Rambam, Hil’ Ta’aniyos: Achzariyus

בעזרת השם בלי נדר we'll review together the opening halachot with which you're all familiar in the Rambam's Hilchot Ta'aniot. I'd like to share two thoughts and at the outset just indicate not, and this isn't said apologetically, it's said because it's intrinsically, substantively very important to recognize that kemedumeh that what we're going to discuss is very much a shiur in halacha, albeit in an area of halacha that pertains to הלכות דעות וחובות הלבבות, but halacha shebo, not only agadda shebo. So if you have access to it, take a look, rabosai, so the Rambam begins Hilchot Ta'aniot as follows. Ultimately we're going to, I think, just comment on one word in Halacha Gimmel, but just to have it in context. מצות עשה מן התורה liz'ok uleharia bachatzotzrot על כל צרה שתבא על הצבור shene'emar על הצר הצרר אתכם והרעתם בחצצרות klomar כל דבר שיצר לכם כגון בצורת ודבר וארבה vekhayotzei bahen za'aku aleihen vehariu.

ודבר זה מדרכי התשובה שבזמן שתבא צרה ויזעקו עליה ויריעו ידעו הכל שבגלל מעשיהם הרעים הוא להם ככתוב עונותיכם הטו וגומר וזהו שיגרום להם להסיר הצרה מעליהם. אבל אם לא יזעקו ולא יריעו אלא יאמרו דבר זה ממנהג העולם אירע לנו וצרה זו מקרה נקרית הרי זו דרך אכזריות וגורמת להם להדבק במעשיהם הרעים ותוסף הצרה צרות אחרות.

Hu shekatuven baTorah vehalachtem imi bekeri

והלכתי עמכם בחמת קרי כלומר כשאביא עליכם צרה כדי שתשובו אם תאמרו שהוא קרי אוסיף לכם חמת אותו קרי.

Let's focus just on the word achzariut, what the word means and the Rambam's attribution of dismissing the tzara as minhag ha'olam as being derekh achzariut. Those are the two things we'll try to do in the few minutes, first of all what the word means and second of all the attribution of this mistake to derekh achzariut. So we generally translate achzariut as cruelty and it's certainly a correct translation but itochen that it's somewhat of a derivative and applied translation definition. So for instance in Perek Bet of Hilchot Teshuva the Rambam quotes from the end of HaChovel אסור לאדם שיהא אכזרי ולא יתפייס. If a person was wronged and the other party is looking to be mipayes, is appeasing him genuinely, sincerely, so אסור לאדם שיהא אכזרי. But rather

יהא נוח לרצות וקשה לכעוס ובשעה שמבקש ממנו החוטא למחול מוחל בלב שלם ובנפש חפצה.

So achzari in this context is lich'ora more precisely defined and translated as a person shouldn't be lema'aseh, to be very technical about it, not being mochel the other person is not achzariut cruelty in the sense of that you're harming the other person, adaraba, after three times the shoe's going to be on the other foot, he's his slight is cleared and intimation of cruelty is not quite accurate here. It means a person shouldn't be unmoved by the piyus. The divrei piyus, the appeasement, a person shouldn't be so callous and rigid and insensitive that he's not moved by the divrei piyus. A person's coming, he's being mefayeis, so it's not so much the cruelty, it's the callousness, it's the insensitivity, it's the divrei piyus are not registering. Now it's easy to understand how that middah, that chumra in a person, rachmana litzlan, will translate into cruelty in bein adam l'chaveiro-dig situations, but the yesod hadavar is the callousness, is the insensitivity, is the failure to react, that what's happening doesn't register.

כל מי שאינו מתאבל כמו שציוו חכמים הרי זה אכזרי. אלא יפחד וידאג ויפשפש במעשיו ויחזור בתשובה.

Rambam is not, clearly he's not talking about whatever tikun for the neshama of the niftar observing aveilus has. He's not, whatever happens on that level, on that realm, that's not the level on which the Rambam is writing. Again, what's the achzariyus? The achzariyus is that there's no reaction, there's a callousness. What happened doesn't register, the insensitivity is so profound and so extreme. And that kimedumeh is the core definition of achzariyus. And that's what the Rambam is talking about in Hilchos Ta'aniyos, that the tzara doesn't register, that there's a callousness, that there's an insensitivity. The chiyuv of lizok u'leharia is a chiyuv that a person is guilty of a bitul asei when there's achzariyus. Again, not achzariyus cruelty, again, although it will metamorphose, it will set off a chain reaction which creates cruel consequences rachmana litzlan, but the core is just an insensitivity. And that's why you find already here in Hilchos Teshuva, but the Rambam has it in more than one place, when the Rambam talks about achzariyus, he associates achzariyus with orlah. זהו דרכם של זרע ישראל ולבם הנכון להתמחל, regardless of how much the other party wronged him.

דרכם של זרע ישראל ולבם הנכון להתמחל. אבל הגוים ערלי לב אינם כן. אלא ועברתו שמרה נצח. וכן הוא אומר על הגבעונים לפי שלא מחלו ולא נתפייסו והגבעונים לא מבני ישראל המה.

So what does orlah mean? So orlah literally means a kisuy. It means a covering. That's what orlah is. So it means that there's a covering which prevents things from registering and it results in this callous insensitivity. And that's the core of what achzariyus means. Let's go a little further. Elsewhere you find the Rambam has the contrast of rachmanus and achzarius. They represent davar vehifucha. So for instance, in the beginning of Hilchos Deios, when the Rambam is gives a whole catalogues, examples of

דעות הרבה יש לכל אחד ואחד מבני אדם וזו משונה מזו ורחוקה ממנה ביותר יש אדם שהוא בעל חמה כעוס תמיד יש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל

vechulu vechulu ve'al drachim elu, fast-forwarding to the end of the halacha, ve'al drachim elu

שאר כל הדעות כגון מהולל ועונן וכילי ושוע ואכזרי ורחמן,

achzarius and rachmanus are thesis and antithesis, polar polar opposites. The Rambam talks about how to treat an eved Kena'ani, yedaber imo benachas ואין האכזריות והעזות מצויה אלא בגוים הערלים. Again, the association of achzarius with the, with the orlah, with, with kisui.

אבל זרעו של אברהם אבינו והם ישראל שהשפיע להם הקדוש ברוך הוא טובת התורה וציוום בחוקים ומשפטים צדיקים רחמנים הם על הכל.

So achzarius and rachmanus, davar vehifucha. The rachman feels, he responds, he feels, reflects, and responds to the tzara of the person in front of him. But here it's important to note the following, and and this is actually a very very important point within משנתו של רבינו הרמב"ם in general in Hilchos Deios. When, when we think of let's say rachmanus, rachmanus whether or not a person gives, gives, gives tzedakah, whether or not a person looks to, to encourage others or not rachmanus let's not. Okay, so we think of that that belongs to sort of one realm. Let's say a different snapshot: I'm sitting at the table, I'm basically full, I've basically eaten enough to satisfy myself, to fortify myself, but the kugel was very good. The first piece of kugel was very good, the second piece of kugel was even better, and there's still some more on the plate. So the shaila is: do I go for the, do I go for the third piece or don't I go for the third piece? That's also a situation, right? So there's a situation: do I, how do I respond rachmana litzlan to this, to this ani? How do I respond to this nebach, nefesh meduka? We think of those as different realms. It's not, it's not different realms. In the Rambam Hilchos Deios, there's, there's no phillug or peirud between those two; there's one continuum in, in terms of Hilchos Deios, it's the same. So for instance, when, when the Rambam then introduces the midah hamemutzaas

הדרך הישרה א-ד היא מדה בינונית שבכל דעה ודעה לפיכך,

skipping a little bit jumping around,

ציוו חכמים הראשונים שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד ומשער אותן ומכוון אותן בדרך האמצעית כדי שיהא שלם. כיצד לא יהא בעל חמה נוח לכעוס ולא כמת שאינו מרגיש אלא בינוני.

Now look at, look at these examples that the Rambam, which are all examples of the same type of morality. There's one continuum here. Look, just listen to the next examples:

לא יתאוה אלא לדברים שהגוף צריך להם. וכן לא יהיה עמל בעסקו אלא להשיג דבר שצריך לו לחיי שעה ולא יקבוץ ידו ביותר ולא יפזר כל ממונו אלא נותן צדקה כפי מיסת ידו ומלווה כראוי למי שצריך.

So right there back to back, it's the same principle. It's the same mussarius. It's the same ethic. It's the same yesod. It's the same vehalachta bidrachav, whether I reach for the gratuitously, unnecessarily for the second, third piece of kugel, and whether I give a proper amount of tzedaka. It's the same. And the sugya we're learning now is a perfect illustration of that. We're talking about again achzariyus. Achzariyus is the antithesis of the rachmanus. Achzariyus is when I walk by the ani and pretend not to see him. But achzariyus is also when the tzara doesn't elicit a reaction from me. I dismiss it. We think of one as ich veis bein adam lachaveiro, one is bein adam lamakom. No, it's the same achzariyus, it's the same mida. It's the same mida of whether or not a person is just so caught up with himself and his small-mindedness that things don't register. There's no sensitivity. There's such a profound and extreme, and it's the same lashon achzariyus because it's one continuum in the Rambam's Toras Hamussar. And yitachen, the Rambam's Hilchos Taanis doesn't really need to be dramatized any more than what the words suggest say on the most basic level, but yitachen and this point needs to be made carefully, not to be overstated. When Chazal say in Yevamos again, the Chazal that the Rambam is reflecting there in Hilchos Avadim and Hilchos Teshuva and more directly in Hilchos Issurei Biah about the גמל סימנים באומה זו: רחמנים בישנים גומלי חסדים. So it's an essential defining characteristic of a Jew that he's a rachman, which means there's no achzariyus in him. But the yesod of rachmanus is not just bein adam lachaveiro. That's one venue in which it will surface. It's one venue in which it's relevant. The yesod of rachmanus, rachmanus again the opposite of achzariyus is a sensitivity, a sensitivity to what's happening, sensitivity to anything and everything. The sensitivity maybe to people, which it is in rachmanus, it may be to events, which is what we're talking about in Hilchos Taanis, but it's the same mida. And that's a defining mida of what it means to be a Jew. Now again to be careful not to overstate the point, I'm not aware that there's any basis in the Rambam for, it's true that the Rambam quotes lehalacha again based on the gemara in Yevamos, he quotes lehalacha in Hilchos Issurei Biah that if you see someone who's an achzar chosheshin leyichuso. Don't make such a shidduch. Not sure why one would have been interested in the shidduch anyway, but maybe she's rich, I don't know, there are reasons that one might have been interested in the shidduch. So the Rambam says no, chosheshin, chosheshin leyichuso, you can't marry into such a family because גמל סימנים באומה זו. We're not suggesting that that question mark of the Rambam lehalacha. We're not suggesting that that cloud of doubt regarding to yuchsin would apply to someone who manifests Rachmana Litzlan achzariyus as in hilchos Taaniyos. I'm not looking to kol hamosef goreia to overstate the point. But with that careful circumscription notwithstanding, the defining mida of Rachmanus is a mida to be sensitive to what's happening. What's happening may be a poor person, an unfortunate person, an unhappy person, a lonely person, or it might be that the world is shaking in front of our eyes. Amudei aretz yirofafu. But I'm so caught up with waiting in line to buy my milk and my morning cereal that it doesn't register. It's the same mida of achzariyus as when I walk by the ani or the lonely person and don't notice. It's the same mida of achzariyus. It's the same word because it's the same mida. Okay. I said the second point that we wanted to comment on here in the Rambam hilchos Taaniyos is the Rambam's attribution of if a person's analysis of what's happening is דבר זה ממנהגו עולם. So the Rambam attributes it to achzariyus. So I understand how it can be attributable to achzariyus again as defined, as just defined. But how does the Rambam know it's that? Maybe it's just am-aratzus. Maybe the person or the people in question never really learned too much about hashgacha, Ribono shel Olam's hashgacha for Klal Yisrael, and maybe that's the source of the error. How does the Rambam know to say so categorically, so unequivocally that הרי זו דרך אכזריות? Maybe it's או אכזריות או עם הארצות. What's more, k'medumeh that we encounter this all the time, of דבר זה ממנהגו עולם. We encounter it all the time. And it often strikes us as am-aratzus. So how does the Rambam know it's achzariyus? How does he know that? So if we were zocheh to ask the Rambam the question and had the chutzpah to do so, he would probably very gently point out to us that we didn't read what he wrote. He'd say just read, read what I wrote. The Rambam quotes the psukim from Parshas Bechukosai. It's not the Rambam's diagnosis, it's not the Rambam's attribution. The Torah says. The Torah says if you don't respond to the tzaros, you know what you're doing? It's telchu imi b'keri. The Rambam would say Lo alai she'elaschem, it's in the psukim. But even more and I have to confess that I was very shaken by this realization that the question it was my question. The question itself stems from achzariyus. The question itself betrays achzariyus. Whether one looks, and let's illustrate it with the eis tzara rachmana litzlan, the current eis tzara, whether one looks with a horizontal perspective or whether one looks, horizontal meaning current, the present, recent history, or whether one looks with a vertical perspective of the entire trajectory of Jewish history, am ha'aretzus can't account for attributing this to דבר זה ממנהגו של עולם. Is it true, is it true that the bnei Yishmael have a deep visceral profound murderous hatred of us? Yeah, that's true. That's true. And does that account for what they do? Yeah, it certainly does. But how come it flows and ebbs? How come it starts and stops? The hatred changes? The hatred doesn't change. The hatred is a constant. So why is it that why is it that there are rachmana litzlan waves of terror and then there are quiet times and then it starts and then it stops? Why is it that for the most part despite the fact that we're surrounded by over a billion, a billion people sworn on our destruction, that for the most part life is for the most part without rachmana litzlan understating for a moment the mesirus nefesh of acheinu bnei Yisrael in eretz Yisrael, but for the most part life is is is peaceful. So how is it? There's no natural explanation for that. What? Something just happened that that now they're trying to kill everyone and strike fear into everyone's heart? Nothing happened. Nothing happened. All of a sudden the the the culture which which glorifies massacring Jews, that that culture's been there for a long long time. The visceral hatred is there for a long long time and the knives have been there for a long long time. So what happened naturally? Nothing happened naturally. There's no natural explanation. There's no natural explanation for how it starts, there's no natural explanation how it stops. And you don't have to be a baki in kisvei maharal, you don't have to be a baki in kisvei ramchal, you don't have to have ever heard a shiur on inyanei hashgacha to understand that דבר זה אינו ממנהגו של עולם. If there's am ha'aretzus, it's am ha'aretzus which stems from achzariyus. Because it just doesn't register. It doesn't register. We just don't reflect. That's the horizontal perspective. And if you take a vertical perspective, no no person in his right mind who reflects on the course of Jewish history can can for a moment for even a fleeting moment entertain the thought that it can be understood in in natural terms. A tiny until sixty-seven years ago for two millennia stateless, defenseless, despised, persecuted people. There's no natural it's not am ha'aretzus, it's achzariyus. It's not noticing, it's not thinking, it's not reflecting, it's achzariyus. If there's am ha'aretzus, the yesod of the am ha'aretzus is achzariyus. And if when I look at other people I think it's am ha'aretzus on their part, so that's achzariyus on my part. Because it means that even if a little bit I get it, but I get it in a very weak and tepid and dim. same way, cause otherwise I couldn't think it's am aratzus on their part. It's a very frightening realization. So I'll project onto other people so you'll forgive me for that. So why is it that why is it that why is it that we're achzorim? And what does one do about it? And that's a question halacha l'maaseh, not intended just as a theoretical exploration. Think of a mashal. Let's say, let's say you want to catch a bus and the bus is every half hour, whatever, maybe it's once an hour. It's a big nuisance to miss the bus, miss the train, maybe it's in the train station, and you're a couple of blocks away. And you see the bus is going to be pulling out very soon. So you want to sprint and make that bus. But what's the problem? The problem is you're not in very good shape. You don't if you would go to the gym, not only would they make a shehecheyanu, but they'd make a baruch mechayei meisim upon seeing you, that's how long it's been since the last time you were on the track in the gym. So right now you know how important it is to be able to run and right now you probably even appreciate how important it is to be in good shape. L'maaseh you can't flip a switch. I don't know about you, but I'm going to miss the bus, I'm going to miss the train. Kacha zeh. If our daily reality, and not when it's an eis tzara, our daily reality when things are quiet, when things are peaceful, is too mundane, if our daily reality is too physical, so even in an eis tzara that remains one's reality. A person can't transplant himself from a mundane physical reality into a metaphysical spiritual reality just because that's what the circumstances would warrant, just because there's a Rambam in Hilchos Taanios which says that that should be the level on which I not only cognitively understand but on which I feel. You can't flip that switch. If I'm a citizen of the mundane and physical, if everything if my life everything is the natural, the physical, the mundane, excessively so, so even though even though I've been taught and introduced to the Rambam in Hilchos Taanios and I know it and I understand it, there's still going to be achzarius inside of me. And the response, if a person looks in the mirror he sees to whatever degree an element of achzarius looking back at him, the answer isn't that he has to be maamik more in the Rambam in Hilchos Taanios. The answer is he has to be מתגבר כארי לעבודת בוראו in the morning when the alarm clock goes off. He has to be makpid on coming to Seder. He has to the reality of the minute of Talmud Torah, that's a metaphysical reality, that's a spiritual reality. If that's a reality, so then when the Rambam in Hilchos Taanios is relevant, that will also be a reality. But if the minute of Talmud Torah isn't a reality, so then I'll cognitively understand the Rambam in Hilchos Taanios and I won't be an achzar rachmana litzlan to the degree of thinking or And sometimes the shortcomings that surface in extreme situations they're only magnifying and highlighting shortcomings that are present all the time. And we shouldn't make the mistake of thinking that the tikun is a tikun which is relevant only to that extreme narrowly defined situation. No, the extreme situation highlights and brings to the surface something that's relevant in one's daily life. What my daily reality is. Is my daily reality yiras cheit? Is my daily reality again chashivos of a minute of Talmud Torah, of bein adam lachaveiro? If that's my daily reality, so then when rachmana litzlan, when the time comes, so I'll be in compliance with Hilchos Taanios. But if that's not my daily reality, so then I'm not gonna be able to be in full compliance with Hilchos Taanios any more than I'm gonna be able to catch that bus or catch that train.