Torah vs. Other Mitzvos. Shelo Lishma. Love of Torah.

Let's look a little bit here in Perek Gimmel for Hilchos Talmud Torah.

בשלושה כתרים נכתרו ישראל כתר תורה וכתר כהונה וכתר מלכות כתר כהונה זכה בו אהרן שנאמר והיתה לו ולזרעו אחריו ברית כהונת עולם כתר מלכות זכה בו דוד שנאמר זרעו לעולם יהיה וכסאו כשמש נגדי כתר תורה הרי מונח ועומד ומוכן לכל שנאמר תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהילת יעקב כל מי שירצה יבא ויטול שמא תאמר שאותן הכתרים גדולים מכתר תורה הרי הוא אומר בי מלכים ימלוכו ורוזנים יחוקקו צדק בי שרים ישורו אלמדת שכתר התורה גדול מכתר כהונה ומכתר מלכות אמרו חכמים ממזר תלמיד חכם קודם לכהן גדול עם הארץ שנאמר יקרה היא מפנינים יקרה היא מכהן גדול שנכנס לפני ולפנים אין לך מצוה בכל המצוות כולן ששקולה כנגד תלמוד תורה אלא תלמוד תורה כנגד כל המצוות כולן שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה לפיכך התלמוד קודם למעשה בכל מקום היה לפניו עשיית מצוה ותלמוד תורה אם אפשר למצוה להיעשות על ידי אחרים לא יפסיק תלמודו ואם לאו יעשה המצוה ויחזור לתלמודו.

So the question is like this. In Halacha Aleph and Halacha Beis, so the Rambam speaks of the unchallenged exalted position status of Torah, of Talmud Torah as being something intrinsic, right? But when he says that Keter Torah is gadol from the other shnei ketarim, so he doesn't he doesn't seek to explain that or justify that in in pragmatic terms in terms of התלמוד מביא לידי מעשה. It's something inherent, it's something intrinsic. And that's what's reflected in in Halacha Beis in the dinei kedima of mamzer talmid chacham, talmid chachamim קודם לכהן גדול עם הארץ. And then in Halacha Gimmel he seems to restart, he seems to press the restart button, and and here it's no longer that Talmud Torah is inherently or intrinsically supreme but but it's based on pragmatic considerations of התלמוד מביא לידי מעשה. That Talmud is meivi liydei ma'aseh, ma'aseh is not meivi liydei Talmud. Again, so why is he restarting? And and why now all of a sudden, the Rambam says even if you isolate Halacha Gimmel without the flow in the Rambam... again Halacha Gimmel is of course the Gemara in Kiddushin... that the Tannaim... the question was posed to the Tannaim, is Talmud gadol, is ma'aseh... maybe is ma'aseh gadol?

וכבר היה רבי טרפון וזקנים מסובים בעליית בית נתזה בלוד ונשאלה שאלה זו בפניהם תלמוד מם מם בית ב

Kiddushin

ונשאלה שאלה זו בפניהם תלמוד גדול או מעשה גדול נענה רבי טרפון ואמר מעשה גדול נענה רבי עקיבא ואמר תלמוד גדול נענו כולם ואמרו תלמוד גדול שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה.

So just even if you isolate this, not Halacha Gimmel necessarily in the context of of the broader context of פרק ג' הלכות תלמוד תורה, just minei ubei. So this Rabbi Tarfon who says ma'aseh gadol, he disagrees with תלמוד תורה כנגד כולם? Is that the pshat? And the fact that the the consensus... Of nanu kulam, which again elevates Talmud Torah, but for pragmatic reasons. תלמוד מביא לידי מעשה is something pragmatic. It's not something inherent, something intrinsic. That also disagrees with תלמוד תורה כנגד כולם? So the pshat is as follows. The pshat is as follows. Halachos Aleph and Bais are discussing again the inherent, intrinsic status and standing of Talmud Torah. That's what Halachos Aleph and Bais are devoted to. Halacha Gimmel, and again, and you know, if you look in the Frenkel, Halachos Gimmel and Daled in the Rambam's manuscript are one halacha, not two halachos. Frenkel prints a colon wherever it's a halacha in the Rambam's manuscript also. So there's no colon at the end of Halacha Gimmel. Halacha Gimmel and Daled are one halacha. So in the Rambam's manuscript, when after the Rambam says

תלמוד מביא לידי מעשה לפיכך התלמוד קודם למעשה בכל מקום,

again, Halacha Daled is a continuation, extension. The pshat is true even if you didn't have this, but that's just gravy, but the meat is filling even if you don't have the gravy. We're taking the gravy, staying with the meat. היה לפניו עשיית מצווה ותלמוד תורה. So the vort is like this. The fact that Talmud Torah is inherently, intrinsically above all else doesn't necessarily translate practically when היה לפניו עשיית מצווה ותלמוד תורה, which do you turn your attention to? Why not? Because the Yerushalmi famously says, it's a Yerushalmi in Shabbos, that's the rishon quote, that רבי שמעון בר יוחאי וסיעתו who are torasam umanusam have to be mafsik their learning to go mkayeim Yeshivas Sukkah. They have to be mafsik their learning for netilas lulav. They have to be mafsik their learning to make a seder and to eat matzah. Why? Because if they wouldn't have to be mafsik their learning to mkayeim these mitzvos, so then their learning wouldn't be al m'nas la'asos, which is why Talmud Torah is actually at a disadvantage, as it were, in terms of the din of עוסק במצווה פטור מן המצווה because since Talmud Torah is open-ended and again, and for someone who's toraso umanuso it's virtually to the extent of human capability, so if the din of עוסק במצווה פטור מן המצווה, if prioritizing Talmud Torah were always the case, so then in theory always and in practice for someone who's toraso umanuso, so learning wouldn't be al m'nas la'asos, but no, the Rambam said it's a Mishna in Avos, right? That learning has to be al m'nas la'asos. So the fact that Talmud Torah is inherently, intrinsically supreme, the fact that תלמוד תורה כנגד כולם, the fact that כתר תורה עולה על על כולם, Keser Torah, the fact that ממזר תלמיד חכם קודם לכהן גדול עם הארץ has no bearing at lich'ora, not necessarily, doesn't have any bearing on a halacha l'ma'aseh shaila of if there's a mitzvah and a person is learning, what do you do? Oh, say Chazal, but if the mitzvah is אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים, so then again, then Talmud is Gadol Talmud, means not Gadol Talmud axiologically. Gadol Talmud halacha l'ma'aseh in terms of which is doche which, in terms of which prevails, not axiologically, but in terms of the halacha l'ma'aseh of היה לפניו עשיית מצווה ותלמוד תורה, so Gadol Talmud. And again, but you can't invoke the fact that Talmud Torah is intrinsically greater because that argument can't hold up in all. However, if it's a מצווה שאפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים, then since on a practical level, so if I'll be mafsik, what's a מצווה שאפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים? A מצווה שאפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים means it's not a chovas yachid. A chovas yachid, like taking lulav, yes, someone else can take the lulav, but if Rashbi doesn't take the lulav, so then his chiyuv is misbattelas. So any chovas yachid by definition is

אי אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים. אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים

means it's a tzorkei tzibur, it's a chesed that needs to be done. It needs to be attended to. It's not Rashbi's chiyuv more than than someone else's chiyuv. Someone has to go to the shul board meeting tonight to to deal with a certain issue. Okay. So if it will, if it will be dealt with without Rashbi's involvement, then he doesn't, he doesn't have to go. But even that is only because in practical terms, Talmud Torah practically, pragmatically is gadol, has a din kedima because it's מביא לידי מעשה. But if it's אי אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים, so then it's self-contradictory to persist in the Talmud Torah. So that's what Halacha Gimmel and הלכה א' וב' are two different discussions. Halacha Aleph and Beis in the Rambam are talking about the inherent, intrinsic quality of Talmud Torah. Halacha Gimmel is talking about a she'eila halacha l'ma'aseh. If you take a look, if you take a look in the Gemara in Kiddushin מ"ו ע"ב, in the Tosefos Ri HaZaken which is printed in the margin:

ירושלמי וכבר נמנו התלמוד קודם למעשה רבנן דקיסרי אמרי הדא דתימר בישישם חכמה מי שיעשה אבל אין שם מי שיעשה המעשה קודם לתלמוד.

Meaning, the Ri HaZaken quotes Yerushalmi says beferush that when the question that was posed to the Tannaim whether תלמוד גדול או מעשה גדול, it wasn't an abstract philosophical question. It was a concrete halacha l'ma'aseh question of halacha l'ma'aseh, which do you prioritize? And the Yerushalmi then says beferush that Talmud will only be gadol if it's אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים because of the reason מביא לידי מעשה. But if it's אי אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים, which is going to be true by definition for every chovas gavra and will be true circumstantially in a chesed or whatever that needs to be done. So the ma'aseh that Rabbi Tarfon said was אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים? Is a מצווה שאפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים. That he apparently holds that לומד על מנת לעשות, that's the machlokes. In לומד על מנת לעשות, is it a chisaron if Rashbi doesn't close the Gemara, is it a chisaron in לומד על מנת לעשות even if it's אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים? So Rabbi Tarfon said yes, you can't ever neglect a mitzvah because of you can't not turn, neglect is obviously not the not the right choice of words here, you can't even Rashbi cannot abstain from a mitzvah because of learning because that's a stira to לומד על מנת לעשות. And Rabbi Akiva says he can. And the consensus of anan kulan is that it depends upon this distinction of efshar or אי אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים. And the ma'aseh is not the same. It says מביא לידי מעשה. It's like the ma'aseh that's אי אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים. No. So I think in the Bavli, right, in the Bavli what we're talking about is that the case is a case of אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים. Now that's the case. The case that we're talking about is, again, it's not a philosophical question, it's a הלכה למעשה שאלה. If you have a מצווה שאפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים, Rashbi is learning and and he becomes aware of a chesed that needs to be done, so is he supposed to what is he supposed to do? So Rabbi Tarfon says close the Gemara and go do the mitzvah. And the consensus is no, if it's אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים, continue learning. Rabbi Akiva holds that that you're only supposed to learn in a מצוה שאפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים? Im iy efshar? What? A mitzvah that's that's iy efshar lehayeasot? He agrees. But the Gemara is not paskin. If a person if it's אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים is that called bitul Torah? A person if a person's learning and it's אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים the mitzvah the person nevertheless does the mitzvah is that called bitul Torah? Halacha l'maiseh? Again it's only true for what what what what was I going to say? If it's a mitzvah if it's a מצוה שאפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים let's say a person has a kvias that every night again he has a he has a seder every night from eight to ten it's a kvias it's it's part of his kvias itim and there's a shul board meeting at eight-thirty. So if his presence won't make a significant difference in the sense that the discussion will go in the same direction the outcome of the vote will be what can be achieved without all those who have a seder tonight so then yeah it's bitul Torah if he if he goes to the meeting. If he's if he's mesupak that maybe no maybe he and others who have a seder are needed to steer the the conversation in the right direction they're needed to make sure that whatever's put to a vote that the outcome is what it should be then it's אי אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים and then it should interfere with the with his seder. I mean again this distinction between efsh and אי אפשר להיעשות על ידי אחרים is a befeyrush Gemara in Moed Katan. What what we're explaining is that that the medubar in the Gemara in Kiddushin which then mameila is the medubar in halacha gimmel is not a philosophical question but is again a question halacha l'maiseh in terms of din kadimah and and again what the din kadimah is halacha l'maiseh obviously doesn't you can't appeal just to the inherent intrinsic quality of Talmud Torah because again if you apply that uniformly the result is that that the limmud that the Talmud is not al menas la'asos which is self-contradictory. Halacha hey. Halacha hey is all right.

תחילת דינו של אדם אינו נידון אלא על התלמוד ואחר כך על שאר מעשיו. לפיכך אמרו חכמים לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

So each of the two halves of halacha hey are befeyrush Gemaras again as the as the Kesef Mishneh is metzayen. Question is what the lefichach is. So the Gemara in Sanhedrin also in Kiddushin the Kesef Mishneh points out says that when when we come before the kisei hakavod so the first thing that's going to be scrutinized is our Talmud. Okay. The end of halacha hey says

לפיכך אמרו חכמים לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

But the Rambam connects them with a lefichach. But what's the lefichach? And Zov Zayin that the first thing a person would be asked is whether he wore tzitzis. וזכרתם ועשיתם את כל מצותי. So imagine there was such a ma'amar Chazal that the first question is, you know, did you were you makpid with tzitzis? So then we wouldn't have said

לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

It's only because the reality is that תחילת דינו של אדם is on Talmud. It's only because that's the reality, that's the basis for this other ma'amar of לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה. So maybe as follows. Let's look at the end of Halacha Hey.

לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

For the moment, we're bracketing, well maybe not. I mean, the way we have the Gemara is

לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

The Rambam quotes it twice here in Perek Gimmel, Hilchos Talmud Torah, and again at the end of Hilchos Teshuvah in Perek Yud, Halacha Hey.

ואמרו חכמים לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

And in both places, he doesn't quote ha-mitzvos. It's hard to say that he didn't have the girsa because, I forget where it is, but רבנו אברהם בן הרמב"ם quotes this Gemara; he has the girsa of ha-mitzvos. Hard to say that Rabbeinu Avraham had a different girsa than the Rambam had. But either way, b'maiseh, the Rambam didn't quote the mitzvos. Be that as it may, how do you understand that מאמר כשהוא לעצמו? Just let's focus maybe for a moment not on the Rambam, but just on the Gemara. So let's say a person senses that there's a she'lo lishmah in his Talmud Torah. Comes to the Beis Medrash, and he senses that he's not doing it lishmah. So what would we have said if he approached us with a sha'alah, you know, should I learn or should I go play games on my phone? So what would we have said? Which game are you going to play? No, what would we have said? So I think we would have said pashut, go learn, because to do a mitzvah lishmah is wonderful, that's optimal. But avadeh, if you have a choice between not doing a mitzvah or doing it with sub-optimal, sub-optimal kavannos, avadeh you do the mitzvah. Or in other words, we wouldn't have said it based on שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. Even without introducing that truth of שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה, I think we would have said לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה שלא לשמה if the two choices are to be misbattel from Talmud Torah or to be osek she'lo lishmah. Again, not a she'lo lishmah of lekanteir. We're not talking about a she'lo lishmah of lekanteir. That avadeh it is better not to learn than to learn lekanteir. But a she'lo lishmah of, I don't know, of kavod, of money. Fools make everything about money, okay. Sometimes people are foolish, what can I tell you? But so a she'lo lishmah of kavod, a she'lo lishmah of money. So we would have said that's sub-optimal, but sub-optimal is better than zero. Better to do it in a bedievedikkeh fashion. So lichora, the pshat is as follows. Halacha Yud. The second half of Halacha Yud. You have it over there? The second half of Halacha:

ועוד ציוו ואמרו לא תעשם עטרה להתגדל בהם ולא קרדום לחפור בהם.

So atara lehitgadel bahem represents a kavana of kavod. And kardom lachpor bahem is a kavana of money. That's practical, it's practical. Or in other words, the emess is that really on a certain level it's assur to learn Torah shelo lishmah. Lo tasem, it's a Mishnah in Avos. You can't make Torah into an atara lehitgadel bahem, you can't make Torah into a kardom lachpor bahem. It's assur to learn Torah because a person looks forward to the kavod that he thinks will come his way for learning. It's assur to learn Torah because a person looks forward to the riches that he thinks await him if he'll learn Torah. It's assur. So if a person comes to Beis Medrash and he recognizes if I learn I'm going to be learning shelo lishmah, so should I stay or should I leave? He should leave. That's what we would have thought. Oh, comes Rava and says no:

לעולם יעסוק אדם אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

You take a look in the Rambam's hakdama to perek Cheilek, so the Rambam says, the Rambam says you take a look, he says hitiru to learn shelo lishmah. Hitiru, that's the lashon ha-Rambam in the perush Hamishnayos in the hakdama to perek Cheilek. Okay, so that's not. Let's take a look for a moment in Hilchos Teshuva, פרק ג הלכה ד. Take a look rabosai:

אף על פי שתקיעת שופר בראש השנה גזירת הכתוב רמז יש בו כלומר עורו ישנים משנתכם והקיצו נרדמים מתרדמתכם וחפשו במעשיכם וחזרו בתשובה וזכרו בוראכם.

There will be a good question on the bechina to ask people to write this be'al peh. It'll be a good question on the bechina.

אלו השוכחים את האמת בהבלי הזמן ושוגים כל שנתם בהבל וריק אשר לא יועיל ולא יציל הביטו לנפשותיכם והיטיבו דרכיכם ומעלליכם ויעזוב כל אחד מכם דרכו הרעה ומחשבתו אשר לא טובה. לפיכך צריך כל אדם שיראה עצמו כל השנה כולה כאילו חציו זכאי וחציו חייב וכן כל העולם חציו זכאי וחציו חייב.

What's that lefikach? It's a total non sequitur. The beginning of halacha daled, and again the beginning of halacha daled is the Rambam's famous remez in tkias shofar that it's a call to teshuva, to wake up call. What's that got to do with

צריך כל אדם שיראה עצמו כל השנה כולה כאילו חציו זכאי וחציו חייב?

What does that have to do with it? Nothing. So what's the lefikach? The lefikach goes back in halacha gimmel. And halacha gimmel the Rambam says that

כשם ששוקלין עוונות אדם וזכויותיו בשעת מיתתו כך בכל שנה ושנה שוקלין עוונות כל אחד ואחד מבאי עולם עם זכויותיו ביום טוב של ראש השנה מי שנמצא צדיק נחתם לחיים מי שנמצא רשע נחתם למיתה והבינוני תולין לו עד יום הכיפורים אם עשה תשובה נחתם לחיים ואם לאו נחתם למיתה.

Lefichach,

לפיכך צריך כל אדם שיראה עצמו כל השנה כולה כאילו חציו זכאי וחציו חייב.

Right, it's going back on what the Rambam had in Halacha Gimmel and earlier in terms of kol ha'olam, kemedina. So what does that mean? That sometimes in the Rambam you have a lefichach, and the lefichach isn't referring to the most immediate antecedent. It's not lefanav but it's lifne fanav. So that's כך הוא סגנונו של הרמב"ם. So it happens as follows. What did the Rambam tell us in Halachos Gimmel and Daled? The Rambam told us that Talmud Torah precedes a מצוה שאפשר ליעשות על ידי אחרים because that תלמוד מביא לידי מעשה. תלמוד מביא לידי מעשה. Maybe there's another solution. Okay, so again, what's our quandary? So right someone arrives in the beis medrash and when he's honest with himself he's there shelo lishmah. He's there shelo lishmah. So we said, but it's assur to learn shelo lishmah. Okay, so maybe the answer should be mitzvos uplift a person. Go tell the person and again and the issurim of atara lehizgadel bahem. This next point is shver from the Perush HaMishnayos in Avos so this needs to be tweaked. Mitzvos don't have the same maybe tell him to go, go fulfill mitzvos and that will uplift the person, that will elevate him, and he'll come back in a week, in a month, in a year. He'll come back and he'll come back to the beis medrash and learn lishmah. Maybe maybe that's the kosav hashlishi. Oh, that doesn't work because תלמוד מביא לידי מעשה but ma'aseh is not meivi lidei Talmud. That's not going to work. That's not going to work. He's not going to that isn't the solution. Heyos that Talmud is meivi lidei ma'aseh and אין מעשה מביא לידי תלמוד. Again here in Gimmel Gimmel the Rambam doesn't spell out the other half so that he did earlier in Aleph Gimmel, shehaTalmud kodem lema'aseh in Aleph Gimmel

מפני שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה ואין המעשה מביא לידי תלמוד.

So that's not a kosav hashlishi. Oh, that's not a kosav hashlishi so then what what do we do halacha lema'aseh? What do we do halacha lema'aseh when someone sees I'm not holding by learning lishmah? What do you tell him? You tell him well since Talmud is meivi lidei ma'aseh and there is no alternative to a person learning, there is no derech acher. So that's where Chazal said, no, you can learn shelo lishmah. Agam that on a certain level it should have been assur and if a person could be misgaber on it it would be assur but no. לפיכך התירו שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. Why did the Rambam interject תחלת דינו של אדם? It's not really a question because once you have Hilchos Teshuvah lema'aseh you see that the Rambam has a lefichach which isn't, you know, where you can block out the lifne fanav. You have to go back lifne fanav to understand it. It could be that the Rambam is saying that that ma'amar Chazal

תחלת דינו של אדם על התלמוד ואחרי כך על המעשה

is just the mirror image of תלמוד מביא לידי מעשה. And don't think that it will be a defense, Oh, I didn't know, because no, that's not a defense because you know in the first half we already showed that you didn't pay sufficient attention to Talmud. So it could be that this ma'amar itself is just the mirror image of גדול תלמוד שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה. And that's reflected in what Chazal say that תחלת דינו של אדם. But the lefichach is not, you can't just compartmentalize the תחלת דינו של אדם and forget what happened before. No, the lefichach is only intelligible in light of תלמוד מביא לידי מעשה. Maybe maybe that's the pshat. Okay, maybe we'll just begin a little bit in Halacha Vav. מי שנשאו לבו לקיים מצוה זו כראוי so here I think the standard defusim just continue ולהיות מוכתר בכתר של תורה and Frenkel has based on the manuscripts karauy lah, has the word lah. What what do you have in the computer? I think it doesn't have the Frenkel right? So you don't have the word lah do you? No. Right. Right. So in so some sofer didn't understand what the word lah was doing there and so he left it out. But the nice thing remember in Berlin, so what takeh is the the sense of the word lah? Again when we read it without lah so we didn't notice that you know when we look in the standard defusim we didn't notice anything was missing. What's the difference between

מי שנשאו לבו לקיים מצוה זו כראוי להיות מוכתר בכתר של תורה

or whether as the Rambam actually wrote מי שנשאו לבו לקיים מצוה זו כראוי לה? What's the difference in meaning between whether whether you have the word lah or don't have the word lah? Subjective or objective? What what do you mean? Karauy lah is referring to the mitzvah and it's done properly in one way or another. Good, excellent. And and if you don't have the word lah? It's on the person. Right, but I'm not sure that's subjective. But but you're you're you're but but you're you're you're you're definitely you're you're highlighting the right thing. If it just says מי שנשאו לבו לקיים מצוה זו כראוי one could say look again what the Rambam is going to continue to describe that

לא יסיח דעתו לדברים אחרים וכך הוא דרכה של תורה וכולי.

So one could have said you know we don't necessarily understand we can't necessarily explain why these demands are made but l'maiseh that's the l'chatchila way that a person is mekayem the mitzvah. And what the Rambam is saying is that the l'chatchila way of being mekayem the mitzvah is is something which we understand and see how that emanates from the cheftza shel mitzvah. It's not sort of g'zeiras hakasuv and v'asiyas hagavra but you have Torah which is which is Devar Hashem. You have Torah which is the the vehicle to kirvas Elokim. So what what that cheftza of of Talmud Torah of mitzvas Talmud Torah what that warrants mitzad atzmah again on the highest level is this is this devotion and this level this degree of devotion and dedication. And and it could be you know a little bit of a stream of consciousness here but but it could be as follows. You know the Chafetz Chaim in a totally different context in his Sefer Ahavas Chesed based on on the posuk of

מה השם אלקיך דורש ממך כי אם עשות משפט ואהבת חסד והצנע לכת עם אלקיך.

What's that posuk in Micha? Right. So עשות משפט ואהבת חסד so it's asos mishpat. You don't have to love mishpat right? Hakadosh Baruch Hu doresh that you should do mishpat, you don't have to love it. Supposed to love, so love the mishpat also? But no, it's עשות משפט ואהבת חסד. The Chofetz Chaim says as follows: He says a person can fully comply, a person can satisfy the demands of dvar Hashem in the area of mishpat even without loving mishpat. You don't have to love it, just do it. And you can, that's realistic. The demands of chesed are such that unless a person loves it, lema'aseh he's not going to be able to do it. משל למה הדבר דומה? What parents should and need to do for their children they can't do if they don't have the love. The self-sacrifice, the degree of devotion and dedication that parents have to have for children, you can't just do out of a sense of obligation. The child is waking up for the fourth time in the middle of the night. A person cannot and will not do that just out of a sense of obligation. And that's why Hakadosh Baruch Hu takeh gives us that instinct. Some people suppress the instinct. But that's why Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives us that instinct of this virtually unlimited love that parents have for children because without it you can't do what's needed for the child. So the Chofetz Chaim says the same is true for the same is true for chesed. And that's why the Navi says that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is doreish ahavas chesed. He wants us to do chesed, but lema'aseh you can't do chesed to the degree on the level that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is doreish if there's not ahava. So you find, right, in Rosh Chodesh bensching so we ask for אהבת תורה ויראת שמים. We ask for ahavas Torah. We ask for ahavas Torah inspired by Dovid HaMelech, right? Ma ahavti Torasecha. Dovid HaMelech doesn't just say kama asakti baTorah. Maybe that wouldn't fit the same number of syllables. Probably would have... no, it wouldn't necessarily, wouldn't fit the tune, maybe. But more likely Dovid HaMelech has something else in mind here. Ma ahavti Torasecha means the only way I can perpetuate the כל היום היא שיחתי is because Ma ahavti Torasecha. And the Chofetz Chaim's vort that he said in the context of ahavas chesed, itachen that one should transpose that to, again, why in our tefillah which is inspired by Dovid HaMelech, why we speak of the need, again, not just for talmud Torah, not just for hisaskus baTorah but for ahavas haTorah. And that's, again, the ahavas haTorah and the romemus kavoa are two sides of a coin. They're two sides of a coin. It can't just be out of a sense of obligation of לקיים מצוה זו כראוי. This is what's demanded of me. This is what's demanded of me of a parent, that if need be to get up at 11, at 1, at 2, at 3, at 4, and 5, it can't be. A person's not going to do it. But if there's ahava, the person will do it. Okay, we'll stop here.