1) R’ Bachya’s Modesty 2) The Need fir Brevity 3) Each Discipline Has it’s Own Type of Logic

The last line that we read yesterday. Again, in this edition, there's a paragraph that begins vehavinosi. The last line in that paragraph: כאשר יחשוב לעשות טוב אל יאחר. Chovos Halevavos in context it seems clear that what the Chovos Halevavos is telling us is as follows: In addition to whatever qualitative enhancement there is of zerizus makdimim, of מצוה הבאה לידך אל תחמיצנה, when there's a tovah that a person, okay, in context here he's talking about authoring this sefer, when there's a tovah that a person contemplates doing and as he presented in this paragraph so the yeitzer hara, whether it's the yeitzer hara of atzlus or whatever manifestation of the yeitzer hara, pushes back against it. The need to do something right away is not only to upgrade it with the quality of zerizus, to not be guilty of מצוה הבאה לידך אל תחמיצנה, but because there's a risk that he'll never do it. It's an inyan of zerizus. It's not that we don't think that what this paragraph is describing is not that the father is going to moreh heter le'atzmo not to mol his son. It's an inyan of zerizus. It's an inyan of מצוה הבאה לידך אל תחמיצנה. But when it's something which isn't, you know, מצוה שקבוע לו זמן, such as mila biyom hashemini, netilas lulav on יום ראשון של סוכות. Again, it's כאשר יחשוב לעשות טוב, not a מצוה שקבוע לו זמן. So here the Chovos Halevavos is saying no, the need to do things right away is because the clarity that a person has may be compromised. If at the moment he has that clarity and, you know, is able to reject the specious counter-arguments of the yeitzer hara, so while the person has that moment of clarity he needs to act on it because otherwise it may not just be a question of zerizus, may be a question that he'll never attend to it.

על כן ראיתי להכריח את נפשי לסבול טורח חיבור הספר הזה.

You see how far removed, totally totally removed he was from ga'avah. I think you know, for I think we could push back against the yeitzer hara with another yeitzer hara of, you know, this will this will be a claim to fame, this will be vechulu vechulu and I don't know would we know. Whoever Bahya was, that there was this great man of towering stature who was a dayan in Spain in the 11th century? Would we know who he was if he hadn't written Chovot HaLevavot? Would it be סוף סוף מדברות בקרב? So presumably the answer to those questions is no, no, no. And yet that doesn't, he wasn't shooting for that. There wasn't the shemetz of self-interest. So the yetzer hara was a yetzer hara of atzlus and he didn't have a yetzer hara of ga'avah to push back against that. He only had the yetzer hatov to push back against that. I think we could form an alliance between the yetzer hara and the yetzer hatov on this, but for him it was only the yetzer hatov that was pushing back against it.

על כן ראיתי להכריח את נפשי לסבול טרח המעשה בזה לבאר עניינו בכל לשון שאוכל,

meaning earlier he expressed his reservation of not being sufficiently a master of Arabic to be able to write as eloquently as one would want. No,

לבאר עניינו בכל לשון שאוכל ובכל מליצה שתזדמן לי שיובן העניין מהם, ואסקור מתולדות חובות הלבבות מה שיבוא לידי ולא אטרח להביא כולם כדי שלא יאריך הספר.

The Rishonim had a remarkable sensitivity that arichus would be experienced as something onerous and were very mindful and conscious of avoiding it. According to Rashi, it's a Gemara Pesachim here.

אמר רב הונא אמר רב משום רבי מאיר לעולם ישנה אדם לתלמידו דרך קצרה.

Why is that? Says Rashi, מפני שמתקיימת גרסא שלו יותר מן הארוכה. So Chovot HaLevavot is conscious of that his sefer shouldn't become unwieldy, and the Rambam ka-yadua speaks about this theme a lot. For instance, Here in the hakdama to Sefer HaMitzvot, when the Rambam is describing that he has this plan to write Mishneh Torah, of which Sefer HaMitzvot is sort of a hakdama, a preliminary volume. So when he describes what he has in mind to do in Mishneh Torah, he says והיה הנאות אצלי להפיל ממנו האריכות. I'm going to avoid all arichus. I'm going to give you the halacha pesuka. And even ad kedei kach to streamline things as much as possible, that I'm not even going to mention, I'm not going to say that this din Rava said and this din Rabbi Yochanan said. והסמיכות בזכרון בעל הקבלה, ad shelo omar divrei Rabbi Ploni ולא רבי פלוני אמר כך בכל מאמר ומאמר. Because all this will allow me to condense even more.

כל זה לבקשת הקיצור. אך אסכמנה בדברים הצריכים ובכל שורש משורשיה בשער שלא משתעו אליו. ובאלוקים האחד האמת אעזר ועליו אפתח וממנו אשאל ברחמיו להורותני סיבות הדרך הישרה אשר ארצה בה והיא מקובלת בעיניו בדיבור במעשה בסתר ובגילוי. וכאשר נגמרו עצתי והסכמתי לחבר תיקנתי אושיותיה ויסדתי מכוניה ובניתיה על עשרה שרשים מקבצים כל חובות הלבבות.

And when he said אעזקה מתולדות חובות הלבבות מה שיבוא לידי, all the corollaries, all the applications, so the sefer is not comprehensive in terms of every application of Chovot HaLevavot. But in terms of the shorashim, in terms of the major yesodos and principles, so in that sense, the sefer is comprehensive.

וחילקתיה לעשרה שערים כל שער מהם מיוחד לשורש אחד משורשיו כולל את גבולו ומחלקותיו והעניינים התלויים בו והפנים המפסידים אותו.

Right, which is at least in terms of that last element, hapanim hamafsidim oso, is what we find the same thing so much later in Ramchal's Mesilat Yesharim, right? About mafsidei hazehirut, mafsidei hazrizut, etc. So the same thing here, already in Chovot HaLevavot.

ואני אוחז בו הדרך הקרובה להאיר להורות ולהשכיל בלשון המבואר הקרוב והנוהג כדי שיהיה מה שאני רוצה לבאר קרוב להבין.

I'm going to do what's most effective, what will be easiest for people to grasp. ואניח הלשון העמוק והמילות הנוכריות. He's I'm going to keshulchan aruch. As Chazal say, ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם כשולחן ערוך. So that clarity is in the language and in the choice of words also. But I also will not engage in

והמפתים ההולכים על דרך מלאכת הניצוח שקורין אותו אנשי חכמת הדיבור

belashon aravit, I don't know, al-jidal. So in the notes, they explain that מופת על דרך מלאכת הניצוח is to show that if you have two approaches, and in one approach, there are sort of ten kashas, there are ten loose ends, ten unresolved, and the other approach only you have two kashas, only two unresolved. So that that would advocate that the second approach is the correct one. I'm not going to engage in that type of argumentation, says the Chovos HaLevavos. אשר לא יתכן להתיישב עליהם בספר הזה. Excuse me. vehanachkarim harechokim

אשר לא יתכן להתיישב עליהם בספר הזה מפני שלא הבאתי בו אלא הראיות המספיקות.

And maspikos means all arguments which are persuasive. אשר תתיישב הדעת עליהם על משפטי החכמה האלוקית. uchemo sheamar haphilosoph:

אין ראוי שנבקש בהשגת כל מחקר מציאותו על דרך המופת, כי אין כל מחקר שכלי נמצא במופת, ולא שנבקש בחכמת השימוש הדבר המספיק, ולא בחכמת האלוקות להרגיש ולהמשיל, ולא בתחלת החכמה הטבעית מופת, ולא בראשית המופת מופת.

So what the Chovos HaLevavos is quoting is as follows: The type of argument, the type of proof that a person introduces depends upon the discipline. Moving beyond Yichud Hashem, after you get beyond Yichud Hashem, that there's a chiyuv in sevara, which the Chovos HaLevavos will explain in Sha'ar HaBechina, to look into the world and to see chochmas Hashem, chasdei Hashem in the world, that there's a chiyuv, skipping one sha'ar to the fourth, that there's a chiyuv bitachon. Those types of propositions don't lend themselves to formal logical proof. The type of formal logical proof, all men are mortal, Aristotle is a man, therefore Aristotle is mortal. So a person, what the level, what the type of proof is, where the bar is set depends upon the discipline. That's what this statement from the, I don't know who he's quoting, I'm not sure, maybe it's, I don't know, look up to see who the philosopher that he's quoting. כי אין כל מחקר שכלי נמצא במופת. There's no formal syllogistic proof that you're supposed to have bitachon bashem. So the type of argument, the type of proof that you give depends upon the discipline. Now, in mathematical, if you're dealing with math, so then you don't present persuasive arguments. No, then that discipline lends itself to mofes, it lends itself to logical demonstration. And you can't say it makes sense that this algebraic formula makes sense. No, you have to show how it is, you have to compel that conclusion logically. Again, logic. Ramban has a similar point; he doesn't have this much more of an arichus here in the Chovos HaLevavos. So the Milchamos, the Ramban defends the Rif against the hasagos of the Baal HaMaor.

ואתה המסתכל בספרי אל תאמר בלבבך כי כל תשובותי על הרב רבי זכריה,

the Baal HaMaor,

על הרב רבי זכריה זל כולן בעיני תשובות נצחות ומכריחות אותך להודות בהם על פני עקשותך.

Don't think that I intended to present teshuvos nitzachos machrichos that a person without abandoning, totally abandoning reason, would have to acknowledge.

ותספאר בהיותך מספק אחת מהם על לומדיה או תטריח על דעתך להיכנס בנקב המחט לדחות מעליך הכרח ראיותי.

Eino davar kein. I mean, the Ramban does say that to disagree you have to be an akshan and you have to be trying to squeeze through the eye of a needle. כי יודע כל לומד תלמודנו. Everyone who studies Shas knows she-ein be-machlokes mefarshav when you have a machlokes Rishonim, a machlokes in the Geonim, שאין במחלוקת מפרשיו ראיות גמורות. We'll see in a minute what he means by rayos gemuros. There are no absolute, unequivocal, compelling proofs. ולא ברוב קושיות חלוטות. And for the most part you don't have, again, absolute refutations that the Ramban will have an absolute refutation of the Baal HaMaor's approach. שאין בחכמה הזאת מופת ברור. Because in chochmah, bachochmah hazos, meaning Talmud, in halachah, in learning Shas,

שאין בחכמה הזאת מופת ברור כגון חשבוני התשבורות ונסיוני התכונה.

You don't have the type of absolutely conclusive, definitive, incontestable proof that you can have in math. You don't have that in a machlokes Rishonim in how to learn pshat in a sugya. So you have to recognize that. You have to recognize that and it's the same yesod as this Chovos HaLevavos that in every discipline a person has to know what the type of argument is that you put forward. And not to think that a person can surpass that and on the other hand to recognize that it's not a criticism that the person didn't surpass that. And that's what the Chovos HaLevavos is also saying, just he's saying it a little bit more broadly. ולא בחכמת האלקות להרגיש ולהמשיל. Don't think that in teaching about Hakadosh Baruch Hu that you can concretize and that you can really give meshalim. Again, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is unique, so by definition you can't really have a mashal in chochmas ha'elokus. ולא בתחלת החכמה הטבעית מופת ולא בראשית המופת מופת. Don't look for a proof for. axioms. You can't ask someone to prove that the whole is greater than any part. That's just an axiom, that you're just supposed to recognize its inherent minei ubei truth, which is the case of all axioms, right? That's how they become axioms. כי כאשר נשמר מן הדברים האלה, when a person again knows what the type of argumentation, the type of explanation, the type of proof is. Again, if you want to prove to someone that something is immoral, so you don't prove it the way you prove a theorem in geometry. And that obviously if a person is ignorant of that, so then he'll think that something, if you hold out for something that doesn't exist, so then you don't recognize what the type of argument is supposed to be in that discipline. There's no formal syllogistic proof that you should have bitochon bashim. Again, the Chovos Halevavos will explain it, but not in the way that you would explain something mathematically.

כי כאשר נשמר מן הדברים האלה יקל עלינו להגיע לבקשתנו,

on the other hand,

ואם לא נעשה כן נסטה מדרך ענייננו, והנה טעה בסדר הישר, ויקשה עלינו למצוא מה שהיתה כוונתנו אליו.

We'll pick up there tomorrow morning.