The Substane of Teshuva. Kabbolas Ol Malchus Shomayim.

Perek Rishon.

ואמר בגדר מהות התשובה שטעם התשובה הוא הסכמת האדם לעבודת הבורא יתברך אחר יציאתו ממנה בחטא ובוא והשבת מה שאבד ממנו.

The word ta'am as it was used in the tekufas harishonim, we use ta'am to mean reason as in mai ta'ama. In tekufas harishonim it was used very commonly to mean the content or the substance of something, the tochen hadvarim. Like when the Ramban says ta'am in the perush al hatorah, ke-seder, that's what it means. So ta'am hateshuva doesn't mean the reason of teshuva, it means the, again, what the substance of teshuva is, הסכמת האדם לעבודת הבורא יתברך אחר יציאתו ממנה. That a person re-establishes himself in terms of avodas Hashem. Now there's here a this line is very remarkable in terms of the definition that the Chovos Halevavos gives for teshuva and to help put that into focus, into sharper focus, so let's compare and contrast to what the Rambam has in Perek Beis of Teshuva, Halacha Beis. Umah hi hateshuva?

הוא שיעזוב החוטא חטאו ויסירו ממחשבתו ויגמור בלבו שלא יעשהו עוד שנאמר יעזוב רשע דרכו ואיש און מחשבותיו. וכן ינחם על שעבר שנאמר כי אחרי שובי נחמתי ואחרי הודעי ספקתי על ירך.

So teshuva means azivas hachet, kabbalah l'haba, then it's followed up with a sense of remorse, ינחם על שעבר. The Chovos Halevavos says that teshuva means that a person returns to his kabbalas ol mitzvos. Notice how the Chovos Halevavos's definition of teshuva isn't focused on a particular chet. Again, for the Rambam, mah hi hateshuva? She-ya'azov hachotei chet'o. The definition of teshuva is teshuva al hachet. Chovos Halevavos gives us a definition that what chet represents is to a degree, on a certain level, in a certain sense, prikas ol and hence what teshuva means is re-establishing, re-affirming, re-committing to that kabbalas ol mitzvos. הסכמת האדם לעבודת הבורא יתברך אחר יציאתו ממנה. And you see repercussions of this later as well. The Gemara in Taanis tes-zayin

אמר אדא בר אהבה אדם שיש בידו עבירה ומתוודה ואינו חוזר בו

le-mah hu domeh?

לאדם שתופס שרץ בידו שאפילו טובל בכל מימי שבעולם לא עלתה לו טבילה.

So if a person is misvadeh but he's eino chozer bo, he's like a tovel vesheretz beyado. So tovel vesheretz beyado, obviously the tevillah is ineffective because while he's in the mikvah which has the potential, which has the capacity to be metaher him, he's holding on to the source of tumah. So too the fact that a person is misvadeh, vidui has the potential to be mechaper but if it's lo chozer bo, no. What's the case here? So Rashi takes אדם שיש בידו עבירה very literally and says it means gezel. And ומתוודה ואינו חוזר בה means he doesn't return the gezel. The Rambam in

פרק ב' הלכה ג' כל המתוודה בדברים ולא גמר בליבו לעזוב הרי זה דומה לטובל ושרץ בידו.

So for the Rambam, it doesn't mean literally yeish aveira beyado in that the davar hagezul is in his possession. It means he's being misvadeh, but the cheit is ongoing in the sense that לא גמר בליבו לעזוב. Okay, the common denominator, albeit that Rashi understands the Gemara obviously much more narrowly and the Rambam more broadly, but it's talking about how a person's being misvadeh and yet his teshuva for that cheit is, I don't know, deficient or nonexistent. But it means that his actions or his inaction legabei that very cheit for which he's being misvadeh, his actions or inaction contradict his words. He's being misvadeh that chatasi avisi pashati, so of what value is the chatasi avisi pashati if the person לא גמר בליבו לעזוב? The Chovos Halevavos, I think he's a da'as yachid in this, but the Chovos Halevavos, if you take a look later in Perek Zayin, Perek Zayin is devoted to mafsidei hateshuva. Things that counteract teshuva, that don't allow for teshuva. So it's more or less the last of those that he's enumerating here: וממפסידי התשובה גם כן שיהיה השב—do you see it there, rabosai, towards the very end of Sha'ar Ha'teshuva?

וממפסידי התשובה גם כן שיהיה השב שב מקצת עוונותיו ומתמיד על מקצתם, כמו שיצא מן העבירה שבינו ובין המקום ושב מהם ולא יצא ממה שיש בינו ובין בני אדם מגזל ואונאה גניבה והדומה לזה, ובזה נאמר אם און בידך הרחיקהו, ואמרו רבותינו זכרונם לברכה בעניין הזה אדם שיש בידו עבירה ומתוודה ואינו חוזר בה למה הוא דומה למי שתופס שרץ בידו.

So notice how the Chovos Halevavos says the girsa of ve'eino chozer bo. Right? What's the significance? Before we just mentioned there's a shayla what the girsa is, bah or bo. Why? What's so crucial about whether it's the hei or the vav? If it's ve'eino chozer bo, so then it's clear that the Gemara has to mean something like either Rashi or the Rambam says. It means that he's being misvadeh on an aveira and he hasn't even really been chozer on that aveira. But if it's ve'eino chozer bo, so it refers to the person. So the Chovos Halevavos, this is ayom venora, ayom venora. Chovos Halevavos says that a person can't do teshuva for one cheit without doing teshuva on all his chata'im. That's how the Chovos Halevavos understands that Gemara in Taanis. That כל מי שיש בידו דבר עבירה, any aveira, and misvadeh on a different aveira ve'eino chozer bo, and the person is not being chozer bo in his other aveiros, הרי זה דומה לטובל ושרץ בידו. Why again? Because that, you don't have to have this application, but the only way you can say what the Chovos Halevavos says in Perek Zayin is if you define teshuva the way he did in Perek Rishon. That the definition of teshuva is that cheit constitutes a prikas ol and therefore what the teshuva means is that there's a recommitment to the kabbalas ol mitzvos. So says the Chovos Halevavos, what kind of recommitment is there, what kind of renewed commitment is there to kabbalas ol mitzvos if a person's picking and choosing, if a person is not addressing... other chatoim and is only addressing cheit ploni, that's not a kabbalah. The Gemara in Bechoros says on daf lamed aleph or something, the Gemara in Bechoros says that ger sheba lehisgayer and he says he's מקבל כל התורה כולה חוץ מדבר אחד, ein mekabelin oso. Then the Gemara, then the next Tanna says, even for דבר אחד מדברי סופרים. A kabbalah is all or nothing. It can't be a kabbalas mitzvos. Kabbalas mitzvos means not, well, you know, I think Shabbos is a nice idea, but איסור מלאכה בחול המועד is too constraining. So that's not a kabbalas ol mitzvos. Kabbalas ol mitzvos means Hakadosh Baruch Hu says it, I do it. That's what a kabbalas ol mitzvos is. So it's an all or nothing proposition. So that's what the Chovos Halevavos again here in Perek Rishon is saying, the definition of teshuvah is הסכמת אדם לעבודת הבורא. Again, he didn't, as it were, buttonhole teshuvah, that teshuvah means she'ya'azov hachotei cheito, the way the Rambam and, for that matter, all the other Rishonim, I think, say. The Rabbeinu Bachaye is very much a, you know, in terms of this chumra of the Chovos Halevavos, that a person can only really do teshuvah on everything or nothing is very much a daas yachid. Now, that doesn't, you know, the fact that one doesn't halacha lema'aseh, you know, subscribe to his application in Perek Zayin, doesn't mean that the yisod isn't a very important one halacha lema'aseh. And it doesn't mean that the yisod shouldn't resonate. The yisod that the emes is that every cheit in a certain sense, on a certain level, represents prikas ol is a very fundamental perspective on cheit and on teshuvah. Let's say in, when you deal with a person being a mumar. So there we don't operate with this. We say if a person is muchzak to be over a certain avera, but l'te'avon, not l'hachis. So then he's mumar l'oso davar. He's mumar l'davar echad. We don't say that he's מומר לכל התורה כולה. So if a person, we see that he has a yetzer hara for treif food, okay, so then he's mumar l'oso davar and he couldn't serve as a mashgiach because he has no ne'emanus in that area in which he's a mumar. But he doesn't become מומר לכל התורה כולה, only if he's a mumar l'Shabbos or l'Avodah Zarah does that make him מומר לכל התורה כולה or if he's a mumar l'hachis. But a mumar l'te'avon that the person is over a particular avera but l'te'avon, so then he's just mumar l'oso davar. The Chovos Halevavos would tell us, no, mumrus and teshuvah are different standards. Different standards in terms of what the Rambam would say, it's the same, it's something similar. That's the chiddush of the Chovos Halevavos's definition of teshuvah. Lichora in there is a time when lichora everyone is sort of in a general sense operating with this emphasis within teshuvah and that's as follows. You know, the paradox of Rosh Hashanah is that Rosh Hashanah is the first of the Aseres Yemei Teshuvah. Rosh Hashanah is a Yom Hadin. And yet we don't say Viduy on Rosh Hashanah. Okay now now the fact that we don't say Viduy is something which is readily understandable because the very mention of chet itself contradicts Malchios. That the Kedushas Hayom of Rosh Hashanah is a Kedushas Hayom of of of Malchios. So chet is something where even the Hava Amina of chet diminishes the Malchios. על אחת כמה וכמה it's not a time that allows for Viduy. משל למה הדבר דומה? Let's say you have a melech basar vadam is being coronated and everyone is pledging their their loyalty to the crown, their undying loyalty. And then in the midst of of all this someone approaches him and says your Majesty remember a few years ago when you were just a crown prince before you before you became king remember you once visited a certain village and and someone threw eggs at you well that was me sorry about it. I do sincerely apologize and I hope you'll come visit again and and and then I can accord you a royal reception. So obviously this is not the time for the person to be even mentioning even in context of apologizing even in the context of confessing this isn't the time and place to to mention such a thing to mention such a something which is which is so degrading when the when the king is being coronated is is it's totally out of place. So that explains why we can't and don't have Viduy as it's indicated in the Machzor and the Arizal even used to skip the first Avinu Malkeinu chatanu lefanecha even even that according to the nusach ha'Arizal one should not say because we don't talk about chet on Rosh Hashanah because it's a contradiction to Malchios. Okay but that doesn't sort of resolve the paradox of so how do we function on a Yom Hadin when as it were our hands are tied in in terms of the process of Teshuvah and and qualifying for kapparah? Without Viduy so then there's no there's no kapparah so our hands are our hands are tied. L'chora what you'd have to say what you'd have to say is that on Rosh Hashanah because it's a day and time of Malchios so the Malchios substitutes for the normal expression of Teshuvah and Viduy. אמרו לפני מלכויות כדי שתמליכוני עליכם. If a person is is really zocheh to do that, so אין לך תשובה גדולה מזו which again it very much jives with what the Chovos HaLevavos is saying. טעם התשובה הוא הסכנת אדם עבודת הבורא יתברך. So you have Malchios, ein hachi nami so he's not expressing the הסכנת אדם עבודת הבורא that I regret the chatonim that I did and I'm not going to return to this chet. Ein hachi nami that renewed commitment is not being expressed in that form in the form that it must be expressed at all other times of of the year but you understand how on Rosh Hashanah so then okay so it's a there's a parallel track there's a parallel track. I think maybe what's the name of the Slonimer Rebbe's sefer? Nesivos Shalom? Yeah, Nesivos Shalom, okay. I think he talks about this, if I'm not mistaken. Not about Chovos HaLevavos, but this general idea, maybe in terms of Rosh Hashanah, I think he may have it. Okay, a little bit more here.

ואמר בביאור מעשה התשובה שטעם התשובה הוא הסכמת האדם על עבודת הבורא יתברך אחר יציאתו ממנה בחטא או בו.

Maybe those two phrases, I think one of the meforshim suggests, one refers to neglecting asei, the other refers to actively being over a lo sa'aseh. How did cheit result? אם בעבור סכלותו באלוקים ובענייני עבודתו. That's cause number one. That a person has no musagim. Either he has no musagim about Hakadosh Baruch Hu and because of that he has no yiras shamayim, or not adequate yiras shamayim, or he has no musagim in what avodas hashem means and that it needs to translate into dikduk bemitzvos. You hear people who unfortunately sort of illustrate this סכלותו באלוקים ובענייני עבודתו, you know, does God really care about, you know, A, B, or C and then there's dinim in the Shulchan Aruch. That's what the Chovos HaLevavos is telling us: סכלותו באלוקים ובענייני עבודתו, או שגבר יצרו על שכלו. No, it's not that the person doesn't know what's right. He knows what's right, but the yetzer overcomes us. או להתעלמותו ממה שהוא חייב בו לאלוקים. No, it's not sort of this overarching סכלותו באלוקים ובענייני עבודתו, but it's ignorance in a particular area of halachos and umimeila he ends up being shogeg. ובעבור התחברותו לחברים רעים. He attaches himself to the wrong crowd and therefore pituhu vechato ba'avorum and he goes along with their behavior.

וכיוצא בזה וכיוצא בזה כמו שאמר החכם בני אם יפתוך חטאים אל תבא ואמר ירא את ה' בני ומלך עם שונים אל תתערב.

Now, in the psicha, the Chovos HaLevavos, as we discussed, also talks about the virtual, not actual, but almost inevitability of cheit and says, this would be the opening lines in the psicha that we saw:

מה שמצאנו על האדם מהשתנות טבעיו והבדל שורשי הרכבתו והתהפכות מידות נפשו וסיבת תנועתו.

Here the Chovos HaLevavos attributed cheit to sort of a natural instability, a natural lack of harmony that the person has, as we discussed there. Which corresponds, so in our list in perek rishon, גבר יצרו על שכלו very much corresponds to that. That is an example of השתנות טבעיו והבדל שורשי הרכבתו, etc. But all of a sudden here it's, other than that one correspondence, it's a totally different list. So the answer is very simple. In the psicha, the Chovos HaLevavos is explaining why cheit, why a tzaddik gamur who never does a cheit is such a rare, rare, rare phenomenon because a person miteva isn't harmonious. And because of that, that lack of harmony results in a lack of consistency. In perek rishon, he's not talking about why cheit is almost inevitable. He's talking about befo'al. When you go to the world, you see cheit happening, this is why cheit happens. He's not telling us this is why a person miteva briaso meharechem is that it's overwhelmingly likely that he will be chotei. No, that's the explanation in In the psicha. Here he's talking about something different, it's the befoal. He says why do people sin? So here already he's not giving, so here there's a much... there's a longer list and where he refers to other causes. The Rambam has a similar discussion and what the Rambam doesn't include is בעבור התחברותו לחברים רעים. And the pashtus is that I don't know... it's a little... I don't know. I'll certainly just sort of just have the beginning of the analysis, the beginning of the thought process and leave it there. So the Rambam writes in Perek Vav of De'os Halacha Aleph, De'os Vav Aleph:

דרך בריאתו של אדם להיות נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחרי רעיו וחבריו ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו.

Human nature is such that a person in terms of his character traits, in terms of his behavior, is influenced, is drawn after the people with whom he keeps company, the society in which he lives.

לפיכך צריך אדם להתחבר לצדיקים ולישב אצל החכמים תמיד כדי שילמד ממעשיהם.

So therefore a person is supposed to connect himself to tzadikim. He's supposed to keep company with chachamim constantly. And on the other hand, ויתרחק מן הרשעים ההולכים בחושך כדי שלא ילמד ממעשיהם. So for the Rambam the עצם התחברות לחברים רעים is already chet. Is already a chet. I mean Chovos Halevavos, you know, is sort of viewing it in terms of the follow-up chata'im. You know, the follow-up chata'im, so this is the goreim. And that's true, but you can also see that someone wouldn't list that as one of the root causes of chet, because that gufo is already chet. That the company that a person chooses to keep, the influences that a person knowingly, consciously opens himself up to, so that gufo is governed by mitzvah and aveira. Okay, stop there.