hava nisbonen, Hava nisbonen. So the man of science claims, the man of science claims that he doesn't believe, he doesn't believe in Ribono shel olam, doesn't believe in a Borei olam, he only believes in what he sees, but his whole life revolves around this assumption, around this assumption that even though the world came to exist randomly, accidentally, that nevertheless the world is the exact opposite of that and the world is totally orderly, everything is systematized, everything is according to chukei hateva with hardly anything random in the world. So if you compare that to what a person who is a maamin says, he also says that yes, there are chukei hateva, but those chukei hateva are ratzon Hashem, חוק וזמן נתן להם. We also believe in chukei hateva, but those chukei hateva are ratzon Hashem, חוק וזמן נתן להם. And the reason the world isn't random and the reason the world is such a beautifully ordered and structured world is because it reflects chochmas Hashem, it reflects the ein sof. So says the Beis Halevi, interpolating this example into his words, leosid lavo the person who's not a maamin will be challenged and when he'll claim that his kefira stems from super rationalism, from being totally rational, so he'll be shown the inconsistency, the inconsistency of his beliefs, that he has blind belief in an orderly world which again basically there's no basis for it and meheicha teisi there should be such a thing, it's the craziest thing imaginable that a world that came into existence totally randomly should should be totally governed by chukei hateva. Another example, this one the Beis Halevi gives, people often scoff at belief in masora, belief in masora. Everything we believe in is based on masora. People who are not maaminim disavow masora as though masora isn't reliable. If you ask them what's going on in current events, so they'll tell you what they read in the New York Times, and they'll tell you that they know what's going on, they know what's going on. So what are they relying on? They're relying on what other people tell them. They're relying on it's not even ish mipi ish, it's and you're relying on one yachid as opposed to relying on shishim ribo who transmit a masora. If you ask them how they know, take the example of science again, if you ask them how they know various facts of science, did they do the experiments and did they verify all the experiments for themselves? Again the answer is no, but they read it in the textbook, they know it, they know it in the textbook that so and so, this great scientist did this and this great scientist did that, and they know that they did the experiment and the experiment confirmed the theory. So what is that? So be'emes that's a form of masora. Be'emes it's a form of masora. Be'emes it's a form of masora. Everyone believes in masora. And what's more, the masora which people accept is a masora which is so, so much weaker and so much less reliable than our masora. Talking about a masora of yechidim or something? Talking about a masora of all of Klal Yisrael. A masora that we see there's so many, so many, so many things on which Klal Yisrael, even though they've been scattered בארבע כנפות הארץ, never disagree on. No one ever disagreed about which day of the week is Shabbos. No one ever disagreed about which months, about the calendar, v'chulu v'chulu. So many, so many basic yesodos, which all Klal Yisrael, even though for hundreds, thousands of years they were cut off from each other and they had no contact, but they all believe in. Things which underscore the authenticity of masora. And yet, the and the eino ma'aminim will tell you, "No, we're rationalists, we don't just accept some oral tradition," when in fact everyone intuitively recognizes an oral tradition and what's more live based on an oral tradition which is so, so which is infinitely weaker than the masora which has safeguarded Torah She'Ba'al Peh. That's a very, very important perspective to have. It's very important to be aware of that the basics of our emuna are not anti-reason. It's not a question that we suspend our reason in the basics of our emuna, but on the contrary, the world outlook of a person who's ma'amin is much more rational and much more reasonable than that of someone who's not ma'amin. That doesn't mean, it doesn't mean that a ma'amin claims to understand everything. It doesn't mean that he claims to understand all darchei Hashem. It doesn't mean that he claims to understand every instance of hashgachas Hashem. No, that's not what it means. Avada כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי, so avada there is no such thing as a person who understands everything Hakadosh Baruch Hu does. No, there's no such person. There's no such person. We all hear, some experience tragedies, and we don't understand it. We don't understand it. So avada as part of our emuna, there are times when we just bow our heads and say כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם, that we don't understand everything Hakadosh Baruch Hu does. But the point is that we're able to reach that madreiga, we're able to reach that stage because everything until that stage is so reasonable. It's not that our entire emuna mitchila v'ad sof is just that we suspend our reason. No, based on our reason, so we know Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and we know that we have Torah mi'Sinai, and we know that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mashgiach on the world. All that based on our reason. And then we also know based on our reason that ha'yitachen that we should be able to understand everything Hakadosh Baruch Hu does. Nowadays there is a very rampant chutzpa that people want to be able to understand everything. And what they can't understand can't be, or at the very least it can't be legitimate. And that's a very, very dangerous and totally antithetical to the posture of a person who's ma'amin. We believe and we understand the yesodos ha'emuna, but part of the yesodos ha'emuna which we understand is הייתכן דהקדוש ברוך הוא, Ein Sof should be limited by our finite intelligence. To assume that we should understand all darchei Hashem and every instance of hashgachas Hashem would basically mean, kavyachol, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu would be limited in governing the world and directing the world to what we can understand. משל למה הדבר דומה, you'll say that a parent can only nurture a child and do for a child the things the child can understand. And if the child can't understand why the glowing red thing on the stove top, which looks so inviting and it looks so nice. to touch, but if the child can't understand why he shouldn't do it, so then the parent shouldn't say anything, because the parent should only guide the child if the child can understand why what the parent is doing is best. So obviously that would be a terrible neglect of parental duty. The parent has to do the best according to his or her ability and the best according to his or her understanding what's best for the child, even if the child is too young to comprehend. So the same is true: we can't have any expectation of understanding everything HaKadosh Baruch Hu does. And lots of things happen collectively and individually that we can't understand and only in acharit hayamim will we understand. But the point is that that has to be, that has to be, because were it not so, were it not so, then kavyachol HaKadosh Baruch Hu's Ein Sof would be limited to guiding the world according to our very, very feeble and finite understanding of what's right and what's wrong. So it's very important to understand the role of reason and at what point tziduk hadin comes in where we suspend reason. But it's not that our entire emuna is just based on suspending reason; that's not at all the case, that's not at all the case. I just wanted one other he'ara from the parsha mentioned last night and discuss the Midrash on ואת יהודה שלח לפניו להורות גשנה. So be'emet, if you look in Rashi and in the Midrash, besides the famous interpretation that it was to prepare a makom for studying Torah, so then the Midrash has another de'ah, and Rashi actually quotes this first, that it was to find him an apartment. He sent Yehuda ahead to scout for real estate. Yaakov Avinu was moving, moving to a new neighborhood, so he needed an apartment, he needed a house. And so he sent Yehuda ahead to prepare accommodations for him. This lich'ora is very difficult. We know, if you just learn Chumash with Rashi, so Rashi says very often, especially in Parshat Bereishit, he says this a lot, that Chazal in Midrash Rabbah have many perushim al derech midrash, al derech aggadah, ואני לא באתי אלא לפרש אלא פשוטו של מקרא. And then there are sometimes where Rashi says that there is no pshuto shel mikra and the pshuto shel mikra is gufo shel aggadah, is gufo shel aggadah, whether on Bereishit bara Elokim right away Rashi says it because the grammar isn't right, just linguistically it doesn't make any sense. So whenever Rashi tells you the pshuto shel mikra, so it means that the pshuto shel mikra is valid. There may be other deeper allusions and levels of understanding, but the pshuto shel mikra is also a valid level of understanding. So in this pasuk of ואת יהודה שלח לפניו להורות גשנה, it's true Rashi quotes al derech aggadah what Chazal say, but the derech aggadah isn't the pshat; it's another level of understanding. But the pshat is also valid. The pshat that he sent him ahead to prepare a house for him is also valid. Sha'ala is: why would that be worthy of mention in the Torah? Mameila that he sent Yehuda ahead to prepare a beit hatalmud for him, so we understand what the Torah is teaching us. We understand the mussar haskel. But that he sent Yehuda ahead to prepare a house for him—he had to do it, he needed a place to live, and he didn't want to be tircha'd when he got there, and he was already a zaken, he didn't want to be homeless and he didn't want to... Why is that worthy of being recorded in the Torah? Why is that worthy of being recorded in the Torah? And lich'ora there is a very, very important mussar haskel in that. From the fact that the Torah does record this, the Torah is teaching us the following: the Torah's teaching us that not only when it comes to Torah and mitzvot is a person—is a Jew supposed to be distinctive in the fact that he learns Torah and he does mitzvot, but even in milei d'alma, even in those preoccupations which we have, which are universal preoccupations, which we share with the umot ha'olam, so there too a Jew... the bechir ha'avos needs a roof over his head, everyone needs a roof over their head. But nevertheless, the way Yaakov Avinu did it was distinctive and it reflected the fact that he was a Yaakov Avinu, that he was a Yaakov Avinu. How a person dresses, how he sets up his household, how a person eats, how a person talks, all these milei d'alma, all these again universal preoccupations, necessary preoccupations, so a ben torah is supposed to be unique and distinctive in these as well. Specifically, specifically, let's talk about את יהודה שלח לפניו להורות גשנה to prepare a house. Let's talk about what's distinctive in how a ben torah would set up his house, set up his apartment. So we know Chazal tell us that

דירה נאה מרחיבה דעתו של אדם, דירה נאה מרחיבה דעתו של אדם.

A person's goal in finding living quarters should be to have harchavas hadaas, to have the peace of mind and the conducive atmosphere in which to pursue his avodas Hashem. So את יהודה שלח לפניו להורות גשנה. So when Yaakov Avinu, mistama, when Yaakov Avinu told Yehuda, told Yehuda to find him a house, so he mistama he told him not just find me a house the same way anyone with this universal need would instruct a real estate agent, but rather he told him find me a dira

בבחינת דירה נאה המרחיבה דעתו של אדם, דירה נאה המרחיבה דעתו של אדם.

And even in that universal need which he had, there was something distinctive in the context and the purpose for which it was done and consequently how it was done. If the point is harchavas hadaas, so there shouldn't be anything conspicuous about it. And avada when you hear stories of houses which are conspicuously grand, it's wrong, it's wrong. We know the acharonim already tzavchu k'kruchya on this question. Conspicuous consumption was not what Yehuda was sent ahead for. It's not בבחינת דירה נאה המרחיבה דעתו של אדם. There should be room, there should be quiet that a person can think, but there shouldn't be any kind of ostentatiousness associated with it. Same is true when it comes to dress. A person should, v'zeh klal is that a person should be inconspicuous. He shouldn't be conspicuous by being a shlump and he shouldn't be conspicuous by you shouldn't see dollar signs written all over his suit. It's very important, very important, and it goes a long way towards assuring kiddush shem shamayim if we're able to be mekayem ואת יהודה שלח לפניו להורות גשנה, not only in the sense of להכין לו בית ועד or beis hatalmud for learning Torah, but also to be mekayem in the pashut pshat of preparing a dira, of carrying out those basic material needs which we have to do that also in a fashion of וכל מעשיך יהיו לשם שמים, both in terms of purpose and also in terms of substance, how you do it, how you do it, so that goes a long way towards assuring that. In the matter which emerges from Parshat Hashavua this week, Yaakov, Yaakov says to Yosef:

עשית עמדי חסד ואמת אל נא תקברני במצרים ושכבתי עם אבותי ונשאתני ממצרים וקברתני בקבורתם.

So it's quite clear just from the pshuto shel mikra that Yaakov Avinu had two requests. It's quite clear if his only request was to be buried in Eretz Yisrael, so all he had to say was

ושכבתי עם אבותי ונשאתני ממצרים וקברתני בקבורתם, ושכבתי עם אבותי וקברתני בקבורתם.

So it's clear that Yaakov Avinu had two requests. Number one was even if for some reason it wouldn't be possible that he should be nikbar in Eretz Yisrael, so he was makpid that he didn't want to be buried in Mitzrayim. Number two, he also wanted that the kvura should be in Eretz Yisrael. So that's clear just from the pshat in the psukim, that it was a double request. He didn't want Mitzrayim and he wanted Eretz Yisrael. He wanted Eretz Yisrael. That's why you find that there's no machlokes at all here. Rashi explains, we're all familiar with the three reasons Yaakov Avinu didn't want to be buried in Mitzrayim because the afar ha'aretz was gonna be stricken with the maka of kinim and that meisei chutz la'aretz is betzaar gadol and that they shouldn't make him an avoda zara. So Rashi is again clearly responding to this, this arichus in the lashon hapzukim explaining what his kpeida was not to be buried in Mitzrayim. The Rambam mi'idei gisa in Hilchos Melachim explains the second request, the second part of Yaakov Avinu's request in perek hei Hilchos Melachim in his discussion of Eretz Yisrael. So the Rambam writes that

אמרו חכמים כל השוכן בארץ ישראל עונותיו מחולין אפילו הלך בה ארבע אמות זוכה לחיי העולם הבא וכן הקבור בה נתכפר לו אינו דומה קולטתו מחיים לקולטתו אחר מותו.

It's better to live there than just to be buried there and

גדולי החכמים היו מוליכים מתיהם לשם צא ולמד מיעקב אבינו ויוסף הצדיק.

So the Rambam is not at odds with Rashi again because מר מחדי ומר מחדי ולא פליגי. Rashi explained why Yaakov Avinu wanted bedafka not to be buried in Mitzrayim and the Rambam is coming and filling in why Yaakov Avinu bedafka wanted to be buried in Eretz Yisrael. It's interesting, I think I heard this he'ara from Rav Sacks zichrono livracha that you see from this Rambam a raya to the question, maybe not the question, maybe it's a davar pashut, that you see a raya to the notion, something which the Rav zichrono livracha often spoke about that there is a shem Eretz Yisrael, there is something, there is a distinct cheftza of Eretz Yisrael even without kdushas ha'aretz. And even at a time when there's no kdushas ha'aretz, so Eretz Yisrael still had a shem Eretz Yisrael that it's a special place in the world even when it's lacking the kdushas ha'aretz. V'haraya, there are many rayos, but one of them is from this Rambam that the Rambam quotes a raya, that the Rambam quotes a raya as a that Yaakov Avinu and Yosef Hatzadik, the mailos of being buried in Eretz Yisrael, so they too wanted, they too wanted even though at that point it was before Kibush Yehoshua and lephi pshuto there was no kdushas ha'aretz yet, but אף על פי כן the mailos of Eretz Yisrael, all the special segulos and mailos of Eretz Yisrael are present there even independent of kdushas ha'aretz. Even independent of kdushas ha'aretz. The Ramban... says that in the hashmatos to Gittin daf bais as well. Tosafos has the stiras on daf bais in Gittin about what the gvulos of Eretz Yisrael are, about Akko and other things, and they they would kiss the the land, but ay Tosafos has kashas it doesn't seem to have been included in kedushas ha'aretz. So the Ramban says there's no kasha from one to another. The chavivus of Eretz Yisrael, the maylas of Eretz Yisrael were there even if kedushas ha'aretz was not there, even if kedushas ha'aretz was not there, even if kedushas ha'aretz was not there. So maybe let's a little bit take a few minutes out to discuss a little bit the inyan of Eretz Yisrael. In the next halacha, the Rambam quotes from the Gemara in Kesuvos, from the beraisa in Kesuvos that it's preferable... It's very... Talk about Eretz Yisrael sitting in chutz la'aretz is a little bit of a tarte d'sasri. It's certainly aino noeh mikayem. But אף על פי כן אף על פי כן if we don't talk about it, so it would be certainly nishtakeach legamrei from our consciousness. Tanu rabbanan

לעולם ידור אדם בארץ ישראל אפילו בעיר שרובה עובדי כוכבים ואל ידור בחוץ לארץ ואפילו בעיר שרובה ישראל.

The beraisa continues, but let's let's cut the beraisa off in mid-sentence. What's the reason for this lechorah? What's the geder hadin? That le'olam yadur adam in Eretz Yisrael even living amongst gentiles rather than living in chutz la'aretz primarily amongst Jews? So lechorah the simple pshat is, let's say if you follow the shitas haramban udeimei, because yishuv Eretz Yisrael is a mitzvah. That's it. Because it's a mitzvah to live in Eretz Yisrael. So it's very nice to, you know, Jewish neighborhoods are very nice, frum neighborhoods are very nice, but yishuv Eretz Yisrael is a mitzvah. yishuv Eretz Yisrael is a mitzvas assay. It's a mitzvas assay. And yet the beraisa, and again, so let's just to simplify things, let's learn according to the Rambam, yet the beraisa doesn't say that. The beraisa continues

שכל הדר בארץ ישראל דומה כמי שיש לו אלוה וכל הדר בחוץ לארץ דומה כמי שאין לו אלוה.

So what do you need this reason for? What do you need this the mussar for? That if you live in Eretz Yisrael, it's as if you have a, you have a ribbono shel olam, but if you live in chutz la'aretz, so it's as if you don't. What's wrong with the reason of it's a mitzvah? What's wrong what's it's a mitzvah? If it's a mitzvah, so you do it. If it's not a mitzvah... It's a mitzvah, you do it. That should be enough of a reason. So lechorah the answer is as follows, and this is a something to try not to lose lose sight of. Rambam writes in perek vav Hilchos De'os, we all know it from experience as well,

דרך בריאתו של אדם להיות נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחרי ריעיו וחביריו ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו.

Human nature is that people are influenced by their surroundings. לפיכך צריך אדם להתחבר לצדיקים, a person should try as much as possible to attach himself to tzaddikim, ולשב אצל החכמים תמיד, and always to be in the presence of talmidei chachamim kedei sheyilmad mima'aseihem and

ואידך מגיסא יתרחק מן הרשעים ההולכים בחשך כדי שלא ילמד ממעשיהם.

So because it's human nature that a person is influenced by his friends, by his environment, so a person... Well, so be'emes lechora in light of this Rambam, if we didn't have the Gemara in Kesuvos and we would have been dealing with this question whether ידור אדם בעיר בארץ ישראל בעיר שרובה עובדי כוכבים or ידור אדם בחוץ לארץ בעיר שרובה ישראל, so I think we would have said based on the Rambam's psak, even according to the Rambam, we would have said true, yeshivat Eretz Yisrael is taka a mitzvah, but if the risk factor in that mitzvah, since derech adam is lihyos nimshach, so the one mitzvah of yeshivat Eretz Yisrael certainly could not outweigh the risk and the danger to everything, to his entire avodas Hashem, to his performance of all Torah u'mitzvos, because the odds are that he's going to be influenced adversely there and that will undermine, so he won't be makpid on davening and he won't learn as much and he won't be makfied on kashrus carefully enough and he won't be makpid on this and on that, and to sacrifice all that for yeshivat Eretz Yisrael, avada you're not supposed to do, avada you're not supposed to do. So continues the Baraisa even according to the Rambam, even if you say that yeshivat Eretz Yisrael's a mitzvah, so the Baraisa has to continue that that alone doesn't account for the psak that

ידור אדם בארץ ישראל אפילו בעיר שרובה עובדי כוכבים ואל ידור בחוץ לארץ אפילו בעיר שרובה ישראל.

That's why the Baraisa continues with שכל הדר בארץ ישראל. But what does the Baraisa taka answer? If this question that we raised is correct, it is a good tyna, so what's the answer in the Baraisa? What's the answer in the Baraisa? It comes out hafleh va'feleh. The answer in the Baraisa is that the fact that it's דומה כמי שיש לו אלוה, that the kirvas Elokim that a person has when he's in Eretz Yisrael will exert more influence on him than the societal influence. And ein hachi nami, ein hachi nami is

דרך אדם להיות נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחר ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו.

That's true. However, when you realize the segulah of Eretz Yisrael, that when a person is in Eretz Yisrael he seems to have a closer, more direct, more personal relationship with Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so that is so real, not just something mystical, but something mystical also, but it's so real in terms of its effect on a person that that's what the Baraisa says that in light of this, that will counter and outweigh the Rambam of פרק ה מהלכות דעות. And mimmela that's the pshat, that's the pshat. Not just the mitzvas asei per se, but rather the fact that the hashpa'ah to which a person will expose himself there is even greater and stronger letovah than the hashpa'ah of living amongst rov ovdei kochavim is lera. So just imagine על אחת כמה וכמה when Eretz Yisrael is the Torah center of the world, על אחת כמה וכמה. So the Gemara says that when you have a stirah between the two, the Gemara says that the דומה כמי שיש לו אלוה is stronger, על אחת כמה וכמה in our days when there is no stirah, aderaba, Eretz Yisrael is the biggest makom Torah in the world. Something which is kedai not to lose sight of. Now when it comes to just one or two random he'aros, when it comes to translating this hashkafa, implementing it halacha le'ma'aseh, so there are other issues involved, there are other issues involved kayadua. some kind of simplistic perspective. But one thing lichora, one thing lichora is clear, and that is that the question of Eretz Yisrael should always, mamash always, lichora without דווקא בטובה ובלשון הטוב, should always be in our minds and if we find ourselves far from Eretz Yisrael, it shouldn't be because of inertia or hesach hadas, but it should be because of some careful, well-thought-out decision. But it should never be out of inertia or hesach hadas. It should never be for those two reasons. Of course, one of the issues which is often discussed, the question of Eretz Yisrael versus Kibbud Av Va-em, and keyadua, there's a teshuva on it, Rav Ovadia Yosef in one of his teshuvos quotes all the...