Bechira Chofshis

It’s a great honor for me to introduce our guest today. Just put it a little bit in the frame of reference. Many, many years ago, maybe Rabbi Twersky remembers how many, when I was young and he was younger, I just come from St. Louis to New York. I became the rabbi of Young Israel of Hillcrest, and I had a great ambition to make the Adult Education program of the Young Israel of Hillcrest the best in the New York area. And at that time, I was... I had the great idea, the lucky idea to invite Rabbi Twersky to become a member of the faculty of the Adult Education... faculty of Young Israel of Hillcrest. And I spoke to the people who took his shiurim. I will not trans... I found out two things essentially, and I'll use it in terms of davka one of the inyanei Kriat Hatorah. We read Parshat Shekalim, Ki Tisa. Now Ki Tisa has many translations. Counting, but one of the translations of Ki Tisa could also mean elevating and transforming. And what, bar none, the students who attended those shiurim told me about the transforming nature of Rav Twersky's shiurim. And when I started to contemplate how come, it occurred to me that perhaps there's another element of that, of his shiur. Ki Tisa also comes... the tav shin aleph also comes from nesi'as, ke'eilov nosay nafsho, in other words, not only transforming and elevating and counting, it also means longing. Because in somebody who gives a shiur, of course you need the erudition and you of course you need the knowledge and you really have to know everywhere. But somebody has the blessed ability of making you not only learn but longing for learning, looking out, learning all of a sudden is a goal, it's a... it's a rapture, it's somehow... and if you learn Torah from that kind of person, not only do you learn Torah from that kind of person, but it transforms you. And that’s why he was that kind of rebbe, not only by us, but also of course for so many years and wishing for much many, many more years in Yeshiva University. It's a great honor to be exposed to the thought of Rav Twersky and have Rav Twersky lecture to us. Thank you very much, Rabbi Krauss, shlita, Rabbonim, Roshei Yeshiva. It was suggested that we talk a little bit about bechira chofshis. There are many different aspects to the topic, so maybe we'll try to touch upon a few different elements, a few different dimensions of the topic. And as so much else in Torah learning, as is true of so much else, we'll begin with a couple of halachos in the Rambam. So if you have the xeroxed sheet in front of you, maybe we'll just begin by reading a little bit and then use this as a springboard a little bit for some discussion. רשות לכל אדם נתונה. So we usually... reshus means permission. In this context, it doesn't mean permission, it means much more than permission, it means the capacity, the ability. רשות לכל אדם נתונה: the capacity and ability is given to every person.

אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק הרשות בידו.

If a person wants to incline himself, wants to put himself on the track of good and to be righteous, he has that ability. On the other hand,

אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך רעה ולהיות רשע הרשות בידו.

If a person so chooses, then he can root himself along the path of evil and he can be a wicked person, rachmana litzlan.

הוא שכתוב בתורה הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו לדעת טוב ורע.

So the Rambam understands this pasuk... not all understand it this way, but the Rambam understands this pasuk... this pasuk is said in the aftermath of Adam having eaten from the Etz HaDa'as, from the tree of knowledge. Some read peshat in this pasuk, hen ha'adam, now Adam post-cheit, after having sinned, has become כאחד ממנו לדעת טוב ורע. The Rambam didn't... there's three... I am working on a Rambam Hilchos Teshuvah called Sefer HaTeshuvah. So I think the author of that work points out that the Rambam clearly understands this pasuk הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו means that Adam from the time he was created is unique in that he knows tov va'ra. כלומר הן מן זה של אדם, this species of man haya yachid ba'olam, he's unique, ואין מין שני דומה לו and in the world there's no comparable creature. Vezeh ha'inyan, now let's pay special attention to this next these next few words Rabosai,

שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ ואין מי שיעכב בידו מלעשות הטוב והרע.

And I'm just going to hold off on one minute in translating that. And before we do, let's say we had a given operating definition of free will. So what would the what would your operating definition of free will be? Ability to choose. Ability to choose, right? The ability to choose. That if you tell me that this is right and this is wrong, so that we have the ability to opt for either. We have the ability rachmana litzlan to opt for the other path. Is that what the Rambam says here? Is that how is that the Rambam's working definition of bechirah, of free will? Well the Rambam has a much deeper and much more profound definition. So maybe let's re-read this line and we'll translate it this time. ואין מין שני דומה לו וזה העניין, there is no comparable creature here in the world sheyehei hu me'atzmo, he me'atzmo, of his own accord, b'da'to with his understanding, uv'machshavto and through his thought yodeia hatov ve'hara, he can know, he can divine, he can understand, he can distinguish good from bad, ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ and can then do whatever he chooses to do, ואין מי שיעכב בידו and no one holds him back, no one interferes with that freedom of choice, mila'asos hatov ve'hara. So the Rambam's definition is a much deeper definition. The Rambam's definition, did anyone anyone pick it up Rabosai? What did the Rambam add to our I think what most people would give as the working definition of free will? Ein mi sheya'akev? Ein mi sheya'akev? Okay, he's underscoring the fact that there is no no one's going to interfere, correct? Specifically with good and evil. But specifically that the Rambam tells us that part of the same capacity of free will is the capacity to discern good from bad. In other words, we would have I think defined free will as if you tell me, if you teach me what's good and what's bad, okay, so now with equipped with that knowledge, so now I have the free will to choose to do what's good or rachmana litzlan to make the other choice. The Rambam says no, part of that capacity with which Hakadosh Baruch Hu endowed us is not only the freedom to choose, but the ability to discern on our own and to distinguish and to recognize and to discriminate right from wrong, and then with that again knowledge that we're as part of that same capacity, now we can act on that and we can choose which to do. Again just to re-read that line, sheyehei hu me'atzmo, it's the third line there in halacha alef Rabosai, he himself of his own accord, b'da'to with his understanding, uv'machshavto again through his thought, through his reflection, he is yodeia tov va'ra. That person has the ability to understand and to recognize what's right and what's wrong and then to choose to act on it. The person has the ability to understand and to recognize what's right and what's wrong and then to choose to act on it. So the autonomy which free will gives a person in the Rambam's understanding is tremendously magnified because it's not only an autonomy of choice but it's also an autonomy which includes the ability to recognize and to discern what's right from what's wrong. Not only that we have the moral autonomy when given choice and having the choices explained to us that we have that autonomy to choose but the autonomy of the bechirah chofshis in the Rambam's understanding is that we have the ability again to discern it in the first place to discern right from wrong and that we're not again not totally passive in terms of being in a position to correctly exercise our bechirah chofshis. Now it might very well be and I apologize you don't have this source in front of you just going to read you a couple of lines it could be that for the Rambam that this is part of his overall conception of man the Rambam the very first chapter in the Rambam's Moreh Nevuchim so the Rambam talks about what does it mean that we're created b'tzelem Elokim. So the text says there are people who erroneously understand that tzelem implies physical image and therefore they had a rachmana l'tzlan a corporeal understanding of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Rambam says if you want to talk about physical image so then the word in Hebrew was toar you don't use tzelem for that the word is as in יפה תואר ויפה מראה but tzelem implies a spiritual abstract quality it doesn't imply something physical but something abstract in an abstract sense we're b'tzelem Elokim and what is it refer to specifically? So the Rambam says that the tzelem Elokim of a person is his essence and what that is in terms of a person is

אשר בו תהיה ההשגה האנושית ובגלל ההשגה השכלית הזאת נאמר בו בצלם אלהים ברא אותו.

That what it means that we're created in the image of God so according to the Rambam's understanding in the image of God means that we have this intellectual capacity and it's probably arguably this understanding of tzelem Elokim which underlies the Rambam's definition and understanding of free will again that the free will is not only again autonomy in making choices but even the autonomy to be able to discover and recognize and appreciate truth and to be able to discriminate right from wrong. It places an even greater degree of responsibility upon a person than the more limited conventional understanding of free will. If no one ever told me what's right and what's wrong so what do you expect me to do with my free will but according to the Rambam part of that capacity for free will is that we have the ability to recognize and to discern and to discover on our own what's right and what's wrong and it again it heightens the degree of responsibility. But the first bit isn't, doesn't the Rambam in the guide talk about? You use truth and good, right? Those are two different dimensions for the Rambam, so how does truth affect good or evil? The עץ הדעת טוב ורע is a fall of man, truth is one thing. It's not clear that in this halacha in Hilchos Teshuva that the Rambam is using without getting sidetracked too much I'm not sure that the way the Rambam is using the pasuk here of v'da'as tov va-ra is the same as the way he understands it in the Moreh because over here he clearly is describing tov va-ra as from the time Adam was first created whereas in the Moreh he understands that that's something that happened after the cheit so I don't think it's of one it's not a miksha achas anyway before continuing with the Rambam for a minute again to further flesh out just the scope of bechira chofshis I don't think you have this in the sheet in front of you but let's review for a minute a very famous comment of the Ibn Ezra the Ibn Ezra addresses what already in his day was a well-known question it is okay okay thank you it's on the bottom of the thank you thank you very much the bottom of the third side that you have אבן עזרא על שמות פרק כ פסוק יד we'll read a couple of lines together in a minute just to give the background to the question the Ibn Ezra refers to the famous question in terms of the last of the aseres hadibros how can the Torah say lo sachmod not to covet coveting again is not only an emotional response but the truth is it can be an instinctive response imagine the following scenario imagine that it's a little harder to imagine this in Eretz Yisrael it's a little easier in chutz la-aretz but imagine that it's a frigid cold day sub-zero temperatures you have someone rachmana litzlan who's homeless he's so impoverished he doesn't even have a proper coat hasn't had a square meal in days and he's walking alongside a house and he looks inside the house and he sees it's lit and he sees that the fireplace there's a beautiful fire going and it's warm and he sees all kinds of delicacies to eat on the table so in that situation a person doesn't make a premeditated decision that he's going to covet I think we would describe his reaction as it's an instinctive reaction just he finds himself coveting so that's the question so how can the Torah regulate instincts the Torah can regulate actions we understand but how does the Torah regulate instincts so let's take a look at the Ibn Ezra lo sachmod אנשים רבים ישמחו על זאת המצוה many people are perplexed by this mitzva you see it rabosai it's the last source that you have here

איך יהיה אדם שלא יחמוד דבר יפה בלבו כל מה שהוא נחמד למראה עיניו

how can a person not react that way again it's an instinctive reaction ואתה אתן לך משל I'll give you a mashal give you the following parable דע כי איש כפרי a villager שיש לו דעת נכונה who's in his right mind והוא ראה בת מלך שהיא יפה he sees a princess a beautiful princess לא יחמוד אותה בלבו שישכב עמה he doesn't aspire to marry her כי ידע כי זה לא יתכן because he knows that it's absolutely crazy he knows that the king is not going to marry off his daughter the princess to some crude villager so he doesn't and for for the for this villager to to want to marry the princess he'd have to be he'd have to be k'ech min hameshugoim he'd have to be out of his mind says the Ibn Ezra so that's his that's his mashal so how does that answer the question right so he goes on and he explains well the nimshal is that HaKadosh Baruch Hu apportions to everyone what he's supposed to have and a person can't have and what's more shouldn't have what Hakadosh Baruch Hu hasn't apportioned to him. The same way the villager understands that he's never going to marry the princess, so too we should recognize that if Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave that house to our neighbor and not to us, it's for him, it's not for us, it ain't gonna happen. That's what the Ibn Ezra says. But how does that answer the question again? In fleshing out the Ibn Ezra's question, so we said that when a person covets it's an instinctive reaction. It's not, he doesn't stop and deliberate and think should I covet, shouldn't I covet, it's an instinctive reaction. So what this Ibn Ezra is telling us, again something which has tremendous bearing and relevance to our topic of bechirah chofshis, is that the Torah expects us, the fundamentals of our belief system, is not only something that we're supposed to be able to intellectually subscribe to, that if a questionnaire is passed around, so do you believe in divine... do you believe in God? Check the yes box. Do you believe in divine providence? Yes. And we check it all off. What the Torah expects is that a person should so internalize those fundamental beliefs that his very reactions are conditioned by those beliefs. Let's say the following, just to concretize what we're talking about. The Sefer HaChinuch that you have here talks about this as well. I think the Sefer HaChinuch is here. Yeah, on the second side. If you take a look you see in the second side where Sefer HaChinuch מצוה רמא so the structure of the Sefer HaChinuch is a listing of the 613 mitzvos and the structure of the Sefer HaChinuch is the opening paragraph sort of gives you a definition, a working definition of the mitzvah, then there's a paragraph which engages in ta'amei hamitzvos where the Sefer HaChinuch gives a reason for the mitzvos, then he gives us some of the dinim, some of the relevant halachos of the mitzvah. So let's take a look here what the Sefer HaChinuch explains the shorshei hamitzvah, the reason for the mitzvah of not taking revenge. So how would we explain why the Torah prohibits taking revenge? What would our explanation for that be, rabosai? It's a societal issue. I think the Rambam actually writes that in Hilchos Deos, it will destroy the fabric of society. How else would we explain it? It's irrational. Why is it irrational? You're basing an action out of feeling. There is no real... but why is it irrational if you did bad to me, so why is it irrational that I want to do bad to you? Makes perfect sense to me. No, you're right. Don't back down. You're right, but you have to figure out why you're right, but you're right. Just because someone else broke the law doesn't mean that you should go ahead and break the law also. It's just, that's not like a reason. Correct, but we're trying to figure out why there is such a law. Right? So we have to try to figure out why there is such a law. To avoid people taking justice into their own hands? Right, I think we would give all these answers. We would say it's a very bad midah, it's a very bad character trait. It's an action grounded in instinct and the Torah is trying to remove man from his instinct. I think all of these are great answers. Now let's take a look and they're all true, they're all correct. Take a look in what the Sefer HaChinuch says. Mishorshei hamitzvah. You see it rabosai? Again here on the second side. שידע האדם ויתן אל לבו. A person should know. We'll come back in a minute bli neder to translate the other phrase. שידע האדם כי כל אשר יקרהו מטוב עד רע. This represents the Sefer HaChinuch's understanding of the all-encompassing nature of divine providence. שידע האדם כי כל אשר יקרהו מטוב עד רע. Anything that befalls a person from good to bad, hu siba. is something which is ultimately caused by Hashem. ומאת האדם מיד איש אחר, from the hands of one's fellow man, according to the Sefer HaChinuch לא יהיה דבר בלתי רצון השם יתברך. Nothing can happen unless Hashem signs off on it. Al kein, consequently, כשייצרהו או יכאיבהו אדם, if a person causes him distress or inflicts pain, yeida b'nafsho a person should know that שעוונותיו גרמו והשם יתברך גזר עליו בכך, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu decreed that this should happen. And therefore,

ולכן לא ישית מחשבותיו לנקום ממנו כי הוא אינו סיבת רעתו.

He shouldn't therefore think how to take revenge because, so, what's your name? Michael. So what Michael said, it's irrational, but you know why it's irrational? Because according to the Sefer HaChinuch, to take, to seek revenge represents a tremendous theological blunder. Because if I'm looking to take revenge, it means that I think that you're the cause of what happened to me. In reality, says the Sefer HaChinuch, given again his all-encompassing understanding of divine providence, one person's, and this also brings us to another important element of our topic, one person's free will cannot impact another person unless Hashem signs off on it. If I, I choose to swing a right and try to punch, punch this young man in the nose, either I'm going to miss, or if I hit, it means that for some reason Hashem wants him to endure, let me just move up for a second back there, okay, Hashem wants him to endure that pain. That being the case, just one minute, that being the case, so the Sefer HaChinuch says to seek revenge is something again which is theologically wrong, not just morally wrong, it's not just moral corruption, but theologically it's wrong, because in seeking revenge, it's as if I view the other person as the cause of what happened, and the other person is never ever the cause. I'm just going to hold up just one minute, just tie this back in with Ibn Ezra and then we'll just stop for the questions for a moment. Now what the Ibn Ezra is saying is, so the point of this Sefer HaChinuch is that the connection in Yahadus between what we believe and what we do and what we think is much closer than we realize. That belief and behavior, if a person really believes in divine providence, so then according to the Sefer HaChinuch, if a person really believes it, so then a person doesn't seek revenge, because to seek revenge contradicts belief in divine providence. Now notice, go back for one minute please rabosai to that first line in the Sefer HaChinuch: משורשי המצווה שידע האדם. What are the next three words? Someone want to read them? V'yitein el libo. What does V'yitein el libo mean? Internalize. Exactly, he should take to heart, he should internalize. It's not enough to know, it's not enough to believe, a person has to internalize. If a person internalizes his belief in divine providence, that undercuts any desire for revenge. Coming back to the Ibn Ezra, so we asked, how did the Ibn Ezra respond to his question? He gave us this whole mashal with the villager, and no villager in his right mind is going to want to marry the princess. So what's that got to do with my instinctive reaction walking in the street, the instinctive reaction of this poor, homeless, starving person? How does he not instinctively covet? The answer is if a person internalizes beliefs, so even things that we label as instincts, a person through his own bechirah chofshis molds those instincts. We're not talking about an instinct to covet, it's not like the instinct when the doctor takes the hammer and then bangs you on your on the bottom of your foot or something and your foot kicks out. We're not talking about an instinctive reflexive reaction. The type of instinct of coveting is an instinct which really, really reflects belief. If I believe that I could have what Hashem gave to the other person, so then I instinctively covet. But if I believe and have internalized the belief that I can't have what Hashem vouchsafed for someone else, what Hashem has given a portion to someone else is not to be had by me, so then if I not only know the fact sheyeda ha'adam but the active phase yiten el libo, so then through that again act of the bechira chofshis I create my instincts. And that's how the Torah can expect us again that even our instinctive reactions will be in line with the Torah's expectations. Okay, so maybe there were a couple of questions, so please. So why shouldn't I try to take revenge? Because if I succeed, then it means that God wanted me to succeed. Okay, so that's a great question. So and maybe let's even magnify your question. So why is it then that we should not react with outrage when people perpetrate violence? Because it couldn't have happened if Hashem hadn't signed off on it. So why do we think that all the evil people in the world because of all the wickedness, why do we condemn them? So Moshe, it's a great question. משל למה הדבר דומה. I'll give you the following, Moshe. Let's say you have a person, rachmana litzlan, a very, very severe case of diabetes. And rachmana litzlan the doctors can't control it, ad kedei kach that they say that there's gangrene on a limb, that the limb has to be amputated, rachmana litzlan, it's the only way to save his life. Okay. And then you have this crazed drug addict. He's, again, he's totally out of control and he's running around with a sword. And it just so happens that he, again, crazed drug addict, right, and he knows when he takes the drugs what drugs do to a person, and he does it anyway. And this crazed drug addict and he comes running in with a sword and it just so happens that he strikes the person and severs the limb exactly where the limb was supposed to be severed. Is he a hero? What's our attitude towards this crazed drug addict? He's crazy, he's a bad thing, he's horrible, he's evil, he's wicked. The fact why, let's say a surgeon would wash his hands and scrub and then surgically make an incision in the exact same place, so he'd be a hero. What's the difference? Why is one a hero and one evil? Intent, intention. The surgeon knows that this is supposed to be done and that it's supposed to be done for a good and noble purpose. And that's why he's doing it. The crazed drug addict, he doesn't. He wasn't given any kind of prophecy or even medical report that says that this person needs an amputation. He's acting on a violent impulse. He's acting on a violent impulse of his own accord. So then he is totally one hundred percent morally responsible. The fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu from a totally different perspective has a totally different reason for allowing that to happen, a reason which is probably totally inscrutable to us, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu intends it letova. God intends it for good. This person, he didn't receive a prophecy. He doesn't... he's acting, the person who goes ahead, so that would be the answer to your question in terms of seeking revenge also. If, if I'm a navi and Hashem tells me, 'You know what? That guy deserves to be punished for what he did to you,' so then it would takeh be a very noble thing for me to do it. But given the fact that I don't have nevuah, so then for me to try to take revenge would be like the crazed drug addict and even if Hashem lets it happen doesn't mean that he wanted me to do it and it doesn't justify my actions morally. So in the first Rambam, hilchos teshuvah, פרק ה' הלכה א', you talked about this universal understanding of good and evil. That's also an excellent question. So I think what the Rambam would tell us, a person can have the ability, but there's a lot that can go wrong in exercising that ability and in applying it. And maybe that's how the Rambam would understand the famous midrashic account with which you're all familiar about how when Hashem was ready to give the Torah, how he offers it to different nations of the world and they ask what's in the Torah. Don't murder, don't steal. No, we're not ready for that, we're not ready for that. Is that people's judgments can be influenced by all types of vested interests, all types of subjectivity. If a person can transcend that and recognize truth, or a person can allow his judgment to be impaired. And I think what the Rambam would say, I think he would insist that if people would really, really exert themselves to transcend all these types of vested interests and subjectivities that people can recognize truth. I think the Rambam would insist that that is the case. So everyone, whether they're in this disgusting, perverse society and that's the norm and they look at that as good, has the ability to be an iconoclast? I think the Rambam's answer to that is an emphatic yes. Yeah. Thank you. To twist it, point two. Since the Rambam is going to essentially, this is an introduction to the issue of virtue, like deios virtue, and the Rambam believes that deios, what is the virtue, can be established universally. In other words, follows Aristotle on that. And that shouldn't make a difference whether you're in this society or that society. Reason should lead to the position of virtue. I think the Rambam thinks that. With regard to your answer earlier to Jeremy's question, it still seems that if our assumption is that anything bad that happens to a person is inherently right and that even if someone attacks someone else or hits someone else, that pain they feel is what is intrinsically what God wanted, doesn't that open the door to what took place I think like in the Dark Ages, it takes place I think in some Muslim societies today where various social services and things like this are not provided because the assumption is if something bad has happened to you you deserved it and you should live with the consequences. Like, where how do you draw the line between? So that's also an excellent question. I think Tosafot in Bava Kamma comments the Gemara has also a very famous drasha in the context of talking about the liability if one person attacks another person and inflicts bodily harm. So the Torah says that there are five different aspects to his liability. If he cripples the person, so he has to compensate him for that. If he causes the person to be unemployed for a while, he has to compensate him for that. He has to compensate him for the pain that he inflicted. He has to compensate him for whatever shame or humiliation accompanied it. But then he also has to pay the doctor's bills. And the Torah says verapo yerape that the assailant has to pay the doctor bills. And the Gemara comments on that in Berakhot and Bava Kamma in a few places. The Gemara comments on verapo yerape מכאן שניתנה רשות לרופא לרפאות. That from here we see that reshut, permission, is given for the doctor to engage in medical treatment and to do his best to heal the patient. So I think there's a little Tosafot in Bava Kamma where they comment and say that what the Torah is, the reason you need the Torah to tell us this is that without such a... so one could have embraced a Christian Science position and said that all type of medical intervention is an attempt to subvert what Hashem has decreed. And the Torah tells us not like that. The Torah tells us that the same way we're asked and expected to engage in human initiative in other realms, here too, the fact that it comes from Hashem notwithstanding, but once given from Hashem, so Hashem says now that's part of your challenge to deal with and to try to overcome. And that's exactly what the Torah teaches us in that phrase Verapo Yerape, and that's how we know not to adopt that position. How do you incorporate the Sefer HaChinuch's views with regard to something like the Holocaust? So you're touching on the very, very important, and so I'm gonna answer straight, but I ask that people should listen very, very carefully. You have to hear all, either don't listen at all or listen to everything. Don't listen to half of what I'm going to say. So either fall asleep now or wait until later to fall asleep, but don't fall asleep in the middle. The Sefer HaChinuch isn't explaining to us the issue of theodicy. Sefer HaChinuch is not telling us that we are in a position to understand why Hakadosh Baruch Hu does what he does. The reason the Sefer HaChinuch is not attempting to do that is immediately apparent. There's a big mistake that is often made in thinking about such a, thinking about let's say about the Holocaust in particular. And the mistake is methodological, meaning the following. People say, look the Holocaust happened, how can a person believe in divine providence given the Holocaust? The correct approach is the following. The correct approach is before looking at any event in history, even the Holocaust, so a person is supposed to ask philosophically, what are our expectations in terms of understanding divine providence? Can we expect to understand everything God does or not? So the answer to that is clearly what? The Mashal; again, take the following Mashal. Let's say you have a parent, a new parent, took lots of classes in parenting, believes in a lot of communication with his children. So he's going to be very open with his children. So he's not going to do anything for his children that his children can't understand. Okay fine, so his baby is three months old. The baby is supposed to get inoculated against chickenpox and against whooping cough and against mumps and rubella and measles. But his three month old won't understand why he should go to the doctor and get stuck in the arm multiple times. So the parent is not going to do it. So what would we say? That this is a kind and benevolent parent or we would say no, we would say that if anything he's guilty of child neglect because what kind of Meshugass, what kind of craziness is it that a parent limits himself to parenting on a level that an infant or a little child can understand. Obviously the parent has to parent on his level to the best of his or her understanding. So the same thing, to that we should have an a priori expectation to understand what Hashem does in the world is as absurd, right when you stop and think about it, as expecting that the three month old infant should be able to understand everything that his or her parents are doing. So we obviously recognize that for Hakadosh Baruch Hu to act as Hakadosh Baruch Hu, of course there are going to be things that are inscrutable and that are totally beyond us. The Sefer HaChinuch is just telling us not that—he's not saying that I can explain to you why everything happens. He's not telling you that I can, that we can ever rise and share Hashem's vantage point to see why what happens has to happen. What he's saying is that what happens is not accidental. And that HaKadosh Baruch Hu from his vantage point has a perfectly just reason for everything that happens. It's something, it's a vantage point that we can't share. And because of that, so we we we accept his will the same way, if the child has enough sense, he trusts his his parents as well. Was that clear? Okay, maybe we'll go on a little bit, a few more minutes here. Okay, so first we we spoke about the Rambam's broad definition of Bechirah Chofshis and again, that it's not only moral autonomy to choose, but it's the moral autonomy to recognize, to recognize and discern right and wrong. We saw the Ibn Ezra, again, also in in terms of just how empowered we are by our Bechirah Chofshis, even things that we label as instinctive reactions, really depend on how we condition ourselves and with what beliefs we we condition ourselves. And then we also, apropos of looking at the Sefer HaChinuch, we we touched upon another fundamental question. We didn't necessarily review all the opinions on the subject, but at least we saw the Sefer HaChinuch's opinion that one person's free will cannot impact another person, another person, unless Hashem approves of of what's going to of what's going to happen. So maybe just we'll touch on one more point, possibly, possibly two more points as as time allows. Take a look in Halacha Gimmel here, back to the the first sidra, rabosai. דבר זה עיקר גדול הוא והוא עמוד התורה והמצווה. This principle of free will is the foundation and the pillar which upholds all of Torah and the very notion of having mitzvos, of having commandments. שנאמר ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים, here I'll just throw out a question you can think about, work on, and not—maybe some other time we can discuss a possible answer. The Rambam here, by association, triggers a very fascinating question. Anyone remember offhand what the Rambam's 13 principles of of faith are? Anyone remember them? What what they are? He doesn't have bechirah chofshis. It's missing. Bechirah chofshis, okay, okay, so take a shortcut. Bechirah chofshis is not amongst the—is not amongst the thirteen. Maybe we'll digress for a minute and the and discuss what what those thirteen principles of faith—they're in the siddur in davening twice every every morning. You have it in Yigdal in in in poetry, and then you have the Ani Ma'amins in in prose, printed at the end of Shacharis. Right? So the first one is belief in HaKadosh Baruch Hu. HaKadosh Baruch Hu is the source of all existence. The second one is the uniqueness and unity of HaKadosh Baruch Hu. The third one is that HaKadosh Baruch Hu is incorporeal. HaKadosh Baruch Hu has no body. The fourth is that HaKadosh Baruch Hu alone is is eternal. Hu Rishon Ve'acharon, HaKadosh Baruch Hu alone is is eternal. The fifth is that we relate directly to HaKadosh Baruch Hu, no no intermediaries. That's usually identified as the first grouping within the 13 principles of faith. was unique that that we have the Torah today that was given to Moshe Rabbeinu and the Torah is immutable. Torah is is eternal, Torah is not going to change. Those are those are number six, seven, eight, and nine. And the last four have to do with the reward and punishment, divine providence, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows everything that happens. Number eleven, we must understand that Hakadosh Baruch Hu rewards and Rachmana Litzlan punishes as our person's just deserts. Number twelve is that Mashiach comes and thirteen is bodily resurrection, Techiyat Hametim. One of them's a little bit hard to find in Yigdal. When you daven tomorrow morning after Adon Olam, you say Yigdal, one of them's is twelve of them are very obvious in Yigdal, one of them is a little bit subtle, so you'll have to look to find one of them in Yigdal. But it is a fascinating question which we're not going to touch upon now. Say, what's your name? Joshua Skotsky. Which Joshua mentioned, why isn't as the Rambam here says, Bechira Chofshis is the foundation of all of Torah, how come the Rambam didn't include it in the thirteen principles of faith? Okay, it's an interesting interesting question to think about. At any rate, that's what the Rambam says that and he goes on to elaborate that it's nonsensical to command, it's nonsensical to reward and punish unless a person has has free will. I mean, isn't the whole premise of the like you have the Gimmel Ikrim and people say that like you have Mitzvos and you can't have a Mitzvah without believing in God? Like Albo calls it that that was the Ikrim as opposed to the Rambam. Like in the Gimmel Ikrim, because from Mitzvos, you need you have to believe in God before you do any Mitzvah. The Gimmel Ikrim like the prerequisite that you have to believe in Hakadosh Baruch Hu otherwise there's no point of commanding to believe X, Y, and Z if you don't believe you have the choice what to believe or what not to believe. So it's it goes above the Gimmel Ikrim. Maybe it's axiomatic? Meaning it's it could be, that's an excellent suggestion. Excellent, excellent suggestion. Okay, there are other other topics here but rather than rush through them, I don't know, maybe you'll you can discuss them with your Rebbeim, the Rambam treats the the famous question about human free will versus divine foreknowledge, you have it here, but it's not something that we can rush so maybe I I leave it to to your study together with with your Rebbeim. Thank you very much.