middah beinonis, ka’as

Perek Bet, Halacha Gimmel, talks about the two exceptions where one is not supposed to follow the Derech HaBenonit, those two being Ga'ava and Ka'as. Rambam says

וכן הכעס מדה רעה היא עד מאד וראוי לאדם שיתרחק ממנה עד הקצה האחר וילמד עצמו שלא יכעס ואפילו על דבר שראוי לכעוס עליו.

And if he wants to instill fear in his children and the members of his household or the congregation if he's the leader and he wants to be angry at them in order to improve their behavior, יראה עצמו בפניהם שהוא כועס כדי לייסרם, however

ותהיה דעתו מיושבת בינו לבין עצמו, כאדם שהוא מדמה כועס בשעת כעסו והוא אינו כועס.

So he feigns anger. He acts as though he were angry, but inwardly his equilibrium is not upset. Amru Chachamim HaRishonim

כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה. ואמרו שכל הכועס אם חכם הוא חכמתו מסתלקת ממנו ואם נביא הוא נבואתו מסתלקת ממנו. ובעלי כעס אין חייהם חיים. לפיכך ציוו להתרחק מן הכעס עד שינהיג עצמו שלא ירגיש אפילו לדברים המכעיסים וזו היא הדרך הטובה. ודרך הצדיקים הם עלובים ואינם עולבים שומעים חרפתם ואינם משיבים עושים מאהבה ושמחים בייסורים ועליהם הכתוב אומר ואוהביו כצאת השמש בגבורתו.

So I want to discuss a few elements of the Mishneh Torah Rambam here, not necessarily limited to this Halacha. The Rambam at the end of Perek Daled of Shmonah Perakim says that in fact, Ka'as was the Cheit of which Moshe Rabbeinu was guilty. In the context, in that same Perek where the Rambam is discussing what he has here in Hilchos De'os as well, i.e., the Derech HaBenonit, so he says that Moshe Rabbeinu was guilty of veering from that mean when it comes to Ka'as and of feeling and displaying Ka'as.

ואתה יודע כי אדון הראשונים והאחרונים משה רבינו עליו השלום ואמר לו השם יתעלה יען לא האמנתם בי להקדישני על אשר מריתם את פי על אשר לא קידשתם כל זה וחטאו עליו השלום היה שנטה כלפי אחת משתי הקצוות ממעלה אחת מן המעלות המדותיות והיא המתינות כאשר נטה כלפי הכעס ואמר שמעו נא המורים.

When he referred to them as rebellious people, so

מחה השם בו שאיש כמוהו יכעס בפני קהל ישראל במקום שאין הכעס ראוי בו.

So the Rambam says that Moshe Rabbeinu was guilty of this Cheit of Ka'as. And again, that Ka'as just per se is a Cheit. So the Rambam has again in Perek Zayin of Hilchos Teshuvah Halacha Gimmel,

אל תאמר שאין תשובה אלא מעבירות שיש בהן מעשה כגון זנות וגזל וגניבה.

That Teshuvah is only limited to active Aveiros. Rambam says no, that's a terrible error.

אלא כשם שצריך אדם לשוב מאלו כך הוא צריך לחפש בדעות רעות שיש לו ולשוב מן הכעס ומן האיבה ומן הקינאה ומן ההיתול ומרדיפת הממון

etc. No, a person has to do Teshuvah also on De'os. corrupt character traits, and the very first one the Rambam lists is ka'as. And that, in the Rambam's opinion, was Moshe Rabbeinu's cheit. Ramban, as you all know, quotes this in the Peirush Al HaTorah in Parshas Chukas, and he says that he doesn't understand how the Rambam simply read the pesukim. The very pesukim which the Rambam himself quotes. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu says to Moshe Rabbeinu, יען לא האמנתם בי להקדישני Leinei Bnei Yisrael, right? You lacked emunah to sanctify me Leinei Bnei Yisrael. So where do you see any allusion to a cheit of ka'as, the Ramban says? There's no allusion to a cheit of ka'as here. יען לא האמנתם בי להקדישני לעיני בני ישראל. And then the pasuk later in the parsha, when Aharon is about to die, and again Hakadosh Baruch Hu repeats why it is he's dying. Again is על אשר מריתם את פי L'mei Merivah. So meila, according to Rashi's peshat that they, that hitting the, the rock instead of speaking to it. Or the Ramban likes Rabbeinu Chananel's peshat that המן הסלע הזה נוציא לכם מים, that Moshe and Aharon said it in such a way that they conveyed the impression that they were going to be the cause of this miracle, Notzi lachem mayim, as opposed to יוציא השם לכם מים. So that you see is in the pasuk. That somehow or other they were contradicting their instructions. And that's לא האמנתם בי להקדישני. But how did the Rambam simply read the pasuk? So lechora, the answer is twofold. The answer is twofold. So the Rambam goes on, and the Rambam doesn't simply say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu indicts Moshe Rabbeinu for ka'as, but he continues. He says:

כשנטה כלפי הכעס באמרו שמעו נא המורים מיחה השם בו שאיש כמהו יכעס בפני קהל ישראל במקום שאין הכעס ראוי בו וכגון זה ביחס לאותו האדם חילול השם לפי שכל תנועותיו ודבריו כולם למדים מהם ובהם מקוים לזכות לאושר העולם הזה והבא והיאך יבא ממנו הכעס והוא ממעשה הרע כמו שביארנו אבל אמרו בענין זה מריתם פי הוא כמו שאבאר שהוא לא היה מדבר עם ההמונים ולא עם מי שאין לו מעלה אלא עם אנשים אשר הקטנה שבנשיהם כיחזקאל בן בוזי כמו שזכרו חכמים וכל מה שיאמר או יעשה

bochanim oso analyze it.

וכאשר ראו שכעס אמרו שהוא עליו השלום אינו מן המאוסים שיש להם מגרעת מדות זאת,

he is not lacking in middos.

ולולא שידע שהשם פה התאנף ושעשינו כבר חטאנו לפניו לא היה כועס.

So be'emes, the Rambam is careful to say, the Rambam is careful to say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu was so stringent with Moshe Rabbeinu for the ka'as because the ka'as created a chillul Hashem. So it wasn't just the ka'as again as a cheit per se, but again then that cheit is then magnified because again the definition of chillul Hashem is when what a person does reflects not only on himself but on Hakadosh Baruch Hu, on Hakadosh Baruch Hu's Torah, on Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And that's what the Rambam says was the result of Moshe Rabbeinu's cheit of ka'as. That's lechora also clearly how the Rambam would respond to the Ramban's other kashyas. Ramban also asks on the Rambam that if the sin was ka'as, he says: היה יותר היה ראוי שיהיה העונש על משה כשחטא. of the Pekudei Ha-Chayil bechinom והכתוב לא סיפר כלל. And then he says that if anything, Moshe Rabbeinu should have been punished if kaas was the cheit, so in Parshas Matos where ויקצוף משה על פקודי החיל, that's when he should have been punished. So lachora the Rambam would answer in one of two ways, either, either that the truer of the two, just, the Rambam would answer that since there was not in the presence of all Klal Yisrael, so therefore the cheit, ein hachi nami, the cheit of kaas was the same, but the dimension of Chillul Hashem was not the same. The fact that over there in Parshas Moshe, in Parshas Matos, it's only directed towards the Pekudei Ha-Chayil and presumably no one else was privy to what Moshe Rabbeinu told them, mah she-ein kein here in Parshas Chukas, it's kovel am ve-eida in the presence of all Klal Yisrael. So clearly the Rambam does seem to have anticipated these kashas. But it would seem to be, seem to be even, even more. How do you translate the words, again, when all is said and done according to the Rambam, how do we translate the words of יען לא האמנתם בי להקדישני לעיני בני ישראל? Somehow or rather the lack of being mekadesh shem shamayim signifies a chisaron in emuna. So what this would seem to point to is that genuine emuna entails just as we find that the Rambam writes in Sefer Ha-Mitzvos by the mitzvah of ahavas Hashem, he quotes the Sifrei שיהא שם שמים מתאהב על ידך that ahavas Hashem is expressed by inducing others to ahavas Hashem as well. שיהא שם שמים מתאהב על ידך, so it seems to be the pshat according to the Rambam is יען לא האמנתם בי that emuna also, genuine emuna also will result in a Kiddush Hashem. And any time a person's, a person's actions don't lead to a Kiddush Hashem, Rachmana litzlan to the opposite, so then that's not just lacking in Kiddush Hashem and Chillul Hashem, but that's lacking in emuna. And it's interesting when you stop and think about it, and maybe this is the reason, I don't know whether the mefarshim, whether the medakdekim talk about it, but it's interesting that, that the verb le-ha'amin is in the hifil. It's in the hifil. Meaning it's, it's a transitive, right? Hifil is always, is always transitive. Lichtov means to write. Lehachtiv means to dictate, right? That's always the relationship between the hifil and the kal, using the same shoresh. So maybe this is even alluded to just in the grammatical construction that le-ha'amin is not just something between a person and Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but it's something which should have repercussions for others as well. And that the genuine, had there been, again, genuine emuna, so then it would have resulted in a Kiddush Hashem. And if on this one occasion, Moshe Rabbeinu's action didn't result in a Kiddush Hashem, so that indicated for that brief moment that there was a lack of, of emuna in the Ribbono Shel Olam. So that would seem to be how the Rambam learned the pshat here in the psukim in Parshas Chukas. The other place where the Rambam again, as you know, comes back to the question of kaas. In Sefer Hamitzvos in the Mitzva of klala, Mitzvas lo saaseh shin yud zayin. So the Rambam writes that the reason for Mitzvas klala

אולי יהיה בדעתנו כי בתכלית מה שנעשה לנו קללת איש מישראל כשישמע אותה למה שישיגהו מן הצער והכאב. אבל קללת החרש אחר שלא ישמע ולא יכאב בו שלא יהיה בזה חטא. הנה הודיענו שהוא אסור והזהיר ממנו כי התורה לא הקפידה בענין המקולל לבד אבל הקפידה גם כן בענין המקלל לבד כשהזהיר שלא יניע נפשו לנקמה ולא ירגיל לכעוס.

Rambam says that the taamei hamitzvos for the issur klala is because if a person is moved to curse someone, so it means that he's so overcome with anger that he can't even contain the anger and he has to vent it through klala. And that again, feeling of and expression of kaas prompting him to again try to take some kind of nekama is what the Torah assurs in the issur in the issur of lo sekalel cheresh. So here again just parenthetically, kam d'asya l'yadach, the Sefer Hachinuch is masig on this Rambam and says no, says that the taamei hamitzvos

והרמב"ם ז"ל אמר בטעם מצוה זו כדי שלא יניע נפשו המקלל אל הנקמה ולא ירגילנה לכעוס והאריך בענין בספרו. ונראה לי מדבריו שלא יראה הוא בדעתו נזק אל המקולל בקללה אלא שהרחיקה התורה הענין מצד המקלל שלא ירגיל נפשו אל הנקמה וכעס ואל פחיתות המדות. וכל דברי רבותינו נקבל עם היות לבבנו נאחז במה שכתבנו למעלה.

So the Chinuch says I think that the reason for the issur klala is that somehow or another a klala is efficacious. Somehow a klala can actually cause harm to the mekulal.

ידענו דרך כלל מכל בני העולם שחוששין מהקללות בין ישראל בין שאר האומות ויאמרו שקללת בני אדם גם קללת הדיוט תעשה רושם במקולל ותדבק בה המארה והצער. ואחר דעתנו דבר זה מפי הבריות נאמר כי משרשי המצוה שמנענו השם יתברך מהזיק בפינו לזולתנו כמו שנמנענו מהזיק להם במעשה. וכעין ענין זה אמרו רבותינו ז"ל ברית כרותה לשפתים כלומר שיש כח בדברי פי אדם.

L'pum ree-ha t'fu. So that's what the Chinuch says. And again lichora that the Chinuch is correct, you see it from two things. Number one, the idea in general, which he alludes to certainly in the Gemara, you certainly have that in Chazal, right? He refers to how Chazal use the pasuk of bris kirusa l'sfasiyam, for instance in Eilu Megalchin. Where the Gemara tells a story that Pinchas, achua d'mar Shmuel, itrah bei milsa. He was sitting shiva either for a wife, for a child, for some relative that he and Shmuel did not have in common. על שמואל למישאל טעמא מיניה. Shmuel came for nichum aveilim. חזייה לטופיה דהוה נפישא. He saw that he had—this is in the sugya of how and when an avel is allowed to cut his nails. So he saw that his brother was not cutting his nails. אמר ליה אמאי לא שקלת להו? Why don't you cut your nails?

אמר ליה אי בדידי הוה מי מזלזלת ביה כולי האי?

If you were an avel, so would you be mezalzel in hilchos avelus? So the Gemara says הוי כשגגה שיוצא מלפני השליט ואיטבד בה מילתא בשמואל. And then sure enough, Shmuel shortly thereafter became an avel. אתא פנחס אחוה למישאל טעמא מיניה. So now the roles were reversed and Pinchas came to Shmuel for nichum aveilim. שקלינהו לטופיה וחבטינהו לאפיה. He literally he took his nails and threw it at Pinchas. אמר ליה לית לך ברית כרותה לשפתים? Don't you know the notion of bris kirusa lisfasayim?

דאמר רבי יוחנן מניין שברית כרותה לשפתים שנאמר ויאמר אברהם אל נעריו שבו לכם פה עם החמור ואני והנער נלכה עד כה ונשתחוה ונשובה אליכם ואיסתייעא מילתא דהדור תרוייהו.

So again he's clearly alluding to this Gemara. The Chinuch mentions bris kirusa lisfasayim. So the idea in general is certainly correct. And specifically as far as klala, the Sefer HaChinuch himself goes on later to quote, I believe, yeah, the Gemara in Shevuos says that המקלל עצמו לוקה שנאמר השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד. How do you know there's an issur even to be mekallel atzmo? It's השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד. So lichora clearly that would clearly seem to indicate that there is some efficaciousness to klala. So ella mai, the kasha is a kushya chazaka on the Rambam, but you just need to add one note of explanation. Emes is that the Rambam doesn't say that the Torah was makpid only about kaas and nekamah. The Rambam says that too is included in the Torah's ta'amei hamitzvos. ולהגיע בדעתנו כי בתכלית מה שנעשה לנו kilelas ha'ish miyisrael that the Torah lo—that ובתכלית מה שנעשה לנו kilelas ha'ish miyisrael

כשישמע אותה למה שישיגהו מן הצער והכאב אבל קללת החרש אף על פי שלא ישמע ולא יכאב בה שלא יהיה בזה חטא הנה הודיענו שהוא אסור והזהיר ממנו.

Now,

כי התורה לא הקפידה בעניין המוקלל לבד אבל הקפידה גם כן בעניין המקלל לבד.

So the Rambam doesn't deny, and Rav Chaim Heller's translation is the same here, so the Rambam doesn't deny that the issur klala isn't mindful of the muklal. The Rambam says don't make the mistake of thinking that it's not mindful of the mekallel as well. So be'emes with that you could have ferent the Chinuch's kashas. But the truth is that when you read the Rambam even when the Rambam describes what the Torah's concern with the muklal is, so the Rambam's not describing what the Sefer HaChinuch says. He talks about the tza'ar and the ke'ev, seems to be the psychological tza'ar and ke'ev. And it doesn't seem to be that he's talking about the again the efficaciousness of the possible efficaciousness of the klala as the Sefer HaChinuch is. So be'emes the kasha stands even though again the Rambam is not saying that the issur klala is exclusively concerned with the mekallel. It is concerned with the muklal as well, but it doesn't seem to be for these reasons. I don't know the rayas of the Chinuch are a strong raya. I don't know. The kasha is tzorech iyun. And then the Rambam says that

ילמד עצמו שלא יכעס אפילו על דבר שראוי לכעוס בו.

And

וינהיג עצמו שלא ירגיש אפילו לדברים המכעיסים וזו היא הדרך הטובה.

How does one implement that practically? Kimdomani that there are three perspectives, not all of them are necessarily relevant in every instance, but there are three perspectives which address probably all instances of where we disregard this halacha and we actually do feel and display ka'as. One perspective is the one the Rambam provides at the end of Hilchos De'os in Perek Zayin Halacha Zayin. The Rambam writes הנוקם מחברו עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר לא תקום. The person takes revenge, so he's over a lav,

אף על פי שאין לוקה עליו דעה רעה היא עד מאד.

Don't mistake the fact that it's a לאו שאין בו מעשה which doesn't carry with it an onesh of malkus to think that this isn't important.

דעה רעה היא עד מאד. אלא ראוי לו לאדם להיות מעביר על מדותיו על כל דברי העולם.

A person should be yielding and forgiving על כל דברי העולם. Everything olam has a relation,

שהכל אצל המבינים דברי הבל והבאי ואינן כדי לנקום עליהם.

Because all these things are hevel v'havai and they don't justify nekama, they don't justify revenge. Ela k'sheyavo lo, says the Rambam,

יתן בלב שלם ולא יגמול לו כאשר גמלו וכן כל כיוצא באלו וכן אמר דוד בדעותיו הטובות אם גמלתי שלמי רע ואחלצה צוררי ריקם.

So the first perspective, the one which the Rambam is discussing here, is that many, many occasions of ka'as, again, the ka'as and the nekama are often intertwined as that Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvos about klala indicates, that many, many occasions of ka'as simply, what triggers the ka'as is divrei hevel v'havai, divrei hevel v'havai. Money, insults, divrei hevel v'havai. If a person would stop and reflect about it, he'd realize the disproportionate reaction of allowing his neshama to be corrupted by this mida, by these midos, in response to something, again, which is דברי הבל והבאי ואינן כדי לנקום עליהם. So that's certainly one perspective. Another perspective is that in most occasions where we get angry, except for those rare instances where one's anger is really moral outrage, but in most instances when we get angry, there's an element of ga'ava which drives the anger. And in most instances, if you stop and analyze why we become angry, so what it boils down to is why did he... he do this to me? And there's very, very few instances of anger that one encounters which are not egotistical displays. And clearly if a person will be mitbonen on those things which reinforce anavah, on his own total dependence on Hakadosh Baruch Hu and vulnerability, so then a person will realize that in addition to the source of dispute often being divrei havel vahavai which is אינם כדאי לנקום עליהם, that he himself, maybe not just the supposed victim but maybe the real victim of a wrongdoing is also אינו כדאי לנקום עליו. The final perspective, which perhaps is the most inclusive and wide-ranging, possibly the Rambam is hinting at it here at the end of the halacha, I'm not sure. If a person believes, as he certainly should according to many, many rishonim, that hashgacha pratis does not allow someone else's bechirah chofshis to impact upon us unless that's in accordance with hashgacha pratis. Hashgacha pratis allows we do whatever we want and therefore we are entirely, absolutely responsible for our actions. In terms of what effect our actions, our motives and attempts notwithstanding, in terms of what effect our actions do register on others, so that will only be in accordance with hashgacha pratis. That's a very, very important yesod and be'emes that's what the pesukim in last week's parsha, in parshas Vayigash express when ולא יכלו אחיו לענות אתו כי נבהלו מפניו. So Yosef sees that the brothers are stunned into silence so

גשו נא אלי ויגשו ויאמר אני יוסף אחיכם אשר מכרתם אתי מצרימה ועתה אל תעצבו ואל יחר בעיניכם כי מכרתם אתי הנה כי למחיה שלחני אלהים לפניכם ועתה לא אתם שלחתם אתי הנה כי האלהים וישימני לאב לפרעה ולאדון לכל ביתו ומשל בכל ארץ מצרים.

So the simple but not correct reading of the pesukim is that Yosef is exonerating the brothers. לא אתם מכרתם אתי הנה כי האלהים, right? You didn't sell me here, the brothers sold me here. Now that can't lichora be the correct reading of the pesukim for many reasons, but the most direct and compelling is that according to Chazal ולא יכלו אחיו לענות אתו, right, the famous Gemara in Chagigah and the Midrash Rabbah on those pesukim is that Yosef right there toch k'dei dibbur had given them tochacha, right? Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara says in Chagigah, רבי אלעזר כי מטי להאי קרא הוה בכי. Rabbi Elazar used to cry when he came to this pasuk that if the brothers couldn't answer a tochacha basar vadam, so a tochacha of Hakadosh Baruch Hu is על אחת כמה וכמה. And again you have the famous Beis HaLevi's explanation of what the tochacha was and how it's expressed in the pasuk. You see that Yosef, toch kedei dibbur, is giving them tochachah. Toch kedei dibbur is giving them tochachah, and then he turns around and says לא אתם שלחתם אותי הנה כי אלוקים. So what does it mean? So Yosef HaTzaddik was telling them as follows. This is very very important. Very very important. Yosef was telling them as follows. A person's actions have to be viewed from two different vantage points, from two different perspectives. If one is the subject, the doer of the actions, so then what's done is done from bechira chofshis. Is done from bechira chofshis. If one is the object of the actions, right, to whom the actions or against whom the actions were directed, upon whom the injury was imposed, so then one is supposed to view it not from the vantage point of bechira chofshis but rather from the vantage point of hashgacha pratis. So as the subject of actions, a person is supposed to recognize that what he did, he did of his own free will. As the object of someone else's actions, so then a person is supposed to recognize that if this other person's free will was allowed to affect me in this way, so then clearly that result accorded with hashgacha pratis. And that was intended by the hashgacha pratis regardless of whether this person would have done it. Now the first of those two basic emunos is intuitive. Because we certainly just intuitively feel that we act freely, right? That's something that we sense intuitively. The other of the two is something which is not intuitive because what we see empirically, physically, is we see someone else do something to us and then we see that we endure pain, right? We see someone pick up his hand and he strikes us and the result is that we endure pain. So right away again, we see the world in terms of cause and effect, so we tend to focus upon that person as the cause of this effect. Says Yosef to the brothers, that's what Yosef HaTzaddik was telling to the brothers. You, of course you sinned. What you did, you did out of your own free will. What you did to me, more importantly to Yaakov, was unspeakable. Was unspeakable. Ha-od avi chai, it was absolutely unspeakable and the tochachah was so powerful, so forceful that לא יכלו אחיו לענות אותו. They couldn't utter a word. However Yosef says, but if you're sitting there, you're standing there terrified that I'm going to take revenge, so then you should know that the way I view what happened, the dimension which I am supposed to focus on is לא אתם שלחתם אותי הנה כי אלוקים. And we see that that was Yosef's immediate reaction as well. Chazal tell us, Chazal tell us in that beautiful midrash in Parshas Vayeishev,

ויהי בעת ההיא וירד יהודה מאת אחיו ויט עד איש עדולמי ושמו חירה.

So what do you mean Vayehi ba'es hahu? So it sounds like the Torah is placing this event of Yehuda going down and getting married in a broader context, right? In a global context, amongst everything else that was happening in the world, this is what Yehuda was doing. So what else was happening in the world? What else was happening in the world? Chazal describe that among other things that Yosef עוסק בשקו ובתעניתו על מכירתו. That Yosef was fasting and observing all the nhugim of a ta'anis because he had been sold. What was he fasting for? So he was unfortunate enough to have brothers who were jealous of him, who hated him, and because of that they committed a terrible aveira. They wronged him terribly. So he should have been sitting there plotting revenge, not עוסק בשק ותעניתו על מכירתו. So ella mai it's clear that Yosef what he tells the brothers in Parshas Vayigash, that was Yosef's reaction immediately. That was his immediate reaction. If this happened, yes, they are terribly guilty for doing it, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu would have thwarted what they were trying to do to me, were there not some reason that it happened to me and that's why he was osek besak vetaniso. That's what the Sefer Hachinuch be'emes says this mefurash. The Sefer Hachinuch says all of this black and white in the mitzvah of lo sikom.

שורשי המצוה שידע האדם ויתן אל לבו כי כל אשר יקרהו מטוב עד רע היא סיבה שתבוא אליו מאת השם יתברך ומיד האדם מיד איש אחיו לעשות דבר בלתי רצונו ברוך הוא אל כן כשצערו או יכאיבו אדם,

says the Chinuch,

ידע בנפשו כי עוונותיו גרמו והשם יתברך גזר עליו בכך ולא ישית מחשבתו לנקום ממנו כי הוא אינו סיבת רעתו כי העוון הוא המסבב. וכמו שאמר דוד המלך עליו השלום הניחו לו ויקלל כי אמר לו השם תלה העניין בחטאו ולא בשמעי בן גרא.

And then one can add to what the Sefer Hachinuch says and that notwithstanding as part of his tzava'ah to Shlomo Hamelech, so Dovid Hamelech instructs Shlomo that Shimi should not go unpunished. That Shimi should not go unpunished. So on the one hand, Dovid Hamelech says הניחו לו ויקלל כי אמר לו השם. On the other hand, he tells Shlomo that he doesn't allow Shimi ben Gera to die a natural death, כי הוא קללני קללה נמרצת. So that's exactly, exactly the same dual or split level perspective that Yosef was sharing with the brothers. That from your perspective, so then you sinned grievously. But from my perspective, you weren't the cause. If you hadn't been the cause, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu would have employed some other means or instrument. He didn't force you to do it involuntarily. That's what the Rambam explains in Hilchos Teshuvah, why was it the Rambam also has this again, this split level understanding in Hilchos Teshuvah as well. Why were the Mitzrim culpable if Hakadosh Baruch Hu had decreed

כי גר יהיה זרעך בארץ לא להם ועבדום ועינו אותם ארבע מאות שנה.

So the Rambam says

והלא כתוב בתורה ועבדום ועינו אותם הרי גזר על המצריים לעשות רע,

so lamah nifrah meihem? לפי שלא גזר על איש פלוני הידוע שיהיה הוא. He didn't, he wasn't gozer on the Mitzrim. He wasn't gozer on the Mitzrim that they had to do it. Hakadosh Baruch Hu said I'm being gozer this on Bnei Yisrael and that's why I will allow the Mitzrim to carry out their evil designs. It's the exact same point that the person who does it, the truth is from the hassagos haRaavad so it's clear that the Raavad didn't have, didn't have this approach that we're talking about. But the Rambam says from the point of view of the subject, so the person acted with total unrestricted free will and that's why he's responsible. From the point of view of the object, he has to realize that if it hadn't been these means or this instrument, so there would have been another means or another instrument. So when you come back to what we're talking about ka'as, again, a כעס בין אדם לחברו. So here too, again, just as the Chinuch explains that if a person recognizes the role of hashgacha pratis, it undercuts a desire for nekamah. It also undercuts that reaction. The reaction of ka'as as well. The reaction of ka'as as well. The reaction of ka'as again is that this person is responsible for something that happened to me. He's responsible for the pain, the embarrassment, or whatever it is that I suffered. But if a person stops and contemplates, or better yet, we strive to internalize this, so this is how we respond instinctively, that מיד האדם מיד איש אחר as the Chinuch says, this couldn't happen if it were not in accordance with hashgacha pratis. So that too totally, totally undercuts that reaction of ka'as the same way it undercuts that desire for nekama.